


JPRS-UMA-91-021  
7 AUGUST 1991



# ***JPRS Report***



# **Soviet Union**

## ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-021

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7 August 1991

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### Gorbachev Signs Marshal Boychuk's Obituary

91UM0727A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jun 91 First Edition p 8

[Obituary: "Marshal of Artillery Yefim Vasilyevich Boychuk"]

[Text] Marshal of Artillery Yefim Vasilyevich Boychuk, famous Soviet military commander, participant in the Great Patriotic War, and Hero of Socialist Labor, passed on after a prolonged and difficult illness. He departed this life as a true son of the Soviet people who devoted his entire adult life to selfless service to the homeland and the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1942.

Ye.V. Boychuk was born 24 December 1918 in the village of Yukhimovtsa, Chernooostrovskiy Rayon, Khmel'nitskiy Oblast into the family of a worker. In 1937, after graduating from a technical secondary school, he voluntarily joined the ranks of the Soviet Army and progressed from student in a military service school to marshal of artillery. From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War Ye.V. Boychuk was in field units on the Northwestern, second Belorussian, second Ukrainian, and Transbaykal fronts. He was commander of a battery and a division and chief of staff of a regiment and an artillery brigade, demonstrating boldness, personal courage, and valor.

In the postwar period he commanded a regiment and a brigade, and he was chief of an artillery technical school and the commander of a corps. He occupied a number of important posts in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and he headed a main directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense for a long time. Since 1985 he has been the military inspector-adviser of the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In all areas of his work he devoted his strength, knowledge, experience, and organizational skills to the job of strengthening the defense of the country and increasing the combat readiness of the troops, and he devoted much attention to questions of training and educating the personnel under his command. He was distinguished by his great responsibility, competency, adherence to principle in the resolution of tasks, and modesty, the demands he made on himself and others, his considerate and respectful treatment of people, and his activity in the social and political life of the country.

The homeland has greatly appreciated the services of Ye.V. Boychuk. He was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, two orders of Lenin, and many other state decorations, as well as orders and medals of foreign states.

We will always preserve the bright memory of Yefim Vasilyevich in our hearts.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, G.I. Yanayev, A.I. Lukyanov, V.S. Pavlov, V.A. Ivashko, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, M.A. Moiseyev, K.A. Kochetov, N.I. Shlyaga, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M.

Tretyak, Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Chernavin, V.M. Shuralev, V.M. Arkhipov, V.P. Mironov, V.A. Achalov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, V.F. Yermakov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, N.B. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, B.P. Bugayev, I.G. Pavlovskiy, V.M. Shabanov, A.N. Soshnikov, V.I. Gerasimov.

### GlavPUR Officials Answer Journalists' Questions

91UM0697B Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 6, Mar 91 (signed to press 13 Mar 91)  
pp 59-64

[Press conference by Colonel General A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate; Major General Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbachev, chief of Organizational-Party Work Directorate of USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate; Major General B. Golyshev, first deputy chief of USSR KGB Border Guard Troops Political Directorate; Major General A. Kirilyuk, first deputy chief of USSR MVD Internal Security Forces Political Directorate; and Colonel K. Voronovich, chief of Organizational-Party Department, Railroad Troops Political Directorate; material prepared by Viktor Firsov, USSR Central Committee Press Center, under rubric "Pertinent Dialogues": "Common Pain and Hope"]

[Text] A meeting was held in the CPSU Central Committee Press Center with Soviet and foreign journalists by representatives of the USSR Armed Forces political leadership. Taking part in the meeting were Colonel General A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate; Major General A. Gorbachev, chief of Organizational-Party Work Directorate of USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate; Major General B. Golyshev, first deputy chief of USSR KGB Border Guard Troops Political Directorate; Major General A. Kirilyuk, first deputy chief of USSR MVD Internal Security Forces Political Directorate; and Colonel K. Voronovich, chief of Organizational-Party Department, Railroad Troops Political Directorate.

Opening the meeting, Ovchinnikov emphasized that before Article 6 of the USSR Constitution was abolished, political entities in the Armed Forces were CPSU entities which, under party Central Committee leadership, conducted and were responsible for its policy in the Armed Forces. Political entities presently are being reformed as military-political entities. It is a question here not of a name change, but of a profound, radical reform. The military-political structures and military-political entities being newly created are guided by resolutions of Congresses of People's Deputies, other legislative measures, presidential ukases, government instructions, as well as orders and instructions of corresponding commanders. Along with other military leadership entities, they are called upon to conduct state policy in the sphere of national defense and security. They are responsible above all for the personnel's education, discipline and political-moral state. They use political means to ensure fulfillment of Armed Forces combat readiness and combat training missions. Finally,



together with other entities they are called upon to provide servicemen's social-legal protection.

These new functions of political entities naturally presume their thorough reorganization. They are being created on the basis of the Armed Forces table of organization structure and will function under the direction of corresponding commanders. The Main Military-Political Directorate will begin to function under the direction of the Minister of Defense.

That briefly is the range of responsibility of military-political entities and tasks stemming therefrom. What will happen to party structures in the Army? They previously operated under the direction of political entities. Party structures being established in the Armed Forces today first of all become independent and secondly they become elective from bottom to top, from the primary party organization to the All-Service Party Committee which is being established in the Armed Forces and which will become an elective entity based on corresponding requirements of the CPSU Bylaws.

The question naturally arises: If party organizations now are independent, what positions will they defend, whose will will they fulfill, and what tasks will face them? The basic positions on this question are set forth in the published CPSU Central Committee Instruction on Work of CPSU Organizations in the Armed Forces. It should be emphasized, said Colonel General Ovchinnikov, that one of the principal tasks facing party organizations and all people wearing shoulderboards is to be in constant readiness to defend our Motherland. That is the most important task for Army party members and party officials, and they will proceed from this in their work.

**[BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY]** Have conditions been established in the Army for cells of other parties to appear in it? In general how do you regard the possibility of other parties appearing in the Army? And further, until recently there was a provision in the USSR Armed Forces Regulation according to which the CPSU directs the Army. Has this provision been retained in the Armed Forces Regulation or not?

**[Ovchinnikov]** There are for now no other party structures in the Armed Forces except the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and it would probably be naive to expect that we would artificially urge people to establish other party structures. I believe there must be clarity and precision in this matter. I will say the following with respect to the assertion that the Armed Forces are guided by CPSU decisions: the USSR Armed Forces always acted on the basis of an appropriate law of the country, which previously specified that the CPSU was the guiding and directing structure in society. Today our state's Armed Forces operate on the basis of the Constitution in accordance with legislation.

**[USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]** If we are speaking of a division of functions of political entities and party organizations in the Armed Forces, it is strange to see only representatives of political entities here without a single representative of party

organizations. Does this mean that representatives of all political entities are part of the leadership of party organizations? And the second question: Who finances the activity of party organizations in the Armed Forces and who pays, for example, for TDY trips of CPSU Central Committee members who are servicemen to party Central Committee plenums?

**[Ovchinnikov]** In fact, basically representatives of military-political entities who represent military-political structures have come to meet with the journalists today, but also among us is Major General Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbachev, who is a member of the Coordination Committee for Preparing and Conducting Reports and Elections to USSR Armed Forces Party Organizations and for Conducting the All-Service Party Conference, which will be held 29-30 March. Well, he deals purely with party questions and structures.

All pay and salaries of freed-up party organization secretaries as well as everything connected with the activity of party structures in the Army now is done from party funds. There is an account for this in the Main Military-Political Directorate to which transfers are made from party publications in accordance with party Central Committee decisions.

**[Spanish correspondent]** Won't the presence of different parties in the Armed Forces interfere with unity, solidarity and subordination in the Armed Forces? Second question: Many aspects of the life of Soviet society, the future of the Soviet Union, socialism, the market economy and so on today are matters of acute political discussions and at times polar interpretations. Considering that only one party structure exists in the Armed Forces, MVD and KGB, won't this lead to other viewpoints being ignored and torn away?

**[Ovchinnikov]** There is for now no multiparty system in the Army. We will see what happens. It is important that all party structures operate in unison and be tuned to the same frequency, which is for one-man command and a commander's order to remain the law for a subordinate in the Army, as is true in the army of any state. If each party struggles to see that a member of its organization sets an example in fulfilling military duty and, moreover, if each member of any party becomes a model in the moral sense, then we will have no special problems.

**[Golyshev]** It seems to me that the essence of your second question is as follows: Aren't there internal contradictions in the Army, particularly in Border Guard Troops, regarding military service and processes occurring in our country, including the market? And will they appear if other parties appear? I must say that views in the Border Guard Troops are rather settled. The personnel, privates, sergeants, seamen, petty officers and officers as a whole perceive and evaluate processes occurring in the country, including the inevitability of a market, in a like manner. With respect to other parties, such structures have not appeared in the Border Guard Troops for now, but this evidently also is natural. Insofar as I am familiar with programs of other parties, they have not expressed

themselves precisely with respect to national defense, strengthening of the Armed Forces and other Army processes, although one would like them to. I will cite the following instance as an example. One serviceman from a Border Guard detachment declared that he was a Democratic Party representative. Naturally no one persecuted him and he himself did not conduct any active work. The only thing relating to him was the delivery to the unit of a packet of newspapers, which in the spirit of the market he tried to sell, not forgetting his own pocket here. This incident did not generate any special reaction in anyone.

**[NOVOSTI INFORMATION AGENCY]** Party organizations in the Army were mentioned here, but unfortunately nothing was said as to what kind of structure Army party organizations have? How many party members are there in them? How did those negative processes occurring in our civilian party organizations affect them? Did they affect the moral and ethical state of Army party members and are there great losses in connection with a departure from CPSU ranks?

**[Ovchinnikov]** There is a detachment of a million party members in the USSR Armed Forces consolidated in primary organizations, which total approximately 37,000. Over 10,000 party groups, shop party organizations, and organizations with the right of accepting CPSU members function in the lower echelons. Like all the country, the CPSU and Armed Forces party organizations are experiencing a difficult time. The overall situation affects the mood of Army party members. But I can say to you with all responsibility that Army party organizations as well as the party as a whole, it would appear, already have passed the crisis. The influx of new replacements to CPSU ranks is proof of this. In 1990 3.7 percent more joined the ranks of Army party members than in 1989. In numbers this is more than 40,000 party members. I also will say that 25,000 out of 41,000 joined CPSU ranks following the 28th CPSU Congress. Here is one more fact. If we take indicators of acceptance into the CPSU in proportion to those who have left, the number of those who have joined is 19 percent more than the number who have left CPSU ranks. If we speak of losses of Army party organizations, a departure is observed, but it is approximately 5-7 times less than compared with civilian party organizations.

Our departure from the party was 3.4 percent of the party members. By this I wish to say that lately (and this was confirmed once again by report-election meetings and party conferences which have been held) a trend is seen toward consolidation of Army party ranks and there has been less of a craze for meetings and euphoria and more constructive proposals. We essentially have completed reports and elections at lower echelons. There alone, party members expressed more than 18,000 critical comments and suggestions aimed basically not at criticism of higher-ups, but at constructive work to renew and transform party work.

**[Radio "Moscow Echo"]** Do political entities examine questions of religion in the Army? Is establishment of a chaplains service planned, for example?

**[Ovchinnikov]** The plans of the Main Military-Political Directorate do not provide for going to the country's President with a proposal to establish military chaplains, but we regard religion as the Law on Freedom of Conscience prescribes for us. By the way, everything is spelled out there for the military. We regard this question calmly and in a rather qualified manner without making any tragedies out of it and without hanging any kind of labels on anyone. I had to serve for a long time in the East, and the familiar expression from the film "White Sun of the Desert" is very understandable to me. Do you remember? "The East is a delicate matter." Religion too is a delicate matter. It is another matter that there are forces urging us to oppose people of a different religious direction in the enlisted environment. This of course is inadmissible. Therefore we believe that we will not make rooms for performing ceremonies in soldier barracks. With respect to use of free time for this, as stated in the Law, this is a matter of conscience of the servicemen themselves.

**[Polish journal SPOTKANYA]** How do CPSU party organizations in the Armed Forces regard organizations such as Shchit and committees of soldiers' mothers? Further, how do party organizations, especially in units of the Western Group of Forces, regard such phenomena as desertion? Insofar as we know, no fewer than 150 of such instances already have occurred.

**[Ovchinnikov]** Speaking of the attitude toward the Shchit organization, I would refer to our party documents, which state that party structures, operating within the framework of the law on public associations, are ready to work together with organizations of socialist choice and with those which advance constructive goals. Therefore where this provision is observed we unquestionably are undertaking dialogue and contacts. But we unquestionably condemn attempts aimed at splitting and undermining party unity. Based on this, the activity of the Shchit organization is coming under serious criticism by Army party members.

Speaking of the movement of soldiers' mothers, we are its active supporters. I myself am a member of a special commission established by the country's President and have been working in it for two and a half months now. I will say to you that those proposals with which the soldiers' mothers are coming forth, above all concerning public coordination with military contingents to improve servicemen's social protection and to give guarantees, can only be welcomed. Therefore I would answer both of your questions as follows: we have a major dialogue and constructive work ahead of us which unquestionably will bring results.

About desertion. Yes, there are such facts. They are reflected in the mass media. These instances are not a

deep secret, but I believe we regard this like normal people and believe it is a small flock that has no black sheep.

**[Irish newspaper IRISH TIMES]** Can an officer become a colonel or general if he is not a party member? What I mean is, does every officer in the Army have to be a party member or not?

**[Ovchinnikov]** No, this is not mandatory. Party affiliation is not a basis for conferring or not conferring the next military rank.

**[Spanish journal ABC]** What are the sentiments that now exist in the Armed Forces concerning events in certain Union republics, particularly regarding what occurred recently in Lithuania?

**[Ovchinnikov]** Sentiments in the Armed Forces connected with inter-ethnic conflicts are not simple ones. If we attempt somehow to consolidate and group them, one should point out above all the very grave impression left by actions of the leadership of individual republics who grossly trample on all conventions on human rights and freedoms concluded by the Soviet Union. Everything possible and impossible is being done, especially in republics of the Baltic, to degrade servicemen and place them in a category of "third class" citizens. The sons and grandsons of those fathers who died in the Baltic fighting fascism now are being called occupiers. There is probably no greater treachery for the world community than to regard one's army so abusively and humiliatingly. There are those sentiments in the Baltic.

I would like to direct your attention to this: just as it is impossible to consider it normal when Americans bomb and leave peaceful residents without shelter and food, so it is impossible to consider normal the actions where Landsbergis and his team leave the country's servicemen without shelter, food, kindergartens and schools. Therefore I believe it must be clear to those present what the Soviet Army's attitude is toward such legislative measures in these republics. Occupiers do not live under such conditions. Occupiers always enjoy the best.

**[Kirilyuk]** A few words about the Internal Security Forces. I will say frankly that the personnel have a good understanding of those processes occurring in the republics. They understand it above all because commanders, political officers and party organizations are constantly working with the personnel, but reality around us itself is the chief convincing argument for our officers and men. When they all see with their own eyes and experience for themselves the consequences of provocative actions, ill-conceived decisions, shooting, attacks, and other actions inadmissible in a normal civilized society, all this naturally cannot help but generate anything except indignation.

At the same time I would note that Internal Security Forces personnel, who have a good understanding of processes which are occurring, always come to the defense of public order and of those people whose rights

are being infringed in a particular republic despite difficulties and complications of service, at times defending them at the cost of their own lives. It is common knowledge that we have suffered losses in the last few years: in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Fergana, Azerbaijan, Armenia and other regions of the Union. Today it is hard to name an area where it is not difficult for our private, sergeant and officer.

But I will re-emphasize that the Internal Security Forces realize full well that in today's difficult situation they are needed for defense of people's constitutional rights and therefore will continue to fulfill government decisions aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country.

**[Newspaper MOLOD UKRAINY]** Speaking recently at a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session, Vitold Fokin, the head of our government, remarked that sooner or later the Ukraine will be faced with the need to establish its own Armed Forces. Legislation already is being worked out in Georgia about a call-up into the Internal Security Forces and National Guard of this republic. And many such examples can be cited for all republics. Sooner or later we will be faced with the need to establish some kind of national armed units. It would be interesting to learn how the Political Directorate regards this fact. Does it regard it as inevitable and will it somehow fight this phenomenon? And the second question: Do you deem it possible to establish party cells in the Army for organizations functioning in the republics such as the Ukrainian Republic Party, Lithuanian Democratic Party and many others?

**[Ovchinnikov]** Lately there has been much said and written about establishing republic armies. In this question one must proceed from what we are making the basis and what we wish to have from our multiethnic state. If we do not wish to have a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but something else, then let us think about republic Army subunits and independent armies. But if we intend to preserve a unified Union based on the Union Treaty (the draft of which, as we know, was published in the press) and if we consolidate in a renewed federation, then of course there can be no question of any separate, independent armed organizations which would not operate under the direction of a unified commander such as a minister of defense or minister of armed forces. We believe that this would be a return to the 9th or 10th centuries when every prince in Kievan Rus had bodyguards which fought among themselves; not against a single, common enemy, but among themselves. The very same also can occur here if we follow this path. Of course in concluding a Union Treaty we must stipulate what rights the republics delegate to the center, and the first of such rights must be the establishment and direction of a unionwide army.

We will proceed in precise accordance with the law with respect to the activity of different party structures such as Rukh or any other formations in military subunits. If these organizations function in accordance with the Constitution, this is one thing. It is another thing when they begin to adhere (such as the Shchit organization, for example) to a position that there must be no one-man



command in the Army, there must be no obedience to commanders and so on. Of course, such parties and such associations are unacceptable for the Army inasmuch as they are anticonstitutional.

[TASS Military-Political Editorial Office] There are many small subunits and separately stationed zastavas in Border Guard Troops and Internal Security Forces where party organizations are small. They previously had complete communication with local political entities, but now there is no such contact in some republics and regions or it has become considerably weakened because of the processes occurring there. In what way does this affect the activity of these small party organizations?

[Golyshev] I am not about to assert that contacts have been weakened. The size of party organizations or, more accurately, party groups has decreased somewhat in our zastavas, but at the same time we are maintaining close, good, firm ties with local soviet, party and Komsomol organizations just as we did before. Moreover, I must say that party groups and party organizations in a number of Border Guard detachments have increased in the last year. We have Border Guard detachments where not one person left the party. And under the difficult conditions of Central Asia, for example, we have a detachment guarding the state border in the Kushka area in which we see a growth of party ranks. This is also occurring in a number of Border Guard units of the Baltic, on the border with Iran and in units which are disposed in the southern part of Azerbaijan. Some kind of difficulties possibly will appear in time, but for now we are maintaining good contacts and the population is giving us great assistance in guarding the state border.

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### Soviet POWs Said Held in Afghanistan

91UM0716C Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 11, Mar 91 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Soviet POWs in Afghanistan: Eighteen More Found"; first paragraph is GLASNOST introduction]

[Text] About 100 Soviet servicemen who fell into the hands of the Afghan armed resistance at one time or another are alive and a part of mujahedeen detachments in various areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thirty-five of them are kept permanently on Afghan territory.

This information, obtained by Soviet journalists in a conversation with Zakhir Abdul Sattar, who is secretary of the Afghan Interdepartmental Commission for Search and Release of Servicemen held by the opposition, was relayed from Kabul by a TASS correspondent.

Four Soviet prisoners-of-war were returned to the Motherland last year with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. Under way is a search for several more men. The commission was able to locate 6,077 Afghan prisoners-of-war, of which 987 have been released.

Efforts of the commission's members have produced the exact locations and names of 18 Soviet servicemen being held prisoner. The development of this kind of information requires exhaustive and painstaking work, for most of the Soviet soldiers suffering the misfortune have been distributed over distant villages and have long since adopted Muslim names, acquired a family, raised children, and took on the style of living of the Afghans, now differing little from them. There are virtually no POWs as such, that is, in the sense of being confined in prison or under guard. Most of them enjoy relative freedom of movement and live in housing provided them, although a form of control over them does exist.

In the environment of the continuing war in Afghanistan, the soldiers often express distrust of anyone who offers to return them to the Soviet Union. Not often helpful in this regard are letters of guarantee from the Soviet Embassy containing the text of the USSR Supreme Soviet ukase on amnesty for servicemen taken prisoner by the mujahedeen, with an offer of return to the Motherland. In this case, our former soldiers are handed letters from their parents and audio tapes carrying messages from their mothers and fathers.

The problem of Soviet servicemen has recently become highly politicized. Leaders of the armed opposition are taking advantage of the Soviet Union's interest in the release of its citizens by setting forth political demands, going as far as cessation of aid to the Republic of Afghanistan, in exchange for the prisoners-of-war. This does much to complicate the work of the commission, which considers the POW problem to be purely humanitarian.

The question of Soviet servicemen buried on Afghan soil has until recently not been raised in the USSR. Graves of this kind do exist, and a great deal of work must be accomplished to find and return the remains of fallen soldiers to the Motherland. In addition, in the Soviet Union there is no single coordinating center that could take up the issue of prisoners-of-war and graves of Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan.

### Afghan Vets' Group Chief Interviewed

91UM0710A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 20, 25-31 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Kovalevskiy by Sergey Mikhaylov under the rubric "Mercy": "Vladimir Kovalevskiy: 'God Helps Those Who Help Others'"]

[Text] He is a colonel and a candidate of economic sciences. Actually, a former colonel. The verdict reached by a comrades' court of officers' honor at the Academy imeni Frunze states: "Colonel Kovalevskiy exhibits immaturity as an instructor, ...makes ambiguous critical judgments of the Soviet government's military-political actions. He has gone so far as to compare the presence of our forces in Afghanistan with the U.S. actions in Vietnam...." Two years before retirement Kovalevskiy was discharged from the army "for discrediting the great title of a Soviet officer."

**Vladimir Kovalevskiy is presently in charge of the Alliance of Democratic Afghan Veterans imeni A.D. Sakharov recently founded in Moscow.**

[Mikhaylov] Vladimir Antonovich, you fought in Afghanistan, but despite this you are still founding the Afghan Veterans' Alliance....

[Kovalevskiy] I have always felt guilty before these young men, involuntarily drawn into a political disaster, crippled physically and psychologically. By organizing the Alliance I wanted to help them rid themselves of the heinous burden of awareness of their participation in someone else's crime and return to the forgotten way and rhythm of civilian life. A psychologically broken person, you know, continues to be crippled when he returns to our impoverished milieu. This is where we should seek the roots of the fact that the Afghan veterans, the best people as a rule, cleansed of the scum of the war itself, plunge into racketeering and become accomplices of the Mafia. They finally have a way to take revenge against a society from which they receive not the slightest bit of sympathy.

[Mikhaylov] Once again, this suggests a comparison with America.

[Kovalevskiy] Yes, the Americans not only acknowledge their guilt before the Vietnam veterans but are actually helping them. Psychological rehabilitation centers have been set up, and the former soldiers are granted benefits with which ours in no way compare. No complete list of our benefits has ever been published, even though the decree was passed by the Council of Ministers back in January 1983. Most of our boys therefore do not know what they are actually entitled to. This is in contrast to the generals who visited Kabul for a couple of days.

[Mikhaylov] The name of your Alliance does not contain the traditional terms "soldier/internationalist" or "military-patriotic." Does this reflect a position?

[Kovalevskiy] Our movement is based on a view which differs from the official view. We proceed from the premise that the boys were following the letter of the military oath and performing their military duty, and not their international duty at all. With respect the term "military-patriotic," it is not a part of our name because we do not want and do not intend to develop militarists.

[Mikhaylov] I understand that your activities center around a broad economic program. Is that so?

[Kovalevskiy] Yes, we call it altruistic commerce or charitable business. God, after all, helps only those who help others. Our concept is to earn more in order to give more to the general fund to aid those in need.

We have presently reached an agreement to obtain from abroad several vans specially equipped as shops, in which only the disabled will work, even as chauffeurs. They will be a sort of mobile vehicle-repair shops. It has become customary here for the disabled to spend all their lives gluing boxes together or putting in window panes.

We talk about political rehabilitation. This is indisputably important, but we must not forget also about social rehabilitation. Incidentally, prior to the mid-'50s we had a fairly well developed system of special enterprises for the disabled. The Alliance has already built several small shops for the disabled in Lipetsk, Murmansk and Lvov. For now each one employs only five or six people, but this is only the beginning.

We want to open a pharmacy in Moscow under the auspices of the Red Cross for the Afghan veterans, with branches in various cities in the nation. We will be helped by sympathetic people in Germany. They will assume most of the cost and provide some of the goods.

[Mikhaylov] How are relations developing with the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR?

[Kovalevskiy] We have found a common language with the Moscow deputies' group and with "Democratic Russia." At the request of the deputies' group we, together with specialists, are conducting an expert assessment of the state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the MVD's Internal [Security] Troops. We are also preparing a draft military reform plan.

[Mikhaylov] I recently learned of the establishment, under the Alliance's banner, of the Fund imeni Disgraced General Petr Grigorenko, who was demoted to private, designated as mentally ill and forced to abandon the homeland in his declining years for criticizing the existing system.

[Kovalevskiy] We established this fund to assist servicemen who have suffered at various times for their political views and convictions. The fund's Presidential Council includes A. Pristavkin, Yu. Lyubimov, Yu. Shchekochikhin, Z. Gerd, Yu. Chernenko....

#### **Kyrgyzstan Military Commissar Interviewed**

*91UM0771A Bishkek KOMSOMOLETS KIRGIZII  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 5*

[Interview with Colonel V.N. Karabanov, military commissar of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, by the newspaper's stringer, Ye. Karpova: "The Army Should Assume Its Place in Society"]

[Text]

[Karpova] In no society has there ever been any doubt that every man should be not only a creator but also a defender. With good reason, since ancient times the peoples of all countries and continents have taught their young men not only to plow, to sow, to tend livestock, to build housing, but also to master arms in order to be able to defend their heart, their family and motherland....

Why then in our country is the profession of the military presently not held in honor? Why do more and more young men refuse to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army and in every possible way seek to avoid induction? They, like their parents, would like to believe that an age of disarmament and business-like collaboration has

begun in the world. Or that the state which has set out on the path of democratization would never allow a repetition of the lamentable experience of the existence of "limited contingents" which provided "fraternal" armed aid to the peoples of neighboring countries. The government is intentionally moving to reduce armaments and personnel, it is withdrawing the groups of Soviet Forces from the Eastern European countries. Why then would a young person exchange for two whole years fashionable running shoes for military tarpaulin soldier boots and "baggy pants" for "army fatigues"?

We asked the Military Commissar of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Colonel V.N. Karabanov, to answer these and a number of other questions.

[Karabanov] From all the rostrums, whether it be the Union, the republic, the democrats are arguing for freedom, ensuring the constitutional rights of the citizens, the flourishing of the state and a reduction in the size of the army. Possibly a reduction is necessary but not the complete elimination of the army. As long as the state exists, the army is indispensable.

It is true that among the civilian population there is at times a negative attitude toward the army. It is the army formations which are sent by the government to impose order in the individual regions of the nation and for settling interethnic conflicts. Yes, people are killed here. The victims are both the military, the instigators of the disorders as well as the completely innocent public. Nevertheless in the narrow sense, it is impossible to view the attitude of the people to the army generally.

The army carries out the will of the government. The people choose the government. Consequently, indirectly the army carries out the expression of the people's will. Unfortunately, from this also stems the reverse pattern that it is again the people who pay for the errors of the government.

Over the decades we have been inculcated with the view of the approach of a cloudless, bright future, although no one actually predicted in a realistic manner in what way it could be achieved. Only the five years of new thinking have altered our mind. We, the people of the older generation, in having these old notions and in gaining the attributes of the new, have an opportunity to compare and analyze the occurring processes, drawing our own conclusions in this.

But what about the young, those who are now 18-20 years of age? Unformed in both moral and physical terms and unable to acquire experience in life, they have fallen under a powerful shower of contradictory opinions on all areas of life. The old ideals have been overthrown but new ones have not been established. With each passing day, it turns out that the entire course of our history has been a solid line of errors and crimes committed by the government against the people. There has been the same babble of opinions over army problems. It is difficult for the politicians to figure things out. But not for yesterday's schoolchildren. The army is a very complex organism and not merely a mighty arsenal holding

modern weapons. While agriculture and industry in the absence of discipline can stumble on, the army without discipline simply collapses. It is said that the army indoctrinates and disciplines. But, unfortunately, in the majority the educating of the man here must start from scratch. What sort of young man is coming into the army? I feel that he can be described briefly. He is a person accustomed to comfort and in no way wishes to part with this. But the army is also hardship. Who wants voluntarily to subject himself to this? And let us add here the antimilitary propaganda which a number of the Baltic and Transcaucasus Republics have instigated. Over the last year or two this has reached its apogee.

As it was to turn out, the government decree on deferring induction for active military service of the students did us a bad service. To a large degree this undermined the defense capability of the nation as there was absolutely no compensation for deferring the induction of students. The decree merely impelled the heart-sick parents to seek out all sorts of escape hatches in order to get their offspring to study in institutions of higher learning. It did not make any difference which ones, as long as they did not go into the army. And so began the bribes, the notorious influence peddling and "telephone law." This is where social injustice has triumphed.... No matter how bitter it may seem, but judging from the polls and the questionnaire data from the fellows called up for service, a majority of them comes from families with little means. The army in the immediate sense of the word has become worker-peasant. It takes no clever thinking to realize that the VUZ is becoming a strong shield protecting the children from well-off families, the scientific and creative intelligentsia and the party and soviet workers from army service. I feel that in time we will publish data about what proportions there are for children of rural workers, industrial workers and people from the above-listed categories studying in the VUZes.

[Karpova] You served in Afghanistan and commanded a regiment; did you notice there such social injustice in terms of the soldiers called up to provide international aid?

[Karabanov] I personally do not know of a single instance when, for instance, the son of the first secretary of a party raykom was called up for service in Afghanistan. I would not assert that the children of families from the representatives of the superior levels of authority were not called up to the Republic of Afghanistan. Only in my regiment there were no such young persons.... At the same time, I would like to say that the sons of the senior officers and generals served on equal footing with all in Afghanistan.

[Karpova] You have focused attention on the fact that many fellows endeavor to get into an institute merely to avoid army service. But certainly in a VUZ does not a student have to study military affairs in one way or another....

[Karabanov] I do not feel that exercises on a military chair can be compared with regular service. Moreover,



there is an order of the USSR Ministry of Defense that the students themselves are to determine whether they will study military affairs or not. Although experience shows that they do not avoid studying on the military chair. It seems to me that this does not happen because the fellows are trying to understand something in the area of military art. More probably they are forced to study there again out of personal consideration. Judge for yourself: if a student refuses to attend the exercises, then probably after completing the VUZ he will head into the army as induction age is up to the age of 27. Secondly, study on the military chair provides definite advantages. Among other things, in contrast to the officer candidates of the military schools, yesterday's student upon completing the VUZ receives an officer rank. And upon his request, if things do not go well on the job in his specialty, he can go serve in the army or the police. And so it turns out, however you look at it, it is advantageous to study in the VUZ.

[Karpova] I agree with you that the people who are "well off" who have a position in society and hold leading positions and posts endeavor to protect their children from harsh army discipline, a meager diet and the other attributes of field life. But nevertheless I feel that not all the fellows are afraid of precisely the difficulties and hardships. Many simply fear the hazing and all those humiliations which the senior servicemen cause for the young soldiers....

[Karabanov] Yes, often the army is seen by the draftees through the prism of stories told by already demobilized comrades. As some octopus which chokes the young soldier with its tentacles of improper relations. I feel that here a definite role can be played by our press which has one-sidedly dealt with the army problems, soldier life and service.

But certainly not all army life is made up of facts shown in the film "Do It Once" or in the story "One Hundred Days to the Order." Understand that I do not seek to embellish army life or am attempting to play down the harm caused by improper relations. Yes, this hazing does exist. And would it not exist if our entire society had not stratified? The real battle is that the conservatives are fighting against the reformers and the representatives of one party are "warring" against the other. Interethnic conflict has grown stronger. The law enforcement bodies can no longer carry out their functions as in the nation it has become difficult to fight against thieves, rapists and swindlers. So how could there not be disorders in the army as it mirrors all the problems of civilian life. Coming to serve are the same fellows who just yesterday were noisily trying at street demonstrations to toss a Molotov cocktail.

They are the same fellows who out of boredom collar passersby and if they refuse to give a cigarette cruelly beat them until half dead. Those same fellows who in civilian life became addicted to drugs. Was it not the juveniles who took the most active part in the atrocities perpetrated in Sumgait, Baku and Osh...? Only a few of

them have been brought to court. A majority was protected from the law enforcement bodies by their preinduction age. Time runs on and just look, there is the rescuing notice from the military commissariat. It may be that the army educates and knocks sense into their head....

[Karpova] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich [Karabanov], are there many cases of refusal to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army in our republic? At present, many parents, seeing that the soldiers must placate extremists and bring order into areas where ethnic internecine warfare has broken out, are categorically against having their sons taken for active regular service.

[Karabanov] It must be said that in terms of the results of the autumn call-up, our republic holds a leading place in the nation. We are carrying out the orders given us by the USSR Council of Ministers and the general staff of the USSR Armed Forces. I am not afraid to appear as a bureaucrat in using the word "orders." It has quite a different meaning than the order which, for instance, for many years was put out upon admission to the party or Komsomol. In the army the number of inducted servicemen is of the most important strategic significance.

[Karpova] All the same, how can it be explained that our republic has no problems with induction for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army?

[Karabanov] I do not feel that any national traditions or education have played a role here.... I see the republic leadership as solely responsible for this. Both the prime minister, the president and the Supreme Soviet have correctly assessed the defense questions. In contrast to their Uzbek neighbors who have exaggerated the problem of calling up the local youth for serving only in their home areas. In the declaration adopted on republic sovereignty, we have delegated the defense functions to the USSR Ministry of Defense. It should be concerned with defense and all of us will help it in this.

[Karpova] What is your opinion of the opinions voiced here and there that there is no place for the military in the bodies of power as it is not so far from them to dictatorship or to a junta.

[Karabanov] Yes, there is such an opinion. I have not established, I admit, whether or not the international acts prohibit a person for entering parliament in uniform. But I am certain that persons in the military profession should participate in running the state. Since we are seeking a state under the law, then each person, regardless of the chosen profession or political views or faith, has the right to be elected to any public body. I understand this aspect as a democratic act. So why should discrimination be shown against the military?

Moreover, at present, it seems to many that the army should be depoliticized. I do not agree with this. Each person has the right to defend his own ideas and adhere to certain views....

[Karpova] You are a people's deputy and a member of the republic parliament. Previously, as far as I know, the

very position of military commissar assumed presence in the official state bodies.... Will you have to participate in an election campaign?

[Karabanov] In actuality, not so long ago official status determined one's presence in the structures of the bodies of power. Now it is a different matter. For example, I had a competitor, the chairman of the rayon executive committee. I went through all the stages of the preelection campaign, I spoke to the voters, I told about my plans and intentions and defended my platform....

I intended to begin my deputy activities by providing aid to the villagers and to fight to eradicating social injustice and improving the domestic conditions of the village inhabitants. But what happens? Chuyskiy Rayon, where my electoral district is located, is separated from Tokmak only by a symbolic frontier. But, as it turned out, their inhabitants are under different conditions. Neither ones in their maturity have private plots but, on the other hand, in distributing the food products the interests of the villagers are encroached on.

Quite near Chu runs a gas line but the housing must be heated with coal and firewood. The inhabitants have requested help in solving their most urgent problems although they should be resolved by the local rural soviets. So a lot of time is lost on this.

[Karpova] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, you are a member of the Commission on Youth Affairs of the Republic Supreme Soviet. What do you feel, how beneficial is its activity?

[Karabanov] It has been in existence now for a year and has worked on developing a state youth program which would bring together all aspects of the life and activities of young people and would bring together all the youth organizations and movements into a single structure. For now they are split....

However, these are questions crucial for all categories of the youth. For example, the young family. Everywhere they are similar—both in the city and in the countryside.... Or the problem of providing amenities for those young men and women who are forced to live far from home. I have in mind the condition of dormitories, be they worker or student. The commission members have investigated the conditions for residing in many of them. Of course, the impression is disheartening. Just tell me how can a student or a young worker get by without watching television? And in a majority of the surveyed dormitories there are no television sets. Nor are there proper amenities. There has been extremely little money allocated for their upkeep and there is no capital funds. The situation is also bad with furniture.

The commission has been searching for a reply to the proposal made by the republic government for attracting young persons of the indigenous nationality for working at the industrial enterprises. As is known, only from 5 to 30 percent of them remain at the plants and production associations. How can they be kept on, how can they be interested? Of course, only by creating dignified living

conditions, conditions for study and recreation. Only then will we have our own worker core.... I feel that the problems of youth will be more easily solved if they are raised to the rank of state ones.

[Karpova] Tell us, is the department you lead working with the preinduction youth?

[Karabanov] Certainly so. And not only the republic military commissariat but also the rayon and oblast commissariats are doing a good deal for basic military training of the preinduction-age fellows. Equally with public education we are responsible for the military training of the schoolchildren. We are helping with literature and training weapons. I feel that the attitude of the senior graders to basic military training should be gradually changed. Certainly now, instead of the retired officers, or to put it simply, military pensioners, they would be taught by the graduates of a physical culture institute. There they have opened a special chair for training instructors for basic military training.

[Karpova] All the same, the profession of the military has lost its former prestige and ever-fewer young people want to link their life to the army and become officers....

[Karabanov] There is nothing surprising in that. The life of the military is full of hardships. They spend a large portion of their lives on training grounds devoid of all the goods of civilization. As a result, being discharged into the reserves, they often do not even have apartments. Although according to the legislation an officer should be provided with housing within three months. Here in our Bishkek, as of now we do not have housing for over 100 officers, apartments are being rented and they are living in dormitories with their families. Among them Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels are no rarity....

At present, a package of laws is being prepared on a military reform, on defense and on the status of the servicemen, where to a certain degree there will be a guarantee for the social protection of officers in the Soviet Army. Possibly our servicemen will finally come to hold that place in society which they hold throughout the civilized world. For now, the attitude of the state toward the officer corps is as negligent as can be.

[Karpova] I have repeatedly read in newspapers that in America and in the Western European countries, the professions of the military and police are held in great respect. People in uniform are respected by the adult population and children are fond of them....

[Karabanov] I do not feel that in the given instance the crucial role is played by the mass information media or the movies where basically the people of these professions are presented in the role of heroes. Probably the desire to become a military or policeman is influenced largely by the material aspect of the question. For instance in the United States a soldier receives up to \$600 and officers from \$1,500 to \$6,000 a month. In our nation, even worse the professional military do not have virtually any social guarantees and they still are among the category of the most poorly paid citizens. Let us take

the work of the junior officers, that is, the lieutenants and captains. On their shoulders rests the hardest, punitive, I would say, work of educating subordinates and preparing soldiers to defend the motherland. This work generally goes on around-the-clock. And for this they receive within the limits of 300 rubles. Well, they can only laugh through their tears....

[Karpova] At present, there is the widespread opinion that if the army were to be made a hired one, then there would be many more desiring to serve in it....

[Karabanov] Let me point out that we frequently confuse the principle for manning the army with the concept of a professional, hired army. At present, no army in the world is manned according to the volunteer principle. It is a different question that abroad there is the practice of concluding a contract for reenlisted service. In our new Defense Law we are also making provision for such an act. That is, the servicemen who have served six months have the right to conclude a contract with the Ministry of Defense for another two years. The experience of world practice shows that such a system is the most rational. The Americans tried to recruit soldiers by contract but the system was not viable. The carrying out of military duty should be compulsory for each citizen.

[Karpova] Nevertheless, regardless of the Law on Universal Military Service, the fellows are not only refusing to serve but are also absent from their troop units without leave. But it does not seem that they were strictly condemned as if this were desertion....

[Karabanov] Yes, the degree of punishment for young people who refuse to serve, I feel, is very mild, some two years of imprisonment and then only perhaps conditionally. For some reason, the law enforcement bodies take such a mild view of such a serious crime to the motherland. In my opinion, if we are seeking a state under the law then certainly the laws must be learned and clearly carried out....

[Karpova] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, you probably like no one else can see all of the mistakes of our society, our schools and the Komsomol in the area of instilling patriotism in the younger generation. The textbooks, artistic literature and movies used to describe the heroic feats of our soldiers....

Veterans whose chests were decorated with orders and medals used to be invited to all sorts of school measures. The Komsomol held Zarnitsa [Summer Lightning Youth Military Training].... Judging from everything, a spirit of patriotism has not been very easy to instill in the soul of the younger generation....

[Karabanov] I feel that only in the family can one begin to instill a love for one's country. For the life of me, I cannot understand how it is possible to cause hostility for the motherland in one's child. Or how the child's upbringing can be turned over to the nursery or school. If a son is born in a family he is the perpetrator of your kind so you must instill in him all that is the brightest and make him a steadfast courageous person. I feel that

first of all a young boy must gain a love of sports. Possibly, this is because since my childhood I have loved sports. Nor have I given up athletics at present. I cannot conceive of my day without morning exercises. In the past I was a master of sports in pentathlon and triathlon. Now I am involved in mountain skiing. I feel that every father must raise his children in such a spirit.

[Karpova] Do you have children?

[Karabanov] Of course. God did not give me any sons. I have three daughters. Nevertheless, I am endeavoring to bring them up as I would bring up boys, strong and with good endurance. Sports are primarily health....

[Karpova] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, as a professional military man, how would you take it if one of your daughters decided to marry an officer?

[Karabanov] If that were to happen, I admit, I would regret it. Although I feel that parents do not have the right to control the feelings of their children in any major way, I would wish a happier fate for my daughters. But, if it were to happen, and you cannot order your heart about, I would advise her to learn patience. To be the wife of a lieutenant is a great show of courage. Take just one aspect, the infinite moves, the placing of children in nurseries, adaptation in school and in a new collective....

[Karpova] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, you have also traveled about the country?

[Karabanov] And how. I have served in the Group of Forces in Germany, in Moscow, Kaliningrad, Ashkhabad, Tashkent and Afghanistan, and now in Bishkek.... All in all, I have devoted 25 years to service.

[Karpova] Were you one of those persons who, while still young, dreamed of becoming an officer?

[Karabanov] Certainly not. I was born in the small town of Volokolamsk. My family lived on the outskirts of the settlement. There were three children, myself and two sisters. We virtually did not see our parents. My father was a construction worker and my mother ran a department at the school. We children were left to our own devices. And so in my free time I played sports and I also had one other passion, music. I even intended to become a professional musician. I had applied to a music school but I did not pass the entrance exam. All the same, I have continued to play in a jazz band. Our family was moderately well off and for this reason after 8th grade I decided to go to work. Naturally, continuing my studies in evening school.

No matter how strange it might seem, I entered the Moscow Hydromeliorative Institute. It was simply to be with my friends. But after 18 months, I realized that I would no longer be able to work in this specialty. It was not to my liking. And if I were to admit it I went there to study in order...to avoid service in the army. At that time, they served three years and then I thought that is an entire eternity....

[Karpova] Nevertheless, you decided to give up the institute? Then how did you happen to come to serve...?

[Karabanov] That was the entire paradox that, having left the institute, I transferred to the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School. Probably my views had changed somewhat. Yes, there was the influence of a comrade who was studying with me. He was older and had already served in the army. Seeing my successes in the military training exercises, he pointed out that a good military man could be made from me. I was very fond of this fellow. Well developed, good, an athlete, of a good build and thoroughly knowledgeable in literature and art. For some reason, his opinion played a major role in my life's choice. Later, I completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze.

[Karpova] Could you name a person you would like to be like? In your youth did you have an idol?

[Karabanov] Generally, I don't like the word "idol." Even more, I feel that it is unworthy of a man to have an idol. In my youth I did have a strong attraction. I played the trumpet in the jazz band when the star of Louis Armstrong was shining at its zenith in the world's heavens. I endeavored to imitate him and to some degree bowed to his talent.

Well, as to whom I would like to be like, that would be difficult to answer. I do not have an idol in the form of a single person. For me, the embodiment of male beauty is the mind of a person in harmony with physical beauty. I have always venerated intellectually developed persons who know languages and who are equally well-informed in politics, literature, art and simultaneously improve their physical abilities. The desire for perfection both intellectual and physical is an endless task....

[Karpova] How does your working day go? Do you have enough time for reading, attending the theater and exhibits in your free time?

[Karabanov] I have never been thrilled by people who work on the job until late at night. I could not understand the newspaper materials in which party secretaries or other responsible workers were extolled when the light was burning "in their office until midnight." I feel that everything planned must be able to fit within the time allocated for work. For this reason, possibly, I have throughout my life shown great responsibility to my duties. I am never late and I do not allow myself to be overcome with laziness. I work at full tilt, sometimes on the very edge of my ability.

To speak about my free time—there is very little of it. Nevertheless, without fail, I read newspapers and magazines for several hours. Both my position and deputy duties do not allow me to fall behind events. I am very rarely at the theater, the movies, let alone exhibits. I endeavor to devote every free minute to work on my dissertation.

[Karpova] What is its subject?

[Karabanov] It involves the Great Patriotic War and the participation of the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan in it. I will defend it next year at the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Karpova] Where do you find your materials?

[Karabanov] From the local State Archives and I am aided by former frontline veterans and people who during the war worked for the needs of defense. I also read a great deal of fiction.

[Karpova] Is your reading somehow systematized?

[Karabanov] I have assembled a rather good library. But I prefer all the same a historical novel. As an adult, I have gone back to the history of the Russian state and with a feeling of bitterness conclude that all of this should be presented to us in school. Then possibly there would not be ethnic conflicts between the different peoples of our country....

[Karpova] We had begun to speak about moral categories. In such an instance, what would you feel if the army had its own saints?

[Karabanov] Yesterday we used to fight against religion, we destroyed the churches and now the Holy Scripture is taught in schools and they are beginning to send priests to the army. Probably that would not be excessive. Some feel that only religion would save the army. That is scarcely my view. Its problems must be resolved by other means.

### **Compromise Sought Between Religion, Army**

*91US0628A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 25 Apr 91 p 2*

[Report by KAZTAG correspondent M. Nigmatullin: "Religion and the Army: In Search of a Compromise"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—In this time which is difficult for the entire country, there is a growing number of those who shirk the fulfillment of their constitutional duty and refuse to serve in the Soviet Army under the pretext of faith and religious principles. What can be done in this situation? Representatives of the Kazakh Military Draft Office and of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops, and the leadership of the religious denominations in the republics attempted to find an answer to this difficult question at a meeting organized by the staff liaison with religious organizations of the office of the Kazakh SSR president.

Colonel L. Bakayev, the republic Military Draft Commissioner, said in his presentation to the gathering: "People are attracted to religion. There was a time when the church, the mosques, and their activities were sharply criticized. Now we come to them on our own and are asking the believers, by their word of truth and worthy example, to help those who are going to serve to fulfill their duty in a worthy manner." He told of the difficulties in regard to the upcoming draft, the problems of the so-called "dedovshchina" [hazing] and invited the leaders of religious denominations to be present at the gathering points for drafted young people, from which they are sent to their destinations, and to bless the young men to good service.



Archpriest Valeriy Zakharov, secretary of the eparchy department of the Alma-Ata-Kazakhstan Eparchy, in talking about the relations between the Army and religion, shared his two-year experience of serving in the Armed Forces and said that this was twenty years ago but little has changed since then. The Army and its political structures quickly turn believers into atheists, since neither units nor subunits have appropriate setups for performing religious rites; the same rules, procedures, and commands are in effect for everyone. The archpriest asked the commander and political officers to invite the leadership of the church and of other denominations into units and subunits more often, so that the believers could, with a kind word and a prayer, strengthen the souls of young warriors, bring out in them a sense of duty, of loyalty to the Fatherland, and contribute to the renaissance of the good. It would be a great blessing, said Father Valeriy, if reading rooms in unit and subunit libraries had the Bible, the Koran, and other religious literature available.

Both Muslims and Seventh Day Adventists are prohibited by their religion from eating pork. The main staple in the Army, however, is pork. What to do? This and other issues were brought up in the presentations by Mufti Al-Haji Ratbek Nysanbeh-uly, the head of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Kazakhstan, and F. Tsikler, one of the leaders of the Seventh Day Adventists. In this connection it was proposed to try to find a way to replace pork with lamb.

Candidate of theology Pavel Khiminets, head of the department of churches of the Southern Uniate of the Seventh Day Adventists, suggested adopting a law on alternative service.

Lt. Col. G. Mikhin and other political officers noted that they are fulfilling the Motherland's social order: They are training a professional military and are not empowered to change the text of the oath and of the military rules and instructions; there are legislative organs for that purpose, whose job it is to show concern for the interests of the believers—the creation of an alternative service and of conditions for performing religious rites. They called on the religious figures to jointly search for points in common.

### Progress of Spring Draft in Belorussia

91UM0716A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 23 May 91 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Lemeshenok under the rubric "A Publicist's Two Pages": "To Become a Soldier, Tried and True"]

[Text] This is a worrisome season for many of our youths, their parents, friends and loved ones. The republic's military commissariats have initiated the callup for the USSR Armed Forces. This has also been a time of changes to the Law on Universal Military Obligation that have been signed by the President and recently published. They probably are a source of disappointment to some people, especially those who expected to see

more radical changes in aspects of army life. Specifically, the new legislation addresses only some of the reforms that are being discussed by society. The naval tour of duty has been reduced by one year, thus doing away with this little-discussed and unfair anachronism. Put forth as an experiment is contract service in this particular branch of the service. However, there is no requirement to implement any changes in the ground forces, the largest component. Why not introduce an experiment, even a partial one, here, into the internal troops? Otherwise, will we continue to send fresh-faced lads who have had no combat experience to pacify professional bands and units located in the country's so-called "hot spots"? The fact is, all the republic parliaments, including the Belorussian, have had something definite to say about this.

It was generally expected that the typical tour of duty would be shortened to 18 months. However, it appears that the country's higher military leadership is simply not in a position to take this kind of step. Many subunits are already experiencing a manpower shortage due to the reduced callup in some areas. As a result, some servicemen will be forced to carry a greater load.

It was with pleasure that in the new document I detected no mention of the so-called alternative service that the Baltics are so anxiously attempting to introduce for themselves. I do not believe that working with chamber pots (even though this may be considered important) is something that would satisfy a healthy young man. It is also true that many medical facilities are suffering a shortage of servicing personnel, but this is a temporary situation. The coming unemployment will fill these vacancies. Why take bread away from the least protected?

The addendum to the law reflects our wariness of the reforms under way. The hope remains that life itself will take them further, as has happened a number of times in the past.

Meanwhile, the draft is in progress, one that is typical and as usual worrisome. It is being carried out in many locations with signs of the times. For example, something new has been introduced in Novogrudok. It was there that draftees heard a speech given by Pavel Lukashovich, a priest from the local Orthodox cathedral. He reminded the young men of the words of Alexander Nevskii: "He who comes here with a sword will die by a sword." The Father bid them to serve honorably, not to forget their home, friends and loved ones, and always turn to the Lord in times of difficulty.

It is difficult for lads who are about to leave home. However, I am convinced that it is even more difficult for their mothers and fathers. I can easily understand them. I wish to at least offer them some words of comfort. Some of them, having read quite a bit about the horrors of the dedovshchina and other negative things occurring in the Army, believe they are seeing their sons off not to become a tried and true soldier, but instead to the possibility of being maimed or even killed. I do not

hesitate to say that this kind of thing can occur to your son at home, on any street, even in daytime. Is that not so? This the kind of time we are living in. And—alas!—we are doing little to bring about a change.

It may be (most likely!) paradoxical, but nowhere but the Army can young men be offered more protection from crime, impunity, and abject lack of discipline. That, even though there are problems there, also. In conclusion, I would like to express my hope that your sons will have commanders such as Lieutenant Colonel V. N. Semeshko. We have long been talking about him in our rubric "Fatherland," as one of the intelligent, sensible and brave. These are commanders who not only take care of yesterday's boys, but in addition teach them to stand up to scoundrels, bullies and cads.

That alone would prompt me to say "Thank You" to the Army.

### Relations With Civil Authorities in Volga-Ural MD

91UM0710C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 31 May 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel N. Krasnyy, first deputy chief of the Military-Political Directorate of the Volga-Ural Military District, under the rubric "Military-Political Organs": "Out Front With Obstacles"]

[Text] When I visit other districts, I frequently hear expressions of envy: "Your area is a good one. You have neither ethnic strife nor 'radical leftist' opposition to the army nor serious problems with local authorities...."

There is an element of truth in these statements. Compared with the situation of other military districts, our problems actually do not seem very acute. One does not see picketers with scathing, angry banners. Our officers do not hear the irritating "Occupiers, go home!" Nonetheless, our relations with local authorities are not without difficulties. At times our search for compromises and our efforts to untie the firm knots of conflicts remind one of being out front with obstacles....

I shall quote from just a few of the telegrams we have recently received:

"...The Sverdlovsk City Soviet of Workers' Deputies has not condemned land designated as a right-of-way for the movement of tracked equipment to the training center and the assembly area, using the construction of the Ural Scientific Center as an excuse."

From Chelyabinsk Oblast came the clamorous demand to "...change the borders of the range, since the noisy activities of the military no longer suit the residents of a nearby village."

Or take this telegram from officer V. Meshkov in Sverdlovsk: "The situation which has developed around the unit because of the actions of a group of people headed by Filippova, a worker in the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon committee, is growing worse. The conflict essentially

involves the fact that, with the consent of city authorities, the unit occupied several buildings heavily damaged by an explosion at the railroad station. Filippova quickly declared us to be "invaders," however, and demands that we be evicted. The Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon committee has adopted a wait-and-see position...."

We receive dozens of these telegrams. And this means that workers in the district military-political directorate must make dozens of extra trips and perform the difficult job of seeking mutual understanding in talks with our own Soviet authorities.

In all candor, could we have imagined just a year or a year and a half ago that the officer-and-political worker would be totally occupied with resolving social and legal, ecological or economic matters? That our relations with local authorities in a number of republics would be reassessed and the writing of their history begun anew, practically from scratch?

As I look back today at recent events, I want to say frankly that we ourselves are to blame for many of the problems which have accumulated and are being resolved with such difficulty. We have to admit, after all, that we were incapable of comprehending at the start the restructuring processes and our job following our election to the local soviets. We dragged things out and temporized, waiting as usual for recommendations from higher up. The most disturbing thing is that we missed the moment, and along with it a clear understanding of the changes.

Another cause is the absence even now of legislation governing relations between the army and local authorities, let us say. It is no longer at just the republic level, but even in the rayon soviets, that "pre-perestroika" laws on the status of the Armed Forces are regarded as archival documents. In addition, the establishment of the State Committee on Defense and Security of the RSFSR has also created many additional problems in relations between the army and local authorities.

There is one other problem, about which we most frequently remain tactfully silent. I refer to the fact that we have traditionally maintained contacts with local CPSU organizations. And this is our gain, so to speak. We have acquired some good experience in conducting joint heroic-patriotic activities. Reality has led us to conclude, however, that the military-political directorate must be fully capable of analyzing the views, political platforms and, at times, the conflicting trends which determine to one degree or another the development of events in the region. Without this it is impossible to foresee either how events will develop or ways to influence them.

We began restructuring our work by seriously studying the fairly active functioning of the republic and oblast centers of the Democratic Russia movement, the Democratic Party of Russia and other parties and mass movements. We looked into various unofficial associations and groups, which have thousands of members. This had to be done, because activists in a number of



parties were attempting with their work in local agencies of authority to influence even the attitudes of the officers.

What tactic did the military-political directorate take in this situation? Our reasoning was approximately this: Since the "democrats" could make themselves heard at a city meeting, for example, why could we not state our own position at these meetings of people of the most diverse political orientations?

It is easy to think this way in the quiet of the office, but many of our specialists in the field of propaganda and agitation, accustomed to performing party-political work in the comfortable circumstances of the military collectives, simply could not bring themselves to take the podium at such a meeting. But circumstances urged us to do so. What was the benefit from standing silent in a charged-up crowd in front of which vociferous speakers "stuck" the army with images one more terrible than the other? But when the political workers found themselves face to face with the audience of many thousands of people, there was not just whistling and whooping. It was apparent that many people wanted to hear firsthand and comprehend the army's present role in the society, how the communists in the shoulder-boards regarded vital problems of the economy, policy, the social sphere....

This was the most difficult period, during which we had to defend our line, withstand the hail of criticism and answer thousands of questions in an atmosphere of aggressive impatience and distrust. But we are asked questions not just at meetings. So-called radical deputies in the soviets at all levels are also attempting to define their position with respect to the army. They are inclined to make scathing statements in the process, to be sure. For example, they are presently acutely concerned with "whether it is expedient to deal with the political workers at all, when the political organs in the army have been transformed and their role has changed substantially?"

I would say, however, that the settlement and rural soviets have, on the contrary, retained their positive attitude toward the military-political organs, regarding them as assistants in the shaping and implementation of military policy locally.

The results of our first joint activities in our new status need to be studied and analyzed, of course. Judging from very recent impressions, however, the general situation is that of all the army structures, the military-political organs have taken on just about the main effort to establish cooperation with the soviets and ispolkoms.

How can we develop these relations further? It was decided at one of the military council's meetings that the military-political organs should initiate the establishment of clubs for military people's deputies in the region's republics and oblasts. This initiative was supported. The organizational structuring of the clubs is now basically complete. Their structures, functions and purposes have been defined. The main areas of work for

the clubs will be the following: to provide social protection for servicemen, to shape an objective opinion of the army in the electors and to unite the efforts of military deputies for working out decisions of the soviets at all levels.

And we can say that we already have the first definite results of the work. At the Tot'skiy Garrison, for example, through the efforts of people's deputies Cols A. Kosyakov and V. Balaban, the Orenburg Oblast Ispolkom has allocated 200,000 rubles for improvements on the military installation. At the Penza Garrison 24 military deputies have broken a stalemate in matters pertaining to the social protection of servicemen. Last year alone reserve officers and warrant officers acquired 826 square meters of housing; officers and warrant officers [on active duty], 205 square meters. With active participation by the group of military deputies, the Mordovian Council of Ministers has allocated 263,000 rubles for military-patriotic work.

Those who read the General Statute on Military-Political Organs, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, no doubt noticed that one of their priority tasks is to help prepare citizens of the USSR for military service. Naturally, it would be difficult to count on progress in this area without close contacts with the soviets and with legally functioning political party organizations and mass associations. We take into account the fact that many of the agencies of authority have new leadership and, when they request it, we help them in their work with predraft and draft-age youth and with the military-patriotic and mass defense work. Incidentally, the sessions of certain oblast and rayon soviets have taken our recommendations into account in their discussion of the spring draft.

Nonetheless, experience has shown that not all the problems can be solved within the context of cooperation with "our" local soviets. The fact is that the personnel in the military units are to a significant degree youth from the Central Asian republics, Siberia and the Far East. The district leadership could not but be disturbed by the fact that they have virtually been left without influence and concern on the part of soviets and ispolkoms existing and functioning alongside them. This gave birth to the idea of "building bridges" between all the district units and neighboring areas.

The first response to our call came from Karakalpakia. Lieutenant General V. Tarasov, chief of the military-political directorate, and the chairman of the republic Council of Ministers soon signed an agreement on the matter. It covers the range of the most urgent issues: the exchange of delegations, the allocation of funds necessary for providing clubs and libraries of the military units with literature in the native language of soldiers drafted from Karakalpakia, the establishment of direct relations between the command elements of district units and the republic's educational facilities and labor collectives....

These are only individual aspects of the difficult job performed by the district military-political directorate. It

is premature to talk about any results. There is no doubt in our minds that there will be results, however, substantial results.

In connection with this, I would like to mention something which sometimes troubles us. From time to time one hears the following: Is the military-political directorate doing the job for which it was intended? It's directing functions have been replaced, it seems, with mediation and consultative work—and frequently, with minor concerns. This is a good way, they say, to lose all social and political influence in the region for a long time to come.

What does one say to this? Such attitudes are mostly a result of failure to understand the situation. With all the uncertainty and even tension of events, after all, we have maintained solid relations with the CPSU organizations and are establishing relations with the new sociopolitical organizations. And to hasten events with ill-conceived initiatives or to pass off what is desired for the reality would be to ignore the prospects for development of the political situation. Furthermore, we should not forget that the local authorities are "sovereign" at practically all levels. This sometimes raises additional barriers to coordinated action.

To work under fundamentally new circumstances is not just a resounding call from lofty podiums. It is our harsh reality. And there must be earnest proof that we are prepared to operate in it.

#### **Moscow Military Prosecutor Interviewed**

91UM0778A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 21 May 91 p 2

[Interview with Deputy Prosecutor of the Moscow Military District V. Nagibin by D. Spiridonov, date and place not given: "Military Prosecutors Are Not Planning"]

[Text] Much has been written about the military prosecutors. They write mainly in the negative: they note the low level of professionalism in the preparation of military prosecutors and investigators, the low quality of the investigations conducted by them, the inability to hold back the flood of crimes, which have overwhelmed the army. Recommendations to abolish the military prosecutor's office and transfer its functions to civilian investigators have been made. But what do the military prosecutors themselves think about this matter? Here is the opinion of the deputy prosecutor of the Moscow military district, V. Nagibin.

[Nagibin] Our military prosecutors are in a specific position. Formally we are independent of the military authorities and are subordinate exclusively to the Chief Military Prosecutor, who is the deputy of the General Prosecutor of the USSR. However, in fact our dependency on the Army is great. First, all military prosecutors wear military dress and have military rank. These ranks, on which wages directly depend, are conferred by the

minister of defense, by the head of the Chief Military-Political Directorate, or by the district commander. And everything else, apartments, lodgings, transportation are also provided for us by the military authorities. They, naturally, always first take care of their own employees, and then they think about us.

[Spiridonov] Is anything now being done to change the existing situation?

[Nagibin] Certain measures are being taken. It is true that shifts in the required direction are still insignificant.

[Spiridonov] Investigators of the military prosecutor's office frequently are criticized for having inadequate professional preparation and for carelessly handling investigations. In your opinion, how valid are such criticisms?

[Nagibin] I cannot help but recognize that the work of the military prosecutor needs improvement. However, I cannot agree with the statement that our investigators are insufficiently prepared professionally. Specifics of the work of the military prosecutor require that success of an investigation depends on so-called bodies of inquiry. It is their work which gives rise to unfavorable criticism.

By law in the army the body of inquiry in the army is the commander of the unit in which the crime was committed. He assigns several investigating officers (officers, commanders of platoons and companies, political officers, and so forth), who must perform various investigative duties: examine the place where the incident occurred, question witnesses and victims, make seizures, and secure evidence. Naturally, the skills of such "investigators" leaves much to be desired. This is the same if it is the investigation of a murder at some factory being investigated not by the prosecutor but by shop directors and engineering technical workers designated by the factory director.

[Spiridonov] Thus, it might happen that the military prosecutor himself performs all the investigative duties?

[Nagibin] Of course, this would be the best way out of the situation. However, the entire matter turns on the shortage of personnel. In our nearly four-million man army there are less than 3,000 jurists. At the prosecutor's office of the Moscow military district many of the investigators handle up to 30 or 40 cases at one time. And I do not speak about the conditions in which the military prosecutors are compelled to work. Some investigators must operate out of rooms which are absolutely unfit for normal work, and there is a shortage of transportation.

[Spiridonov] The cries for abolishing the military prosecutor's office are louder all the time. Do you believe that such a step would be wise?

[Nagibin] I think not. The military service has its own specific aspects, and not to consider that in implementing such an important structural change, as abolishment of the military prosecutor's office, is impossible.

Also, one must bear in mind the conditions of secrecy which are still in effect. And the categories of military crimes do not always coincide with the civil.

A different matter is the need for certain changes of the military prosecutor's office itself. The military prosecutor must be kept genuinely independent, subordinate only to the law. Perhaps a balance can be struck with the prosecutor's office of the Soviet Union, expanding the state establishment, and conferring on us the same ranks, which the civilian prosecutors have. Of course I understand that all these problems will not be solved in one day. Nevertheless, one cannot just walk away from them. The question of the legal protection of servicemen is now an urgent one. The lion's share of claims of our society on the army is directly related to it. Thus, the problem of ensuring law and order in the army is not only an army ailment. We are speaking of trust of society in armed forces. It is unnecessary, I believe, to say how important such trust now is. As the army goes, so goes society.

#### **Shlyaga Speech on Military-Patriotic Work**

91UM0726A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report on speech by the chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military Political Directorate, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga: "To Assert With Specific Deeds"]

[Text] As has already been reported, at a Moscow gathering of the chiefs of military-political organs a report entitled "Urgent Problems in Military Political Work at the Present Stage in the Building and Development of the Armed Forces" was presented by the chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military Political Directorate [Glavnoye Voenno-politicheskoye upravleniye Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR], USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga. We publish below a summary of the text of that speech.

After noting that this was the first gathering on such a scale since confirmation of the Provisions for Military Political Organs of the USSR Armed Forces, which defined their status, the strategy for their activity, and their fundamentally new tasks, Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga emphasized the need to come to a unified understanding of the provisions of this basic document and determine implementation of its key issues.

The speaker dealt in detail with the characteristics of the sociopolitical situation in the country and in the Army and Navy in which a new model for political officers has been created, and in which, that is, the model, practical running in, to use an expression, is taking place.

The question of the fate of army political officers, he recalled, was being decided against the backdrop of a sharp polarization of opinion in society and fierce political struggle. And this in a period when the number of regions where the opposition from political groupings has assumed forms of extreme social and interethnic confrontation has increased. When forces have entered

the arena which have set themselves the goal of changing the social system in the USSR and moving the transformations that have been made onto an antisocialist path of development. Reality is the desire of movements and organizations opposing the CPSU to assert their own influence in the Armed Forces.

It is clear that the political officers are a major obstacle to those forces in achieving their goals. This is why the shouts of "Down With...", slogans calling for depoliticization of the army, and the incitement of an antiarmy psychosis have become their usual tactics. Behind this has stood, and still stands, one thing—namely, to discredit the political officers and force them out of army and navy structures so as to alter the political and party orientation of the Armed Forces—the most important element of statehood.

Today it may be said that those who support the preservation of military political officers in the Armed Forces, but as renewed and capable organs, have managed to make common sense prevail. The proof of that is the Provisions and other legal documents that define their powers, and the complex life in which military political officers have shown that they are needed.

The chief of the Main Military Political Directorate dealt in detail with the main directions in the practical activity of military political officers and with the mechanism whereby they exercise the functions assigned to them.

Proceeding from the normative documents, he said, these functions may be divided in terms of aims and methods into the following main groups: indoctrination, organizational-political, the strengthening of military discipline, protective, informational, personnel, and coordination.

What does each of these represent? What actions do they require?

**The Indoctrination Function:** This is the most important because it is the person with his views and convictions, his actions and deeds formed by purposeful indoctrination work who has been and remains at the center of military development.

Life raised for us long ago the question of the need for a new concept for indoctrination activity. Its essence is to insure unity of indoctrination and a person's everyday conduct. At the local level many advances have been made in this respect. Positive changes have taken place in the organization of political training for personnel and forms of work such as debates, roundtable discussions, and business games are being actively introduced. Agitation and propaganda activity is becoming more attuned to the emotions, more intelligible, more immediate.

The question is this: to make the process of improving indoctrination work continuous, without pause in terms of time and the completeness of the influence. The dynamics of political events require this. This dynamic is now such that practical indoctrination is often too late, outdated, not even yet formed. Gaps in the effect on

people, indoctrination done from one event to another, and attachment to methods and forms once they have been found often lead to a situation in which the potential for ideological-political influence is inadequate to the need.

Among the flaws in the organization of indoctrination work Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga named the situation in which it is sometimes done outside the dialectical unity of political, military, moral, legal, esthetic, and atheistic indoctrination and is organized in a haphazard way, without focusing on its effectiveness. When it is set in free motion. The report cited instances in which under the sign of pluralism, de-ideologization, and independence the organization foundation has been ignored. In which by adapting to "fashion," in some units the Lenin rooms have been restructured and as a result have been converted from centers to exert ideological influence on people into faceless premises called relaxation rooms.

Very little use is being made of the facilities of officers clubs, soldiers clubs, ensembles, army theaters, libraries, museums, and television and radio centers in indoctrination work. There are many instances in which because of the curtailment of cultural and enlightenment facilities, amateur associations are economically disadvantageous, but instead those who organize discos, video studios, rental centers, and pinball machines feel free to act as they like.

The method of individual work with people can in no way be described as widespread. It is effective but is less spectacular than mass measures that may cover the entire gamut and then be considered to have carried out indoctrination work. This is why, the speaker noted, in some military collectives N.G. Chernyshevskiy's gloomy prediction that this approach shapes personalities in which "there is not only confusion in their heads but also nonsense in their deeds" is being confirmed.

The speaker went on to deal with the priority directions in indoctrination work.

First, using all the resources available to us it is essential to consolidate in personnel the ideological reference points and a sense of conviction in the correctness of socialist choice; to act decisively against the theory of "laissez-faire," which rejects any kind of interference in the process of developing the individual. Indoctrination work must act in defense of the history of our state and the Armed Forces, and the ideals of socialism, and it must present a solid obstacle against ideological cynicism and nihilism. We must, N.I. Shlyaga said, defend Lenin and the October, and our culture and traditions. We must act in such a way that new boundaries in the army milieu are lit up with concepts such as patriotism and fidelity to the socialist choice.

Second, the thrust of indoctrination work should be more toward specific categories of people. It is particularly important to raise the overall level of work with officers. The processes taking place within the officer corps enable us to pose the problem thus: Either we preserve the officers as the backbone of the Army and

thus strengthen the Armed Forces or, we leave them alone and thus lose them. It is a complicated issue. What is needed here is effort first and foremost by the central departments. But we must not forget that the moral climate in the officer corps is largely determined by the attitude of the leadership at the local level.

It is essential to make major corrections in work with officers' families. It is specifically here that today real difficulties of an economic nature are building up. It is precisely there that the moral and psychological and spiritual sense of the officer are shaped.

Third, in the context of our conversation I would like to deal with the problem of ideological support for military reform. Grave passions are boiling about this problem today, lances and pens are being broken, and airways are abuzz. Even those who never bothered with military matters are rushing to offer their contribution to the business, and some are offering alternative ideas. Political delineation is often occurring with respect to military reform. Because of this, the label of "conservative" is hung on some people, "radical" on others, "centrists" on yet others, and so forth. It is important to achieve an objective reflection of the essential nature of military reform in verbal propaganda and among the mass media. It is worthwhile explaining the steps already taken within the channel of the reform, particularly those connected with strengthening the legislative foundations of military service and improving the material position of servicemen. Military reform needs effective advertising.

Fourth, the special subject of national attitudes, contradictoriness, and acrimony, which have been moved to the forefront in our society. All our ideological work should take into account and express and reflect the interests of all the nations and nationalities in our federal state, and insure in practice the unity of the international and the national. The Armed Forces have been, are, and should remain a school of internationalism and the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR.

Fifth, the task is to have every political officer and our ideological services be aware of people's moods and be able to sense where unresolved problems have built up and where help is needed, and be able to recognize tension promptly and remove it.

In concluding what he had to say on this problem the speaker emphasized the importance of high moral and professional qualities for ideological workers, qualities that they must possess in order to work in their vocation.

**The Organizational-Political Function:** Active involvement in resolving the problems of combat readiness and combat training, the speaker noted, are issues relating to the authority of military political officers in other organs of military control, and their self-assertion and establishment. The main levers for gaining this kind of stature are primarily active military-political work to make personnel aware of the tasks to be resolved and instill a sense of moral responsibility for their successful fulfillment. They also include the creation among the troops and in the fleets of a healthy rivalry in work on plans and



programs for combat and political training. They include providing incentive for honest military labor and reviving old traditions of combat comradeship, and, moreover, in all elements of the military organism.

The pivotal line in the influence of military political officers on key problems in the life of the troops and fleets is work in the collectives of headquarters and other organs of military management. They must be made more cohesive, and the level of exactingness must be raised with respect to the political positions of the generals and admirals and officers working in them.

There is more. The authority of the political officer is the authority of each person working for him. First and foremost the professionals. And the weight of his words and the sense of conviction derived from personal example depend on this. Officers in political organs are obligated to be on the forward sectors of combat readiness. Where there are successes in training, field exercises and flying exercises and naval exercises. We cannot reconcile ourselves to a situation in which individual military political workers spend their service time inside offices and do not go out to where the fate of training for subunits and units is being decided.

**The Function of Strengthening Military Discipline:** Analyzing this problem, Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga said the following:

Why do we, who are constantly involved in matters of discipline, all see a palpable decline in the general level of organization and order and increased crime and incidents?

Naturally there is the adverse effect of the atmosphere that has been formed in society and about the Armed Forces. But we must also see that the methods used in the activity of some military political officers are out of step with the real situation, and some of them are simply following in the wake of events. The insufficiently high professionalism of command political personnel in their work and the weakness of junior and mid-level commanders also hamper the work.

Some military political officers are unjustifiably switching their efforts into the sphere of statistics without adequate analysis and without making active use of them for devising and implementing measures of a preventive nature. There is no well-established system for preventive work or for revealing and preventing violations of the law and other negative phenomena.

Nor have we succeeded in making a qualitative breakthrough toward improving discipline, because the work methods that previously gave positive results have now in some cases exhausted themselves. Military political personnel are having difficulty in ridding themselves of outdated approaches to strengthening discipline and people's indoctrination. They are reluctant or unable to understand that earlier "pressure" forms no longer work, often have an opposite effect. The circumstance that today new people are coming into the Army who include those who have become aware of "meetings" democracy,

and have scant sense of their responsibilities under the law and are disrespectful of the Armed Forces and the moral values of society, is considered only in words, not deeds.

Discipline for officers is not a new issue. Let me say candidly that among the troops and in the fleets a naive idea exists that it just comes about by itself. Even though it is absolutely clear that today the officer needs indoctrination, needs to remove himself from the pressure of outside factors, in particular the attempts by particular political forces to discredit the role and importance of long-serving personnel in military service.

In the work to strengthen discipline we need to reset in a major way the mechanism whereby influence is exerted on this sector of military life, totally reject the outworn forms and methods of work that have produced no positive results, and search for, reveal, and make use of more effective approaches in problem solving.

It is important to impart a social and legal element to the process of strengthening discipline. What do I have in mind here?

First, organizational and indoctrination work must be built exclusively on the basis of laws, regulations, and orders. It is essential to try to achieve a situation in which the law is equally taken into account and complied with both by the commander and by his subordinates.

Second, military political officers are called upon not only to generate ideas on making improvements in the conditions for the troops activities but also to display persistence in transforming those ideas into practical deeds. It is little enough to convince personnel of the need for honest service. It is also necessary to give them the conditions that would make deviations from the regulations and standards of military conduct impossible.

Third, now, as at no other time, preventive work is needed. The military political officers are simply bound to be concerned with introducing scientific approaches to the study of the causes of violations of the law, predicting the possible development of processes in discipline, and devising immediate and long-term preventive measures.

Military life is cyclic. The features that characterize it for certain intervals of time are repeated year in year out—the draft, transfer to the reserves, planned training, taking part in the harvesting, swimsuit weather [kupalnyy sezon], and so forth. This all requires that measures be implemented at the appropriate times, when an event or crime occurs.

The position of the military political officer determines that he assume responsibility for the status of military discipline. And this is so. But each of us is also endowed with certain administrative rights. When we exercise those rights we must not allow the false opinion to form in the troops and fleets that other officials and organs of military management are not also involved in this work. The level of their responsibility depends on the military

political officers, and it is essential to act here without looking over one's shoulder at other authorities.

**The Function of Social and Legal Protection:** This, N.I. Shlyaga emphasized, occupies a special place in the activity of military political officers. Whereas previously concern for the individual and defending his honor, dignity, and interests was the concomitant and implied duty of the political officers, now this function of social and legal protection for servicemen and the members of their families has acquired the nature of an obligation.

There are more problems than solutions here. Tension is growing in the social sphere of the officer corps. There are many reasons for this. First and foremost we must name the tardiness in devising and adopting laws that guarantee social protection for servicemen, and the poor work in introducing constitutional standards in the everyday life and activity of servicemen.

The continuous war of laws and discriminatory measures against servicemen, moral terror and deprivation, the various kinds of restrictions in trade and medical care, and the not always adequate actions of commanders and political officers in given areas are introducing special complications.

But still the most dismal thing is that many commanders and chiefs of military political organs are working with serious lack of tact and attention to people, and are failing to take effective steps to protect the individual. Many everyday examples of this could be cited. For example, for how many years have we been talking about regulating officers' work time; there have been few advances. Often we do not see justice in regular promotions. Hence the apathy seen in service and duties. Hence the reports about resignations from the Armed Forces. Here, too, we find the cause of many family tragedies.

One extremely important task is concern for people's lives and health. It is our duty to prevent tragic events with people, teach them safety measures, increase the responsibility of commanders and political workers. The provisions of the appropriate ukases of the USSR president on these matters must be fulfilled.

Talking about the priorities that military political officers must bear in mind when exercising their functions of social and legal protection, the speaker distinguished the following:

- studying and analyzing real social situations, the effectiveness of the functioning of the system of legislative enactments among the troops and in the fleets, and on this basis drawing up proposals for the organs of military management, and participation in work on drafts of orders pertaining to social and legal matters;
- organizing social and legal work among the troops and in the fleets, and providing methodological and practical help for commanders in setting the mechanism for social and legal protection, and for servicemen in defending their social and legal rights;

—participating in devising and implementing measures aimed at improving legal standards among the officer corps, improving legal training in military higher educational establishments, and making decisive improvements in legal education;

—generalizing practical experience in the organization of social and legal work, strengthening one-man command, and shaping healthy service relations in military collectives under conditions of democratization in the Armed Forces;

—jointly with other organs of military management, the people's deputies in the soviets at all levels, and the army and navy communities, monitoring compliance with decisions adopted by state and military administrative organs on social and legal problems and the life and activity of personnel.

But the main thing, the speaker emphasized, is to work actively to create conditions that facilitate people's everyday lives. Strict control is needed over in making personnel aware of the standards set in the regulations, along with an uncompromising struggle against bribe-takers, thieves, and speculators who plunder what belongs to people. We need decisions and actions that could at least soften the blow inflicted on the families of officer and warrant officers in connection with the jump in retail prices. Including providing opportunities for them to grow their own food. In all this work we must rely actively on our public institutions.

In general, the essential nature of the work of military political officers in this direction is to bring the level of material and spiritual life of servicemen and the members of their families into line with their role in the state and the importance and crucial nature of the missions that they fulfill.

**The Information Function:** The report revealed the content of work in this direction, and its forms and methods and nature. In particular, Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga said that under present conditions, when there is obvious pluralism of opinion on particular processes and phenomena taking place in society and in the Armed Forces, it is impossible to allow political information to be subordinated only to the bald presentation of facts, or to eliminate in-depth analytical conclusions and generalizations. It is essential that it be an important factor in the shaping of a political, world-outlook culture and a respectful and solicitous attitude toward socialist values, an effective tool in bringing the politics of the state into the field of defense.

**The Personnel Function:** The report noted that when this function is exercised by military political officers they must place the emphasis on retraining military political workers for their new duties. It is essential to approach in an attentive manner the fate of each officer. Much work needs to be done to switch the military political training establishments to new plans and programs. In personnel work it is essential to overcome the technocratic approach. What is needed is comprehensiveness and a



systemic approach in expanding the intellectual development of military political personnel and strengthening their moral-political and moral qualities.

**The Coordinating Function:** The speaker noted that this provides for an active role for military political officers in uniting the efforts of all sociopolitical organizations to implement state military policy and organize cooperation with the organs of legislative and executive power at the center and at the local level, and with public movements and the mass media.

Considering the problems in this direction, the chief of the Main Military Political Directorate dealt in particular with the mutual relations between military political officers and CPSU organizations in the Army and Navy.

He emphasized that in some places the process of reforming party political structures is being perceived in an oversimplified way: Well, they say, the party organizations are being separated from the political officers, and the political officers from the party organizations. And each of them, they say, will act in a totally independent manner. Nothing is more dangerous than this kind of primitive interpretation. The military political officers and the CPSU party organizations have never had a totally autonomous existence, not least because they have the same base for working with people. It would be a dishonorable and harmful thing to set them apart.

We have decades of experience in exerting political influence on the life and activity of the troops. Can we today just "cut it in half," to put it graphically? Certainly not. It is our common experience. And together we must develop it further. In the interests of reliable defense of the motherland.

Thus, the military political officers and the organizations of the CPSU have not run off to different sides but are altering the nature of their interaction. From unconditional subordination to cooperation on an equal footing. From the duplication that was inevitable in the past to coordination of independently planned actions.

Hence the need to define the basic approaches to the organization of cooperation between military political and party organs.

It appears that they could be seen as follows:

- in mutually providing information on a regular basis about the aims, tasks, and key directions in practical activity, both in a given interval of time and long term;
- in setting priority measures for party and political influence in training for the troops, indoctrinating personnel, and maintaining discipline and organization;
- in combining efforts in conducting specialist mass agitation measures;
- in analyzing and exchanging experience in organizational and ideological indoctrination activity.

A considerable part of the report was given over to matters relating to the mutual relations between military political officers and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations in the Army and Navy, the trade union organs, the women's movement, servicemen who are deputies of soviets, and other public associations.

In conclusion, Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga emphasized that it is absolutely impossible to permit attempts to fit military political work into some kind of mold or formula suitable for any situation in life. It cannot be done using absolutely identical methods and identical forms in the different branches and arms of the Armed Forces.

What is needed everywhere is choice, initiative, and creativity and the rejection of formalism. This is a requirement of our times, of life itself.

### All-Army Komsomol Conference Meets

#### 27 June Proceedings

91UM0776A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Jun 91 First edition p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kovalev and Captain V. Popov: "A Time for Difficult Decisions: At the First All-Army Komsomol Conference"]

[Text] On June 27, the First All-Army Komsomol Conference began its work at the Soviet Army Central Home Red Banner Hall imeni M.V. Frunze. Its goal is to complete the organizational formation of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization as a federation subject within the VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League].

First Deputy Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Colonel-General A.I. Ovchinnikov, Deputy Minister of Defense, chief of the Main Personnel Directorate, General of the Army V.F. Yermakov, VLKSM Central Committee First Secretary V.M. Zyukin, CPSU Central Committee and VLKSM Central Committee officials, and representatives of VLKSM federation subjects.

The 369 delegates began discussing the main issues on the agenda:

- the current aspect and tasks of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization;
- program goals;
- the Armed Forces Komsomol Organization Charter; and,
- elections of Armed Forces Komsomol Organization central organs.

The report on the current aspect which All-Army Soviet Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksey Reshetnikov delivered was at the center of attention of the first day's work. During the breaks between sessions, I managed to hear quite a few different opinions of delegates but all of them agree on one thing: the report made an impression. The main thing—it contained a high percentage of, and possibly to some people impartial, truth about the state

of affairs in Army Komsomol. Truth which is so necessary today for both the rank and file VLKSM member and for the professional Komsomol worker.

We offer the report's key points for your attention.

The realities of today's political life have significantly changed the role and place of the Komsomol organization in society and the Armed Forces, the All-Army Soviet Chairman stressed. The Law "On Public Associations," reform of political organs, and the transformation of Party structures in the Army and Navy have created new conditions for work and have led to the need to create a fundamentally new model of the Army Komsomol.

I think that the cleansing process alone and the consolidation of healthy forces of young people, but not grumbling and apathy, define the future Komsomol today. As a result, it is already long since time to shift from critical rethinking of the past Komsomol to the search for new, creative work.

With all of the variety of views and assessments, today the absolute majority of Armed Forces Komsomol organizations are acting as a united, strong All-Union Organization. They expect from the conference that it will demonstrate the real cohesion of Army and Navy young people, soberness of views and assessments, and the main thing—it will mark the paths for the union to emerge from its crisis state.

Are we laying too large a task on ourselves? Can we not deal with it? But then it would not be worth undertaking.

The speaker noted that we do not need to begin from zero and that is why the process of restructuring the Army Komsomol already has maybe not the largest, but its own history. A decision was made to create Komsomol organization soviets as elected collective leadership organs in September 1989 at an Army Komsomol meeting. A democratic, integrated structure was created for the Armed Forces Komsomol organization. In April 1990, the Army and Navy Komsomol emerged as a united delegation with its own platform at the 21st VLKSM Congress and obtained the rights of a full-fledged VLKSM federation subject.

Realization of a series of programs began right after the congress at the initiative of the All-Army Komsomol Organization Soviet. The Soviet Armed Forces Youth Propaganda Association has been founded and is operating, a legal and material base of youth centers is being created under the VLKSM and SKO [Association of Sanatoriums and Health Resorts] committees. The creation of appropriate centers and social assistance funds for young soldiers and members of their families is provided for within the framework of the "Social Young People's Service" socio-state program and legal and material conditions for the participation of young officers in the MZhK [Youth Housing Complex] movement are being created, and a scientific research group at

the Institute of Youth has formulated scientific tracking of the processes for realizing youth policy in the Army and Navy.

Some progress has also occurred within the context of the democratization of the life of Komsomol organizations. The methods and techniques of practical work have been perceptibly renewed, there is less paper-shuffling, and the experience of independent political activity is being gradually accumulated.

And yet, the main thing has still not occurred: the crisis in the Komsomol has not been stopped. Its prestige is declining.

Many Komsomol workers have also begun to panic. As a result, some have generally remained aloof from matters and others have been diverted by endless organizational experiments in which, actually, a place is more often not found for the young people themselves.

It is impossible to delay any longer. As the speaker stressed, each delegate and each person who is somehow or other associated with Komsomol work must clarify this for himself.

If I say it in brief, the problem consists of maintaining political initiative behind it. But this assumes the creation of a streamlined system of Komsomol influence on young people.

Today it is already clear that the politicization of the public consciousness has actually resulted in the stratification of those who defend the socialist choice and those who reject it. A real political and ideological war is being conducted against entire layers and generations of Soviet people under the cover of glasnost and pluralism of opinions. In my opinion, no one has any doubt that the main strike has been directed at young people.

It is a matter of Army Komsomol's honor under these conditions—to speak out in defense of real historical values and the precepts of V.I. Lenin, to defend our country's history and the traditions of our youth union from lies and slander, and not betray the socialist choice which the older generations have made.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Reshetnikov frankly and fundamentally talked about the miscalculations in the international education of youth.

Today representatives of more than 100 nationalities are performing duty in the Armed Forces. And it is very important to consider the growth of national self-consciousness and political activity among young people. For example, take these same "friendly associations of people" and other associations based on national origins. They have, we must admit, not only a negative side. They, just like any association of people, unite soldiers to a certain extent and impart unity to their efforts. But we need to direct these efforts in the needed channel and to reorient them from unsound aspirations toward correct and needed causes.

Special attention in the report was paid to the influence of Komsomol organizations on the state and strengthening of military discipline. What can we say here? Just one fact speaks more eloquently than the rest. According to sociologists' data, nearly 15 percent of young soldiers think that the Komsomol is remaining aloof for now from eradicating mutual relations not in accordance with regulations.

There is something to ponder here.

And if we analyze the Komsomol's role in the organization of young soldiers' leisure time? Unfortunately, soldiers' and seamen's free time is frequently farmed out to random people who are not worried about anything besides money. Cheap, second-rate video tapes replace theaters and museums and the bestial "delights" of hit movies stimulate violence in barracks and crew's quarters.

But progress for the better is being noted here. Centralized training of leisure center managers has been organized and the issues of their technical equipping are being resolved. As for the leisure time of young officers, the question has long been raised about creating oblast centers and young officers' cultural centers at major garrisons, including in Moscow. Existing in parallel with Officers' Clubs, they could become the site of healthy relaxation, interesting meetings, and informal social intercourse of young people. While organizing their activities, the Komsomol could actively cooperate with Officers' Assemblies.

The issue of Komsomol and military-political organ mutual relations prior to the conference caused the most contradictory interpretations. In the report, this issue found, let us assume, an exhaustive answer. As the speaker stressed, the nature of mutual relations with VLKSM organizations has changed substantially as a result of the reform of political organs. From absolute subordination—to interaction and cooperation. But it is impossible to imagine the very existence of the Komsomol organization under current conditions without reliable contact with the military-political organs.

The question is in no way about the mechanical subordination of the Komsomol to military-political organs. It is just obtaining the required support while preserving its possible independence.

So, the Komsomol is living through difficult times. There are signs of good changes and of real creative revelations.

But, as the speaker stated, it is most important of all at this time to "shed light" on problems. There are many of them. But they are solvable. There is a chance to rectify the situation. The task is to find this chance. And not to let it slip by. The conference is also being conducted to do this. If in brief, this chance is in specific, painstaking, creative work. And in faith. All is not yet lost and the Komsomol can still seize the initiative. The future of the Komsomol is in faith.

Discussion of the report developed into a sharp discussion.

The conference will continue its work on June 28.

### Shlyaga Speaks

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[Excerpts from speech by First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense Colonel-General N.I. Shlyaga: "Prestige is Returning to the Cause"]

[Text] As we already reported, USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate Chief, First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, Colonel-General N.I. Shlyaga spoke at the First All-Army Komsomol Conference which occurred on June 27-28 in Moscow. We are publishing excerpts from this speech.

Having noted that the First All-Army Komsomol Conference is occurring during a difficult time for the Komsomol, when it is living through a profound crisis, and when it is essentially a question of whether it will be or not be, Colonel-General N.I. Shlyaga called on the delegates to mark the strategic paths to resolve the problems that have arisen and to frankly and fundamentally answer the question—how do we restore the Komsomol's prestige in the Armed Forces. Because only the Komsomol's high prestige among personnel can return it to its former magnetic force, the respect of non-union youth, and the glory of the military political advance guard of youth. Without this, the prospects for survival and all the more so the capability to really lead the youth movement in the Army and Navy seem to be extremely doubtful. The Komsomol will exist as long as the young people themselves need it.

Later, N.I. Shlyaga dwelled in detail on the analysis of the causes of the decline of Army Komsomol's prestige. The speaker noted that there are a multitude of causes. They are both of an objective and of a subjective nature.

These causes can be combined into several groups: socio-political, ideological-moral, organizational, and specific internal army causes.

**SOCIO-POLITICAL CAUSES.** Their essence consists of the fact that the Army Komsomol, just like in the All-Union Komsomol as a whole, did not manage to totally flexibly and in a timely manner react to the fundamental changes that are occurring in the socio-political life of the state in recent years.

It, like other socio-political state institutions, found itself in a particularly violent critical fire zone. On the one hand, they began to dump all of the sins for miscalculations in the spiritual education of young people on the Komsomol, sarcastically emphasizing its role as the "closest assistant and reserve."

This, figuratively speaking, political squabble naturally reached the Army Komsomol. All the more so it became directly snagged on the furious squall of faultfinding and

defamation that came crashing down on the Armed Forces from the pseudo-democrats and pseudo-independent press.

All of this—the frequent theoretical muddle in raising the new socio-political reference points of a restructuring country and the appearance of many alternative programs of our future progress have objectively confused the Komsomol and resulted in ideological fragmentation of young people's consciousness, the appearance of sort of "opposition" opinions and doubts in the goals and tasks of both the All-Union and the Army Komsomol in particular. And the most dangerous thing—social indifference has appeared among a large portion of VLKSM members who are reducing their socio-political activities.

**IDEOLOGICAL-MORAL CAUSES.** The appearance of ideological differences of opinion among young people has become a strict check of the VLKSM organization for the capability to convincingly defend the ideas for whose sake they exist and in fact realize their ideological and moral principles.

And it has unfortunately become clear here that our Komsomol members do not have enough conviction, force of logic, and exemplariness in compliance with moral standards in service and in discipline.

For the first time maybe in the many decades of its existence, Army Komsomol has been deprived of its ideological comfort. It has begun to live as if surrounded, among constant ideological opposition by young people who have attended the universities of informal socio-political associations and frequently—from a nationalistic, pacifist, extremist ideology. Many Komsomol members, including their leaders, have turned out to be unprepared for a worthy political struggle. Moreover, the informalists have had a negative impact on a large portion of them which in many cases has also served as the cause of their departure from the VLKSM and a drastic reduction of acceptances into its ranks. In 1990, over 15,000 Army Komsomol organizations did not accept one person for membership. On the whole, considering the drastic reduction of the Komsomol layer in the youth replenishment, VLKSM membership strength has been reduced by a factor of 1.5 during the last year.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES.** The ossification of the forms and methods of its work promoted the decline of our Komsomol's prestige. And the expansion of the framework of the Komsomol's independence and democratization were far from always used in the interests of consolidating its genuine prestige.

**SPECIFIC INTERNAL ARMY CAUSES.** In summarized form, their sense is reduced to the cyclical nature of military service and to the instability of Komsomol ranks for objective reasons. The instability of the organizations, frequent changes of many members of the aktiv, and the drastic increase of the ethnic factor in the military environment, and the replenishment of organizations with young people who frequently bring far from

the best "specific features" of convictions into the collectives. All of this, taken together, has negatively influenced the unity of Army Komsomol forces and has introduced disintegration into their ranks.

Later, N.I. Shlyaga analyzed the ways to increase Army Komsomol prestige in the current socio-political situation.

First. In order to become a genuine advance guard of Army youth and a socio-political organization of a new type, today Army Komsomol as never before needs a new understanding of its role in society and in the Armed Forces and of the real ideological goals for whose sake it exists. Because nothing so rallies young people or unites them spiritually as the profound consciousness of the appropriateness and greatness of the goals for which the Komsomol is struggling.

We need to be frank: many people have retreated before the mass attacks of the defamers of socialist ideals, have surrendered the initiative to the impudent informal ideologues and cosmopolitans who are subverting the feeling of pride for their native Homeland, for its very rich history, and for the Komsomol's labor and military traditions among the people and primarily among the young people.

Consequently, the most important strategic goal of Army Komsomol's activities at this stage consists of seizing the ideological initiative and in restoring the former perseverance in defending our socialist values and in mobilizing Army young people to carry out tasks that have risen before the country's Armed Forces today. We need to understand that conversations about the Komsomol's ideological neutrality are inappropriate today. The people who are calling for this are once again pursuing their own ideological and political goals.

If the Komsomol does not affect the spiritual sphere of VLKSM members, later on it will be a toy in political intrigues.

Second. The organic part of the Komsomol's political ideals are, as we all know, moral ideals. It was no accident that V.I. Lenin devoted special attention to the development of high moral reference points among Komsomol members. That is undoubtedly why there is still one true path to the return of the Army Komsomol's prestige—the restoration of its impeccable moral character. Which is why as the proclamation of high moral ideals in the Komsomol environment and the brazen flouting of their irresponsibility, lack of discipline, "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], and drunkenness—all of this creates as if two faces for the Komsomol, light and dark, makes it two-faced, and teaches Komsomol members to live according to the principle of "two morals."

In essence, it must be a question of a fundamental review of the exacting criteria for VLKSM members and assessments of their service and conduct. It is here that the



Komsomol has lost the primordial-traditional intolerance toward everything that cast a dirty shadow on its name.

Third. The problems of restoring the Army Komsomol's prestige cannot be examined in isolation from the state of its intra-union work. Its primary and long-standing shortcoming is formalism. Boring meetings, unfulfilled decisions and tasks, effective in name and fruitless in end result, and measures that bore you to death for the sake of a "check mark." All of this takes away from the vital, healthy, and creative work of its core—a business-like manner.

Today a decisive breakthrough to precisely this quality of intra-union work which would insure the main thing—real, perceptible results is extremely necessary for the Army Komsomol. And then the senior comrades and non-union youth will see and understand: the Komsomol's word and deed are indivisible and it really is advancing the combat readiness, discipline, and political maturity of young people.

Fourth. A special responsibility in winning the prestige of Army and Navy Komsomol lies with the Komsomol's elected organs and personally on Komsomol organization soviet chairmen. They can be called the Komsomol's backbone and central nervous system.

The new time is making special demands on the political, business, and moral qualities of the Komsomol worker-leader. A clear understanding of the Komsomol's new ideological reference points, the capability to disseminate them to like-thinkers, and the skill to defend their convictions in disputes with opponents, a precise vision of priority tasks, a keen rejection of formalism, the feeling of a new charge for creativity and a sincere need to know what young people breathe and react to their needs, a clean moral character—today this is primarily what defines the face of the Komsomol leader and his prestige. And these qualities need to be persistently and stubbornly cultivated. And yet, the speaker stressed, we need to constantly remember that both the military-political organs, CPSU organizations, and the Komsomol need to operate in a new socio-political situation in the country and in the Armed Forces.

Reform is occurring in the Armed Forces. The political and Party structures have been transformed in its course. The mastery of their new functions is occurring. Although today the military-political organs do not lead social organizations—but it is clear that both they and the Komsomol, while acting in a single state institute, also have a single strategic goal—to comprehensively promote and achieve the reliable protection of the Homeland.

But we need to consider, noted N.I. Shlyaga, that the mechanism of cooperation of military-political organs with the social structures, including with the Army Komsomol, has quite a few new, still untested elements. There are many nonworking, unpolished "gears." Along

with adjusting and correcting many things, we need to reach a mutually acceptable and legislatively true understanding of the positions.

But it is very important while resolving problems to allocate efforts and tasks that do not coincide with ambitions, do not give free rein to arrogance, and do not strive to place someone above someone else or to demonstrate their independence, but to think, and to serve the interests of the common cause—the interests of the reliable defense of the Homeland.

But, unfortunately, many messages from the local areas demonstrate that some leaders of military-political organs are remaining aloof from the problems of young people and resolve them depending on personal desires and the tone of sentiment. Often instead of aid some of them shift to "grumbling."

Certainly the Main Military-Political Directorate will react in a fundamental, state-like manner to this attitude toward the Komsomol's needs and concerns.

In conclusion, Colonel-General N.I. Shlyaga expressed the hope that the conference will become an event in the life of the Army Komsomol and a turning point to a new, attractive, authoritative image.

#### **DOSAAF Problems Operating in New Economy**

*91UM0724B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
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[Article by A. Akishin, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent: "Will Control Become Reliable? Notes From the All-Union Seminar of Chairmen of Auditing Commissions of DOSAAF Organizations."]

[Text] *An All-Union seminar for chairmen of auditing commissions of republic, kray, and oblast organizations of the DOSAAF Russian Federation took place recently in Smolensk.*

*A. Anokhin, Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF of the USSR and Chief of the Directorate of Organizational-Mass Activities and Military-Patriotic Propaganda, presented a report on the decisions of the 6th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and their significance for a more comprehensive restructuring in the activities of the defense society.*

*A. Khankov, Chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission made a presentation to the seminar.*

*The seminar participants discussed the problems of auditing under new economic conditions. Reports on these issues were presented by A. Volkov and V. Yashukov, Deputy Chiefs of the Directorate for Financial and Economic Affairs, as well as by O. Osetrov and V. Ryzhenkov, Deputy Chiefs of Central Committee directorates of the USSR DOSAAF.*

The present seminar, in contrast to those in the past, took place under very modest circumstances. DOSAAF committees and organizations transitioned to new forms

of management, and a system of market relationships is beginning to function. In such a situation, some people try to find various loopholes for possible machinations and abuses.

Under these conditions the activities of auditing commissions at all levels, and first and foremost at the republic, kray, and oblast levels, have become more complex and their role has gained in importance. It is now not only a matter of uncompromising and decisive financial control, struggle against bad management and squandering, and misappropriation, but also participation in evaluating economic operations and their expedient economic activities in concluding contracts, agreements, and transactions....

Two figures: Last year, misappropriation and mispending accounted for over 270,000 rubles, and around one million rubles were attributed to losses and unproductive expenditures. These facts also demonstrate that many auditing commissions have not, up until now, been fully immersed in feeling a responsibility for their assigned tasks, and some even calmly pass over cases of clear violations and abuse.

There is a lack of systematic planning and testing in the work of some of the commissions. In the final analysis, this leads to some defense collectives being without financial control for a number of years. The work of the auditing commission of the Krasnodar Kray DOSAAF organization, headed by V. Ishin, Deputy Chief of the Yeysk Automotive School, was criticized at the seminar. This commission usually audits only the kray committee, a small wholesale store, an industrial group, and a construction repair directorate. The remaining organizations, directly subordinate to the kray committee—and there are around thirty of them—have not been subjected to an examination by the auditing commission for many years. It is not difficult to imagine what such lack of control could lead to.

There are other unpleasant facts as well. During the course of several years, for example, no public auditors showed up in the DOSAAF Central Committee organizations in Tajikistan, or in the Dagestan, Tunin, Udmurt, and Kabardino-Balkar Oblast Committees of DOSAAF...

Nevertheless, the defense society still has many activists who exhibit initiative working in control and auditing. They are distinguished in their work by their exactness and genuine objectivity, their competence and their high principles. It is they who set the tone in financial control.

Here, at the seminar, I had the opportunity to meet old friends: Nikolay Ivanovich Prokofyev, Chairman of the DOSAAF Auditing Commission of Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast, and Bayan Gindallipovich Zaripov, Chairman of the DOSAAF Auditing Commission of the Bashkir Oblast organization. Incidentally, just a short while ago, in accordance with a decision by a bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, both were given awards for excellent work.

What is so characteristic about the work style of the commission that Bayan Gindallipovich has been heading for several consecutive terms? It is the systematic and organized participation of all members of the commission in conducting reviews. It is the personal, high degree of responsibility of each member for the quality of the audit. In addition, the commission always works in a spirit of irreconcilability toward abuses, and constantly exerts controls in an effort to eliminate deficiencies. Of course, the successful activities of the commission are also determined by the attitude of the chairman himself toward his responsibilities, and his ability to organize people and direct their efforts into proper channels.

I think it should be understood that the results of commission activities depend basically on people, and specifically, on the commission chairman.

The present chairmen of DOSAAF auditing commissions at republic, kray, and oblast levels are, by absolute majority, excellent finance experts who are engaged in doing a high volume of work in their profession. It is natural that because they are so involved in their own work, they usually find little time to organize and conduct audits on public matters. Also, they are often very distant from the everyday activities of the various subunits of our defense society.

At the previous, 5th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, there was talk about the necessity of improving control and audit work, and increasing its effectiveness.

And indeed a year ago the first step was taken toward creating a unified, independent, public, and open system for control and audit work. As an experiment, chairmen of auditing commissions in a number of large organizations were given staff duties. This innovation justified itself fully. The concept, however, is progressing slowly. As of today, only 12 organizations out of the 86, which are directly locked into the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, have audit commission chairmen with staff duties. What seems to be the problem? I think there are several reasons. Some simply involve unwillingness and, in a few places, hidden opposition by committee chairmen who have been forced to introduce new positions (with good pay, incidentally) from their existing manning and from their salary budgets. And a few committee heads apparently like the inactivity of some of their members who are engaged in public work: It makes for a more quiet life.... In any case, at present, in the Russian Federation, we have only 8 staff chairmen of auditing commissions at 77 kray and oblast defense organizations.

There is no doubt that a great deal depends on exact and skilled, and most importantly, conscientious work of auditing commissions. But there are also other factors which do not at all promote these activities; in fact, sometimes even impede them. Here is one of them: In the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the processing of long obsolete documents, which regulate auditing



commission activities under new managerial rules, is taking too long and is too slow.

Over a period of 25 years, for example, there were instructions issued, that are still valid, on how to conduct audits of financial and economic activities in the DOSAAF system.... Another set of instructions, that has been outdated for 10 years, has to do with how to conduct audits of DOSAAF manufacturing enterprises, shops, and housekeeping organizations.... For nine years, no one has reviewed the regulation on departmental control over financial and economic activities of DOSAAF committees, enterprises, and organizations. And the regulation on USSR DOSAAF auditing commissions itself needs basic revision, even though certain changes were made in it not too long ago.

In short, the people in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee structure also have something to think about.

The seminar which just ended showed once again, that the activities of auditing commissions and their effectiveness are measured not only by the number of reviews, audits, and well-written documents, but primarily by their effectiveness. This means that success is attained only when the committees and organizations of our defense society really rid themselves of poor management, waste, misappropriation, and abuse.

Was the seminar useful? Generally, as far as I am concerned, the answer is affirmative. Its participants familiarized themselves with the situation in the defense society and its complex problems, and received comprehensive answers to many questions.

But here is what was distressing: Unfortunately, an exchange of information that had been planned about work experience did not take place. There were not very many presentations, and most of the speeches concerned special problems. It would have been good to hear interesting, specific proposals on basic problems for restructuring the control and financial activities of DOSAAF commissions under present conditions.

#### **DOSAAF Chairman Kotlovtssev Interviewed**

*91UM0724A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Jun 91 First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Colonel-General Nikolay Nikiforovich Kotlovtssev, People's Deputy of the USSR and Chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, by Colonel R. Makushin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Defense Society: Anxieties and Hopes."]

[Text] Colonel-General N. Kotlovtssev, People's Deputy of the USSR and Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF of the USSR, answers questions asked by a KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Correspondent.] Nikolay Nikiforovich, the questions which I would like to ask you come not only from my editorial office and, in fact, not so much from there as

from readers of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA. I can say without exaggeration that every letter concerning the work of the defense society expresses concern about its status at various locations. One of the most recent letters on this subject is from Lev Nikolayevich Moshkov. He is the chairman of the DOSAAF committee in the city of Rostov, in the Yaroslavskiy Oblast. I shall not quote from this letter in full, because I think that the questions he touches upon will surface in our conversation one way or another. But here is one phrase: "I would like KRSNAYA ZVEZDA to have a discussion on the present and the future of the defense society." I assume that the wording of this question is proper for today's interview.

[N. Kotlovtssev.] I cannot help but agree with the reader. It is true that the crisis, which has enveloped the socio-political structure of our country, has also affected the organizations of the defense society. Specifically, this can be seen in the extremely slow restructuring of our organizations with respect to functioning in an environment of a legal government, the development of a real multi-party system, and a transition to a market economy. We have to "survive" and function where there is a break-up of organizational structures and a displacement of the prescribed activities of some DOSAAF organizations due to the pressures of financial difficulties.

[Correspondent.] I suppose that this crisis also manifests itself in the present mass exodus of DOSAAF members. As far as I know, persons who have left the organization number in the millions.

[N. Kotlovtssev.] Yes, that is true. Over the past three or four years the number of primary organizations has decreased by around 40,000, and there are about one quarter fewer members in the defense society. But I would not want to dramatize this situation. The fact is that for the most part this process is occurring because DOSAAF organizations with few members and no material base of their own are joining together, and also decreasing the number of so-called deadwood. I consider these moves to be correct. Just look at where DOSAAF organizations used to be before: In pharmacies and, say, in some kind of small institutions. Well, what kind of defense work do you have here? You walk in and look around: In the best case they will have a gas mask lying around somewhere. So, today we are getting rid of the ballast.

[Correspondent.] Nikolay Nikiforovich, But doesn't this process affect the financial situation of the organization? People leave, money leaves. There go their membership dues...

[N. Kotlovtssev.] Naturally, you cannot say that the defense society's present financial situation is good. But I have to mention one thing, not tied to its reduction. This is the general misconception that DOSAAF exists on its membership dues. Dues amount to practically nothing; they constitute up to five percent of our budget. The main sources of income for the society's budget consist of self-supporting activities: Training economic

experts, publications, and our lottery. Well, in general, a paradoxical situation has developed in our defense society with regard to finances. It seems that we have money and at the same time we don't. The fact of the matter is that the greater part of our resources accumulates at different locations and is spent for trifling matters. They say that DOSAAF has half a billion. And where are they? The DOSAAF Central Committee has, realistically, 15-20 million in its account, but as soon as a need arises to appropriate money for a serious program, a search for money begins.

**[Correspondent.]** Do you see a way to get out of these crisis situations? Needless to say, I have in mind other than just your financial difficulties.

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** Obviously, there are ways. Jointly we tried to find ways during the All-Union Conference with chairmen of DOSAAF committees, at a seminar with deputy chairmen on organizational- mass work, and in individual organizations at different locations. We came to the conclusion that to find these ways it is necessary, first of all, to raise the level of our organizational work and, secondly, to be bolder in transitioning to economic forms of management.

**[Correspondent.]** And is there already some kind of movement in doing this?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** Yes, including activities in the more restive regions of our country.

The defense collectives in Latvia and Estonia, due to the flexible policies and suspension of policies by their elective bodies and their leadership, are among the few links which are still holding together the population that has been split into groups. Beating back constant attempts by local authorities to isolate these collectives from the Union and the USSR DOSAAF central leadership, these organizations subtly conduct their patriotic activities and ably resist those who are striving to undermine the authority of the Armed Forces and spread dirt about the army.

Here is what is so characteristic about all this. You and I were talking about how large-scale defense and patriotic activities are being curtailed because of lack of funds. This is true, but not completely. They find funds in defense organizations in Latvia and Estonia. Organizing paying sports events and expanding the training of specialists for the national economy results in saving and, here and there, even increasing revenues. For example, revenues increased several fold in the organization of the Leninskiy District of the city of Tallinn.

In general, too, the transition to new managerial methods have given good results. The Volgograd defense organization, for example, has established self-paying associations of amateur radio operators, model builders, marksmen, and carting and motorcycling enthusiasts. They have opened shops for servicing and repairing automobiles. Some training organizations have equipped special centers for preventive medicine and

treatment for the population. There are five self-paying club affiliates for dog breeding services.

All these activities resulted in the oblast defense organization increasing its revenues by 50% and their profits doubled.

**[Correspondent.]** These examples are interesting, of course. But then, where are those letters of alarm coming from?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** Unfortunately, there are grounds for these kinds of letters. In these complex times, dullness and indifference flourish in many of our organizations. Elective bodies, for all practical purposes, do not do anything.

Wide scale defense activities in DOSAAF organizations in the Krasnodar Kray and Magadan Oblast, for example, have many deficiencies. Here, the defense collectives are "seething" as they sort out their interrelationships and send complaints by the package to the DOSAAF Central Committee. In other words, they work for themselves, in isolation, and all activity ceases.

I could cite example after example of similar cases. They give us the right to draw this conclusion: Time does not tolerate inactivity and incompetence in directing wide-scale defense activities. The lowering of standards and the refusal to conduct activities established by regulations are inescapably leading to the edge, beyond which there is the question: To be or not to be for our organizations?

**[Correspondent.]** Our country is undergoing military reform. In connection with this, are there changes in the activities of DOSAAF in training experts for the Armed Forces?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** As is well known, this is one of the high priority items for our activities. In connection with the military reform, however, we have the full-blown problem of reexamining the organizational structure and scope for training our specialists. After all, we have to answer the question: Will all our training organizations have a permanent and stable requirement for training these specialists? At the same time we have to take into consideration the fact that now, pursuant to decisions made by the government of the USSR, estimates for training specialists for the Armed Forces in our educational organizations will be made on the basis of an agreement between the General Staff and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. Strict mutual responsibility of the parties will be required for the timely staffing of educational organizations with draftees and for the quality of their training. The Ministry of Defense has the right to turn down the services of those DOSAAF organizations which do not live up to the terms of the agreement.

In connection with this, it will now be necessary to have a substantive review of our training organizations and authenticate their capabilities.

We shall have to seriously look into the quality of training of our students. This is not a new problem for us and we have nothing to brag about. Year in and year out more than one-third of our graduates are satisfied with only passing grades. The number is unsatisfactory and number of students with a mediocre preparation is significant. The military is justified in expecting a low level of training of many of our graduates, especially in performing practical functions.

**[Correspondent.]** Is it probable that the transition of the Navy from three-year to two-year active duty will affect the activities of DOSAAF organizations?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** There is no doubt about that. This transition will inevitably drag down the level of professional training of personnel having term enlistments. Implementing a contract system of service in the navy will not fully resolve this problem. DOSAAF assistance will be needed. We have to preserve and utilize more productively the technical specialty training system in DOSAAF. This applies first and foremost to those specialties requiring a sufficient amount of practical training: Electromechanical, radio-technical, and other specialties.

**[Correspondent.]** DOSAAF is also trying to resolve the important problem of determining how the training of personnel in technical professions assists young people in acquiring technical creativity. What problems face the defense organizations in doing this?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** Our organizations are meeting stiff competition in the environment of transitioning to a self-supporting basis and to a market economy. Thus, up to a short while ago, training drivers for various means of transportation was done only by DOSAAF and by republic societies for automobile enthusiasts. Now it is conducted by republic ministries of automotive transport, professional technical schools, and cooperatives, and the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] has initiated the acceptance of off-site examinations on a wide scale.

In connection with this, our organizations have to seriously study the needs of the population and determine the scope and organizational structure for training people in specific specialties, and take appropriate measures. We have to do this jointly with Soviets, military commissariats, and enterprises. At the same time we have to react efficiently to requirements and proposals, including prices, and of course demonstrate flexibility to restructure in the interests of our clients.

**[Correspondent.]** I would like, Nikolay Nikiforovich, to return again to financial problems, but this time, in connection with the technical aspects of sports for which DOSAAF was always famous. Apparently, there are also problems here?

**[N. Kotlovtssev.]** Many problems. This is, after all, an expensive pleasure. Judge for yourself. The automobile, motorcycle, aircraft, and parachute now cost two to three times more than before. There is not much money. But

the youth is drawn to us. As an example, it is astounding how many girls want to become parachutists. Many want to fly or drive. We cannot satisfy these demands right now. But here is the strange part: We were poorer before, but had more achievements in technical activities. Our flyers still enjoy worldwide prestige. We now have the Su-26 and Su-26M aircraft, the best sports aircraft in the world. Our parachutists are reestablishing the position they lost. This technology problem has to be solved, because it is practically the only thing we can use to keep our young people. If we have no technical equipment, people will abandon the types of sports we have to offer.

And so, in conclusion, I would like to say that the problems facing DOSAAF are problems facing the entire nation.

### Servicemen's Protection Group Interviewed

91UM0716D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
10 Jun 91 Union edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel N. Karasev, director general of the Social Initiative association, by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Litovkin: "Officers Form Own Association"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] On 7 June, the Social Initiative association held its founding conference in the Moscow Military District Officers' Club. The association's creation has the approval of the country's Supreme Soviet. The association is an amalgamation of about three dozen funds, councils, institutions, committees, and enterprises which in one way or another work in the interests of social and legal protection of servicemen, members of their families, white collar and blue collar Army and Navy civilian employees, and Armed Forces veterans.

Below is the text of an interview our correspondent held with Colonel N. Karasev, professor and doctor of economic sciences, who is the association's director general.

[IZVESTIYA] Nikolay Fedorovich, I know that included in your association are organizations with names that do not mean much to the reader. For example, there are the All-Union fund Recuperation and Sports, the society Women for Social Renewal, the All-Union association Youth for the Revival of the Fatherland's Culture. What departments or parties are they "masking?"

[Karasev] I am afraid that my answer may be disappointing. We have nothing to do with that. We are an economic, not an ideological, organization; one that receives no funding, to boot. Our purpose is to render assistance to military personnel in this unusual, and, needless to say, very difficult social situation—one characterized by an emerging market economy. For that reason, we stand ready to cooperate with state institutions and departments on the one hand, and public organizations, parties, and religious faiths on the other. We are not concerned with whether persons are of the "right," "left," or "center," opting instead for common sense, matter-oriented acumen, and economic impact.

[IZVESTIYA] What exactly do you have in mind?

[Karasev] The construction and purchase of housing for servicemen; retraining of servicemen; the acquisition of new specialties and occupations presently in short supply, going as far as to include completion of a second level of higher education. We will also be active in seeking employment for men discharged into the reserves and offering them any kind of legal aid we can. We intend to set up our own publishing facility, information and commercial centers, and produce our own periodical. We are to found a humanities university, which will offer three levels of training in five specialties, the purpose being to graduate persons who will fill management positions in state institutions and enterprises. Doctorates will also be conferred there. Plans abound.

[IZVESTIYA] How do you intend to earn money, seeing that servicemen are forbidden involvement in cooperatives, performing any labor activity, or having anything to do with "outside" matters?

[Karasev] Our structure is making room for carrying out social programs and setting up a definite base of production operations on which to build them. This base is to consist of enterprises, scientific production and scientific commercial centers that will employ reserve officers and retirees, servicemen's wives, and workers from defense branches. Within the framework of the association, they will fill the base's orders, thus supporting a special development fund and making centralized contributions into general social programs. In addition, our financial resources will be increased by contributions made by association members and receipts from commercial and intellectual activity. There are quite a few qualified specialists among the officers. Their organizational ability, experience, responsibility, and competence are held in very high regard in today's labor market.

[IZVESTIYA] Now for the last question. Where are you located? How can you be contacted by persons wishing to join the association?

[Karasev] We do not as yet have an official address. That we will receive upon registering. The telephone numbers for inquiries are 293-37-39, 293-21-27, and 412-45-17.

### **Turkish Firm Builds Veterans' Hospital in Moscow**

91UM0716B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
12 Jun 91 Union edition p 1

[Article by G. Alimov and G. Charodeyev: "A Hospital for Our Veterans"]

[Text] A hospital for veterans of the Patriotic War has been erected in the Babushkin Locality of Moscow under a contract with the Turkish firm of Enka. The first stone of the foundation was set on 23 February 1989. The hospital is built in the European style, with construction

technology in line with contemporary practice as incorporated into a design produced by the Finnish corporation of Devekon. The facility is to be provided with medical equipment produced in the West. The contract price is 88 million dollars and 30 million rubles. (The medical equipment is valued at 18 million dollars.)

The hospital complex's departments are designed to treat 1,000 patients at any one time, or 31,000 cases per year. The examination center will be capable of examining and treating approximately 100,000 patients a year. Splendid conditions have been created to render veterans a high level of care. To be employed in the complex are various types of rehabilitative measures, including a therapeutic swimming pool, underwater massage, illumination therapy, and athletic devices.

Special mention must be made of the superior scheduling and quality of construction, which were under constant monitoring by the Mosgorispolkom, the Main Medical Administration, and councils of war and labor veterans. In a conversation with IZVESTIYA correspondents, Dr. Sh. Tara, the head of Enka, expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which Soviet-Turkish relations have progressed.

"Concerning future cooperation," he stressed, "the firm is prepared to erect three more modern hospitals of this type in the very near future. We have additional plans; we do not intend to stop here. There are a number of future projects in progress. Here, in the Soviet Union, we are laying a fairly strong base that will make it possible for us to rapidly erect highly complex and large structures at a high level of quality. We find it a pleasure to do business with our Soviet colleagues, and I personally have developed partnership relations with them."

The timely opening of the hospital's doors will make it possible to render high-quality medical care to the handicapped and war veterans, the ones who are the most in need of such service. Specialists point out that this hospital complex is far superior to all the similar facilities in the country, including the 4th Main Administration of the USSR Minzdrav.

### **Group To Defend Ex-Soldiers' Interests Formed**

91UM0710B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 91  
Union edition p 2

[Report by V. Klavdin and V. Yuzbashev: "A Shield For the Reservists"]

[Text] A presentation of the All-Union Social Protection Fund For Former Servicemen took place in the conference hall of the CEMA building in Moscow. It was established by the Ministry of Defense, the USSR KGB, the Soviet Committee for Safeguarding Peace and other state and public organizations. They included also the editorial board of the newspaper SYN OTECHSTVA.

"Our job," Major General (Res) Kim Tsagolov, fund president, told the IZVESTIYA correspondents, "is to provide social protection for servicemen released into the reserve—all of them, from the rank-and-file soldier



to the general—and help them adapt to a new life, build or obtain housing and learn new job skills, and to support disabled servicemen. For the resolution of these problems we shall rely upon cooperation with state and public agencies, foreign and international organizations, study their experience and apply it in our own situation.”

“I support the establishment of such a fund,” we were told by Colonel Aleksandr Rutskey, Hero of the Soviet Union and people’s deputy of the RSFSR. “It is a disgrace that 292,000 officers and warrant officers in the nation lack apartments. What other state could treat its army this way? I feel, however, that the state, and not funds, should guarantee a normal, human standard of living for our armed defenders. And Russia’s parliament is working on such a law.”

Right now, however, the new fund has neither its own space nor even a telephone. It is beginning its work with troubles and problems.

### Law on Rights of Ex-Servicemen Without Pensions

#### Text of Law

91UM0798A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 91  
Union edition p 4

[Law on Rights of Ex-Servicemen signed by USSR President M. Gorbachev on July 9, 1991, Moscow, the Kremlin: “Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On Special Employment and Social Assistance Guarantees for Servicemen Released from the Service Without the Right to a Pension”]

[Text]

**Article 1.** This Law defines the special guarantees to realize the right to work, terms, standards, and procedures to render social assistance to officers, warrant officers, and extended service military personnel of the USSR Armed Forces, Committee for State Security troops and organs, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops, USSR railroad troops and other military formations created in accordance with the laws of the USSR, command and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs who have been released from service without the right to a pension for age, sickness, personnel reductions, or restricted health condition (hereinafter referred to as personnel released from service).

The validity of the Fundamental Laws of the USSR and the republics on employment of the population applies to the personnel indicated and also to personnel who have been released from service without the right to a pension based on grounds not stipulated by this Law if something else is not stipulated by USSR law.

**Article 2.** Individuals who have been released from service have a priority right to job placement. Their salary is maintained according to the former position held prior to release during the period that they look for work but for no longer than a three-month period with

the condition that they have registered at a state employment center as individuals seeking work within 10 calendar days of being placed on the military roster. In so doing, payment of the maintained salary is carried out by the ministries and departments where the indicated individuals performed their service.

**Article 3.** Unemployment allowances for individuals who have been released from service are established in the amount of 60 percent of the salary for the last position held prior to release but no lower than the minimum wage prescribed by the law of the USSR.

**Article 4.** Professional training, increasing skills, or retraining of individuals released from service and registered at the state employment center are conducted in a priority manner using State Employment Assistance Fund resources.

**Article 5.** Individuals released from service and registered at the state employment service as persons seeking work, during the period of training, increasing skills, or retraining according to state employment service direction are paid a stipend in the amount:

- those persons who have minor children or dependents—80 percent of the salary of the position held prior to release; or
- those persons who do not have minor children or dependents—60 percent of the salary of the position held prior to release.

**Article 6.** Individuals who are released from service and who undergo professional training, increase skills, or retraining with a break from production in the new job, are paid a stipend during the entire training period in the amount of the average wage for that profession (specialty) for which they are preparing but no less 50 percent of the salary of the last position held prior to release.

**Article 7.** Republic law and local Soviet of people’s deputies decisions may prescribe additional employment guarantees and social assistance for individuals who have been released from service.

President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics M. Gorbachev

Moscow, the Kremlin, July 9, 1991.

#### Supreme Soviet Resolution

91UM0798B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 91  
Union edition p 4

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution signed by USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov, Moscow, the Kremlin, July 9, 1991: “USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution To Invoke the Law of the USSR ‘On Special Employment and Social Assistance Guarantees for Servicemen Released from the Service Without the Right to a Pension’”]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To invoke the Law of the USSR “On Special Employment and Social Assistance Guarantees for Servicemen

Who Have Been Released from Service Without the Right to a Pension" since July 15, 1991.

2. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers will make a USSR government decision in accordance with the Law of the USSR "On Special Employment and Social Assistance Guarantees for Servicemen Released from the Service

Without the Right to a Pension" and to insure that USSR ministries and departments review and repeal normative acts that contradict this Law prior to January 1, 1992.

USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov Moscow, the Kremlin, July 9, 1991

**Republic Delegation To Visit NATO***91UN2111C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Jul 91 p 1*

[INTERFAX report: "Delegation of Russia Invited To NATO"]

[Text] On the invitation of the NATO leadership, a delegation of the Russian Federation is leaving for Belgium on Saturday; the delegation is headed by Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Security, and Colonel General Konstantin Kobtsov, chairman of the State Committee of Defense Matters of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

As Stepashin told us, this is the first official invitation extended by the NATO command to representatives of Russia. "Since Russia occupies a leading place in matters of national defense," said Stepashin, "now, in connection with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, and the fulfillment of the program of nuclear armaments reductions, the plenipotentiary representatives of Russia intend to bring up the issue of reciprocal steps on the part of the NATO command in regard to reductions in the five million contingent of armed forces in the countries of West Europe."

**Ukraine Said to Need Own Republic Army***91UM0799A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian  
No 26, Jun 91 p 35*

[Article by Ukrainian Republican Party Soviet Member Valeriy Semivolos, Kharkov: "Will Ukraine Get Its Own Army? Ukraine Has Agreed To Sign the Union Treaty and Therefore Entrust its Defense to the Union Army. But There Is an Alternative Point of View"]

[Text] The Ukrainian People's Republic (1917-1920) did not have its own combat capable army and this is precisely why the Bolsheviks managed to overthrow the legitimate Ukrainian government. In the 1940's-1950's, the national liberation movement in Western Ukraine relied on a relatively small army (UPA) [Ukrainian People's Army] and as a result the people's prolonged resistance to both the German and Soviet occupations became possible.

The events of the "perestroika" period suggest: in those republics where more or less organized national military formations are operating, the Center prefers not to risk large-scale military intervention in internal republic affairs. The examples are Armenia and Georgia and, if Moscow also introduces troops into those regions, they occupy a neutral position (South Ossetia, Moldova). However, Ukraine is neither Moldova nor Georgia. Separate military formations will not save us. Only a regular national army will be able to protect our sovereignty.

What will it cost the Ukrainian people?

Prior to 1989, it was officially announced that the amount of USSR military expenditures total 20.2 billion rubles. In 1989, it was stated that they are equal to R77.3 billion. Finally, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved R96.5 billion as the amount of military expenditures for 1991.

However, it seems that this number includes only Ministry of Defense expenditures and that behind the parentheses remained other expenditures that were scattered among various sectors of the military-industrial complex.... One can presume that the actual military budget is nearly 2-3 times higher.

What portion of that exorbitant load does Ukraine bear? They are silent about the official statistics so we will calculate it ourselves.

As we all know, Ukraine's share of the All-Union Gross National Product (GNP) is 25 percent. One can assume that the Ukraine's share of the military budget remains in that same proportion. That is, if you believe the official numbers, it totals nearly R25 billion.

One can conduct the calculations another way. The population of Ukraine is 52 million people. According to the correlation from the percentage of the Union population, we can ascertain 20 percent to be the minimum percentage of the military budget. It turns out to be R20 billion—that is, the expenditures are the same. But this, I repeat, is if we assume that the 1991 military budget is R96.5 billion. It seems to me that the number R300 billion is more reliable, based on detailed calculations and analysis of the structure of the military-industrial complex. In this case, Ukraine's share is R60-75 billion.

You do not believe it? Well, let us calculate a bit more. Ukraine's 25 percent share of the Union GNP is R218.5 billion. Ukraine's official budget, that is, what Moscow leaves on the master's table, totals R50 billion. One other number was named by MOLOD UKRAINI newspaper: "Union ministries annually steal R100 billion from Ukraine." An ordinary mathematical calculation indicates that the difference between Ukraine's shares of the Union GNP (R218.5 billion) and the colonial tax number (R100 billion), taken together with the republic budget (R50 billion) totals R68.5 billion which undoubtedly goes into the all-union military budget.

According to my calculations, nearly 1.2 million army men are deployed in Ukraine whose weaponry includes 14,000-16,000 tanks, 15 nuclear submarines, 364 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 20,000 BMP's [armored personnel vehicles] and BTR's [armored transport vehicles], 20,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 combat aircraft. By strength and combat potential, this is approximately equal to the armed forces of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] (prior to reunification), England, and France, taken together!

If we wish to become a normal European power, our army must meet European standards. Because who wants to have a hungry, naked neighbor along side him who does not exert all of his efforts to feed himself and

his family and to restore his destroyed home, but to obtain weapons? And still a fire flares up in that ragamuffin's yard from time to time which threatens to burn down the entire village in one minute.... Therefore, Ukraine must already right now proclaim its intention not only to close down the ecologically dangerous nuclear power program but also to strictly adhere to the three nuclear-free principles.

The Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Mikhail Moiseyev, while speaking to the Ukrainian parliament on November 27, 1990, stated that our republic provides more than 17 percent of the total draft into the Soviet Army. This is approximately 700,000 men, almost half of whom until recently served outside the borders of Ukraine.

Well and what strength do I see for the future Ukrainian Army? If you consider the future professional army, the rejection of nuclear weapons and the appropriate resources for maintenance, support, and delivery, the number will be reduced to 200,000-300,000 men. That is, right now there are 400,000-500,000 excess Ukrainians under arms....

What costs will Ukraine bear for maintaining this army? Such European countries as the FRG (prior to reunification) and France spend 2-4 percent of their gross national product on defense. For Ukraine, this percentage of GNP in a numerical expression will be equal to R4.3-8.6 billion. That is, the creation of the Ukrainian National Professional Nuclear-Free Army will permit us to release nearly R70 billion. And its national army will also become one of the primary guarantees that these resources will be used to realize social, cultural, and national economic programs of precisely Ukraine.

### **Military Draftees Wreck Train**

*91UM0773A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jun 91 p 1*

[Article by M. Pereplesnin: "Troop Train Gone Astray"]

[Text] A troop train of draftees wandered in Turkmenia for five days before it went to Moscow Oblast as designated.

Along the way the future soldiers lost no time as they actively took note of being called into active service. At dawn of the first day one of the conscripts was thrown off the train which was travelling at full speed. After a few hours one of the officers accompanying the men was similarly thrown off the train. Then the director of the train and his deputy political officer were beaten up. Out

of the whole train not one window was left unbroken, and seven cars were completely demolished.

The troop train was stopped, surrounded by police, and later was sent to Maryysk Oblast. Here twelve of the participants were placed under investigation. Four conscripts were sent to a hospital with injuries of varying severity. Fortunately, there were no fatalities.

### **Additional Troops to Safeguard Threatened Armenian Village**

*91UM0773C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Major A. Petrov: "Firing from all Sides"]

[Text] The situation in Zakavkazye remains tense. At the request of the Armenian government additional troop garrisons have been set up in the Shamshadinskiy, Gorisskiy and Krasnoselskiy regions which border Azerbaijan. The troops had not yet managed to deploy at their outpost when they were fired upon.

The outpost in the populated area Shurnukh was fired upon on June 26 from the Kubatliinskiy region of Azerbaijan by unknown persons. The next day from the Armenian side unknown persons opened fire on an outpost in the village of Khidzoresk. During the search a ZIL-131 vehicle and three persons of Armenian nationality were detained. They were turned over to the local ROVD. [Rayon Department of Internal Affairs]

### **Sergeant Killed During Raid on Guard Post**

*91UM0773B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 91 First Edition p 1*

[Article by V. Kaushanskiy: "New Firing on Soldiers"]

[Text] While the leadership of Armenia is attempting on all levels to broadcast the role of the Armenian population of the regions bordering on Azerbaijan as victims of intrigues of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and subunits of the Soviet Army. The illegal formations of fighters which have not yet been disarmed are quietly continuing to commit their nefarious deeds.

On July 2 at 10:15 PM in the region of the populated point of Yeras Senior Lieutenant S. Strizhak, who was passing by in a "Niva" automobile, was wounded by a pistol shot. During this same night a group of unknown persons on the western edge of the town of Sisai made an outlaw attack on the guard post. Sergeant A. Babenko was killed and private A. Belukha was wounded. Information of losses of the attackers have not yet arrived, but an investigation is underway.



### Current State of Military Legislation

91UM0728A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Jun 91 First edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel Justice V. Volkov, candidate of law, chief of the Military Legislation Section of the Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Affairs, by Colonel G. Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Interview at the Readers' Request": "2,000 Proposals, or, Whether the USSR Ministry of Defense Values the Opinion of Soviet Citizens"]

[Text] When I left for this meeting with Col V. Volkov, candidate of legal sciences and chief of the Legal Legislation Section of the Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Affairs, I took along several letters from our readers, which clearly indicate concern about the slowness of the Union parliament in its consideration of bills on defense matters. Ever increasing numbers of such letters are arriving in the editors' mailbox of late. The authors are concerned about what becomes of their comments and proposals on bills, sent by the established procedure to the Military Legislation Commission of the Ministry of Defense. They wonder whether these will be heard there. Our interview began with this question.

[Miranovich] So, Vasilii Petrovich, you have just attended a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security. It is my understanding that, along with other documents, it discussed the draft Law on Universal Military Duty and Military Service and the draft Law On the Status of Servicemen. What can you tell those who have demonstrated an interest in these documents, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 26 December of last year?

[Volkov] First of all, enormous thanks. We received almost 2,000 comments and proposals. And not just from the military. Given the current, frequently negative attitude toward the army, such interest in its improvement—and this is the focus of our legislative activities on defense matters—inspires optimism. One can only regret that the mass media, including the military press, Central Television and All-Union Radio, have been totally deaf to legislation affecting the fate of millions of Soviet people. It is particularly difficult to understand the position taken by the central youth publications, which have not reacted in any way to bills essentially of interest to the bulk of their readers.

With respect to their consideration in the parliament, this work is being done there, and, as you yourself have noted, the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security does not keep us in the dark about it. Specifically, when I attended the latest session, I became further convinced that the members are greatly interested in seeing that bills become law as rapidly as possible and are doing a great deal to achieve this. As you can understand, however, this is not a simple process. The resolution of many problems raised for the legislators by the documents we have worked out will depend upon the provisions of the new Union Agreement. All things considered, the members of parliament will need

more time. There is an enormous amount of work to do to coordinate a number of provisions with the Union republics and to back them up financially and economically. Two working groups have been set up for this, headed by committee members N. Strukov and Yu. Sychev. Representatives of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Affairs have been designated to help the members of parliament. One should therefore expect the work to be stepped up. In any case, it has been recommended that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers complete the final work, taking into account the opinion of the republics and interested ministries, departments and public associations, and send them to the Supreme Soviet by 20 June.

We developers, so to speak, did our part earlier, submitting the bills to the USSR Presidium on 26 April. And the comrades who have written to us should not worry: All of their letters were carefully reviewed and—whenever possible, of course—taken into account for refining the bills.

[Miranovich] And were many amendments made in response to letters from citizens?

[Volkov] It would be difficult to give an exact figure, since we did not specially tally them. Furthermore, along with letters from individual citizens, the commission considered numerous comments and proposals from collectives: officers' assemblies, councils of seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, and other public organizations of the army and navy. Add to this surveys completed by more than 900 servicemen, a study of social and psychological problems performed by the center, research conducted by scientists.... Given this quantity of comments and proposals, many of which were, for understandable reasons, duplicates, it is simply impossible to determine who made the greatest contribution to the final version. And this is probably not the point. The main thing, after all, is the essence of the proposals.

[Miranovich] This is exactly what I intended to ask about. For example, a letter from M. Sokolov of Lvov directs attention to Article 18 (Subpoint b) of the draft Law On Universal Military Duty and Military Service. It indicates the retirement age of a draftee's father, mother, grandfather or grandmother which entitles him to a deferment from active military duty "for family circumstances." It is 60 years for men, 55 for women. "But there are occupations and specialties—specified, incidentally, in labor law, the writer points out—from which people retire at an earlier age. What are those draftees whose father, mother, grandfather or grandmother is retired but has not reached the specified age to do"?

[Volkov] Our mail also contains such questions. As in this case, they involve certain provisions already set forth in the law. When we put the final touches on the documents, we carefully considered each such comment and—here this was necessary, of course—made the necessary amendments in accordance with the current laws. In this case specifically, I can report to Comrade Sokolov that the provision on the specific retirement age for a

father, mother, grandfather or grandmother has been removed from the draft Law On Universal Military Duty and Military Service.

I must point out, however, that these are not the most difficult issues for us, although they require painstaking work and vast knowledge in the legal field.

[Miranovich] Just what are the most difficult?

[Volkov] Probably those related to the social and personal service area, let us say. And this is understandable. In addition to the fact that the servicemen and their families are, to put it mildly, not in an enviable position today, measures promulgated by the nation's President to enhance their social protection are not being properly effected locally and are even ignored altogether in some places. This undermines the people's faith in justice and in the possibility of changing things in general. The authors of the letters feel that the legislation being considered should improve legal regulation of the status of servicemen and help to establish a more reliable system of legal and social protection for them. They feel, naturally, that all of the subtle aspects of this matter should be taken into account and precisely spelled out.

In the draft Law On the Status of Servicemen, for example, severe criticism has been leveled at those articles which cover the problems of employment upon being released from the military service, the provision of housing, health protection and leave. A particularly large number of comments was evoked by the norm indicated in this draft for the length of duty time for the servicemen, i.e., the "work week." The opinions are polarized: from fervent support to absolute lack of faith that the working hours for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, and extended-duty personnel can be standardized within the limits set forth in the labor legislation: 41 hours a week.

[Miranovich] The doubts are not surprising. Today the work week for many servicemen is 60-90 hours.... But what has the commission decided?

[Volkov] When we finalized the draft we took into account, wherever possible, comments and proposals for compensating servicemen for working overtime and for working on holidays and days-off. We considered proposals pertaining to leave for first-term personnel.

[Miranovich] Once again, wherever possible? And just what are the possibilities, considering, let us say, the legal and economic aspects of the problem and the interests of combat readiness?

[Volkov] Precisely. Every proposal was carefully weighed. When we discussed the drafts, of course, we would have liked for everyone to think only of how to strengthen the national defense and not about its disintegration, how to make the military service more attractive and not about the possibility of evading it. Our mail does not indicate such singleness of mind, however. And it is not just that the army, like the KGB and the CPSU, has enemies.

Here is an example from the discussion of that draft Law On the Status of Servicemen. It contains an article on the right of servicemen to housing. Many people simply cannot accept some of its provisions. Who are these foes of the army? Given the current war of laws, it is simply difficult for a person to imagine that, upon being released from the army, he will receive housing within three months of his arrival at a place of residence selected in accordance with the existing registration procedure.

We cannot be guided by emotions, however, and base our attitude strictly on what we see today. The war of laws too will probably not last forever.... In short, the commission saw fit to retain this norm. I believe that if it is passed by the parliament and if a system for implementing it is specified, this will also enhance the prestige of the military service. A person who has dedicated his life to defending the homeland should be confident that the homeland will take care of him as well. And for this—no matter how absolute such a formulation of the matter might appear to some in the difficult sociopolitical situation and the difficult transition to a market economy—the social protection of servicemen discharged from the Armed Forces must be guaranteed by law.

We are talking, if you like, about the preservation of the army. The military formations which are being set up or will be set up in a number of republics, you know, are already promised the kind of social protection about which the Union army could not even dream. And what about us? For now, we have only the high-sounding preelection promises of certain candidates for president of Russia. Our draft's provision on job placement for servicemen following their release into the reserve, if you recall, states that they must be provided with a job in their specialty no later than 1 month from the date they apply to the local soviet of workers' deputies or to the managers of enterprises, establishments or organizations. Despite numerous disagreements, this period was extended to two months. But then, this conforms to the existing norm.

In some respects we went even farther, though. We made an amendment to the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen which provides an extra 14 days of leave time for individuals (except for first-term personnel) required to perform service duties over and above the established work week. It is also planned to increase leave time for first-term sergeants and petty officers. The procedure for granting leave to those serving under contract is also defined. This was not included in the published version.

There are also changes which will probably not suit some people. Anyone who is in conflict with discipline, let us say, can shorten his leave time by exactly the number of days he spends under arrest in the guardhouse. And anyone committing an infraction while standing alert duty, performing guard duty or other important duties may be deprived of his leave time altogether. It is

planned to put all of this into law. Is it just? Perfectly just, I believe, and so do many of those who have written us letters.

[Miranovich] Judging from the editorial mail, not everyone feels the same also about that section of the draft Law on Universal Military Duty and Military Service which deals with nonmilitary service. As in the case of the one-month period for providing those released from the service with jobs, some people totally rule out the possibility of implementing it, saying that everyone must be equal with respect to protecting the homeland. Others, to the contrary, propose enlarging the group of "alternative service personnel." What can you tell us about this?

[Volkov] If we stick to common sense, in my opinion, there is no doubt as to the expediency of establishing nonmilitary, or alternative, as it is also called, service. What kind of service one would like that to be is another matter.... Many draftees and parents, for example, for some reason feel that nonmilitary service should be like a freely chosen occupation, service performed near one's home and that it practically be mandated that this be in the services field. In their opinion, the personal wishes of the draftee alone should be the main criterion for assigning him to nonmilitary service. Unfortunately, judging from the mail, some public organizations take the same position. Obviously, many of them do not understand the essence and the purpose of nonmilitary service or its equivalent in foreign states. I want to stress our premise that draftees should be assigned to this kind of service only for reason of religious convictions. This is precisely what the latest version of the draft states. In addition, the USSR Supreme Soviet is presently working on a draft Law on Nonmilitary Service. Obviously, everything will be spelled out in detail in it.

[Miranovich] Vasily Petrovich, it is obvious that in this brief interview we cannot cover the entire range of opinions of people who wish to contribute their bit to the legislation on defense development. But let us at least indicate a few provisions in the drafts which have drawn comments and proposals from citizens.

[Volkov] A great many comments have to do with the actual military service. Here again, some people demand that deferments be eliminated for students of regular VUZ's, while others—the committee of soldiers' mothers, for example—on the contrary, propose enlarging the group of individuals entitled to deferments. Opinions coincide only on the matter of the service term: It should be shortened.

A vast amount of mail deals with problems of effecting the rights and duties of the servicemen. A large range of issues is involved: from participation in elections to the taking on of jobs by servicemen. And once again, some people demand that this be forbidden, others that it be permitted. Many people propose granting officers the right to leave the military after serving five years instead of 10, as set forth in the published draft Law on the Status of Servicemen.

Naturally, we specifically defined every point. For example, servicemen are forbidden to engage in entrepreneurial activities. At the same time, the commission feels that in certain cases a combining of jobs in the scientific, pedagogical, expert or other fields can be permitted when this is not detrimental to the service.

But let us not anticipate events. The final word lies with the parliament.

[Miranovich] And the final question. The bills are before the USSR Supreme Soviet, but letters pertaining to them continue to come in, even though it was announced in the newspaper that proposals and comments would be accepted by the Military Legislation Commission up to 20 January 1991. What is your position on this matter?

[Volkov] There can be only one opinion here. The lawmaking process is an ongoing one, and we shall be happy to receive every constructive proposal. We have only one request of those who write: Do not demand that the Military Legislation Commission immediately resolve any specific, even vitally important, issues which are outside its authority. There are appropriate levels of agencies for this.

#### **Inspection Finds Western Group to Be Combat Ready**

91UM0728B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Jun 91 First edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Inspection Showed That the Forces Are Combat-Ready"]

[Text] The results of the winter training period have been summed up at an enlarged session of the Military Council of the Western Group of Forces.

This period was specially characterized, it was noted, by the fact that the staffs and troops functioned in a situation of Germany's unification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Soviet Union. This made it considerably more difficult to maintain a good and smooth pace for the training process. Nonetheless, the Military Council stated that during the inspection the troop command and control elements demonstrated their preparedness to accomplish their assigned mission.

#### **Transbaykal MD Combat Ready Despite Training Problems**

91UM0728D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 4 Jun 91 First edition p 1

[Report under the rubric "The Army and Navy: News Service": "The Troops Are Combat-Ready and Capable of Performing Any Mission"]

[Text] The Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense spent two weeks in the Transbaykal Military District.

Summing up the findings, Arm Gen V. Shuralev, main inspector for the USSR Minister of Defense, spoke highly of the level of personnel training in the units and

formations inspected, and about the political and moral status of the servicemen. He noted that, despite a number of objective difficulties and problems in supporting the combat training work with everything needed, district troops are combat-ready and capable of performing missions for the reliable protection of our homeland.

### **Ministry Increases Leave Benefits for Far North Service**

91UM0728C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Jun 91 First edition

[Report under the rubric "Resolved, Signed..."]

[Text] On 29 May of this year the USSR Minister of Defense signed Order No. 248, On Extra Benefits For Traveling to and From Leave for Blue- and White-Collar Workers of the Soviet Army and Navy Who Work in Areas of the Far North and Equivalent areas. In the future workers in this category are entitled once in three years, together with their families (a spouse and one child in addition to the blue- or white-collar worker himself), to travel free to and from the locale of his leave.

### **Land Reform Disrupts Combat Training in Siberian MD**

91UM0734B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the editor by USSR People's Deputy Red Banner Siberian MD Commander Colonel-General V. Pyankov and response from USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Utilities Directorate Chief Colonel-General N. Gryaznov: "On the Firing Range with Seeding Machine"]

[Text] As we all know, the Russian parliament adopted a number of laws that allotted broad powers to conduct local land reform to local Soviets of People's Deputies. In accordance with them, city, rayon, rural, and village Soviets of People's Deputies are conducting inventories of all land resources and reregistration of all land plots and land users. This is unquestionably a large and needed work that is required to increase the effectiveness of the utilization of land—our country's priceless wealth.

However, in a number of krays and oblasts of Western Siberia, in my opinion, local governmental organs have begun to hastily and rashly carry out land reform, at times permitting steps that contradict previously adopted republic laws and union legislative acts. As a result, the combat readiness of Siberian Military District units and subunits is being undermined and servicemen's rights are being infringed upon.

Altay Kray's Biysk rayispolkom decided to seize, without compensation, 1,900 hectares of land that belongs to a military unit according to the appropriate RSFSR Council of Ministers decree. Tomsk Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies did not consider the needs of servicemen when it adopted a resolution on the transfer

of military forest district land (21,720 hectares) to a reserve land category for the raysoviet's needs. Yurga Raysoviet of People's Deputies, while examining the issue on providing food items to the population of the Kuzbass, resolved to seize land from the Tomskiy Military Sovkhoz and also a part of the territory of the firing range which is a total of 3,000 hectares.

Behind each of these hasty decisions is a broad circle of issues that require immediate examination. Let us begin with the fact they inflict quite a bit of material damage on the military district. We are conducting large housing and special construction projects using our own resources. We produce a significant portion of our lumber for these purposes in Tomsk Military Forest District. How can we provide housing to servicemen, including those arriving from abroad, if the production of lumber is terminated in this rayon?

Intense combat training is being conducted in the Siberian Military District as in any other. The range facility is practically the only place where we can totally work out all combat training missions. During the first months of the Great Patriotic War, Siberian regiments polished their military skills here and, in December 1941, they entered fierce engagements with the German invaders near Moscow and defended the capital of our Homeland. The leadership of the Siberian Military District twice appealed to Yurga Rayon Soviet while attempting to find mutual understanding but without success.

I would like to especially say something else about one circumstance. Military units are not only learning combat skills but are also engaged in growing vegetables and storing feed for animal husbandry on the allotted lands. Today practically all oblasts and krays of Siberia have significantly curtailed their food deliveries to military district troops and some of them have refused in general to fulfill their contractual obligations.

While considering the situation that has developed, we are compelled to shift to providing ourselves with such food products as potatoes, cabbage, meat, eggs, and some others. It is understandable that it is impossible to carry out this extraordinarily important task if we do not have adequate land.

The activities of local Soviets in the cases described are based on the new Laws of the RSFSR "On Land Reform" and "On the Peasant (Farmer's) Farm." In the meantime, as we all know, Article 20 of the Law "On Property in the USSR" states that plots of land that have been allotted to the Armed Forces are for the use of the USSR. However, local organs are ignoring this provision.

I must note that common sense has nevertheless triumphed in a number of such cases and illegal decisions have been repealed. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to defend our land utilization rights and people are increasingly appearing who desire to express their rights to land redistribution to the detriment of the normal life and activity of military district



troops and the social security of servicemen and members of their families on the vast territory of Siberia.

How do we avoid conflicts like these? I think that we need to reflect the Armed Forces land utilization issue on Russian territory in the Russian parliament's legislative acts. Specifically, I propose supplementing the appropriate chapter of the RSFSR Land Code with a provision on the Armed Forces right to own land and the procedures for coordinating this issue between military units and local governmental organs. It is not in our interests to hold excess land but there should not be any arbitrariness here.

Colonel-General B. Pyankov, Red Banner Siberian Military District Commander and USSR People's Deputy

**FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF.** Let us frankly state that similar, alarming signals are arriving at the editorial staff offices not only from the Siberian Military District. Claims on lands that were legally allotted to military units at one time have also become more frequent in other regions.

We asked Colonel-General N. Gryaznov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Utilities Directorate, to comment on the situation that has developed. This is what he stated:

The return of unused lands to the national economy is a natural process, all the more so under conditions of Armed Forces reductions. During the last two and a half years, 43,800 hectares of land, primarily plowed land, gardens, and pasture, have been transferred to local governmental organs. We need to say that this work is systematic and purposeful in nature and considers not only required troop combat readiness parameters but also ecological requirements—military units conduct recultivation of the lands using their own resources.

Naturally, these elementary requirements are being violated when a rational approach is replaced by a voluntaristic approach. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and republic Council of Ministers resolution "On Additional Measures to Accelerate the Conduct of Land Reform in the RSFSR" created the preconditions for precisely this resolution of the issues. It openly states: "...seizure of unused lands from land users without their consent and when necessary—up to 10 percent of the area of the agricultural land attached to them."

This sort of Spring agricultural allotment must have given civilians or collectives plots of land to create farms and for gardening and truck farming. Everything would be fine but, as we should have expected, arbitrariness began in some places and local authorities began to make claims on the territory of range facilities and training centers while placing the fulfillment of combat training tasks on the verge of failure. And it is quite illogical, it would seem, to take land from military sovkhozes where agricultural products are already being produced to supply military units. But such cases have not only been noted in the Siberian but also in the Far Eastern, North Caucasus, and Volga-Ural military districts.

In connection with this, I would like to direct the attention of the Ministry of Defense's direct land users to the legal aspect of the resolution of land issues. An April 25, 1991 RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution has placed into force the RSFSR Land Code which regulates land relations on the republic's territory. Specifically, Article 29 of this code stipulates that, in the event the land user disagrees with a land seizure decision made by a local Soviet of People's Deputies, the decision can be appealed through a statement in court within a 10-day period. The plaintiff in this case is the USSR Ministry of Defense land user, military unit, institution, military training facility, enterprise, or organization to whom the plots of land have been allotted. An appeal of a Soviet of People's Deputies decision terminates its execution.

Unfortunately, USSR and RSFSR land laws have not gotten by without the notorious "war of laws." So, in the previously adopted USSR law "On Property in the USSR," plots of land provided to support Armed Forces activities are the property of the USSR (its organs or organizations) and their seizure is carried out with the consent of the USSR. At the same time, the previously mentioned joint resolution of the RSFSR's highest organs of power has significantly "simplified" land seizure procedures.

There is no disputing that quite a few issues have accumulated in the national economic sector that require legal resolution. Land use procedures in the interests of the country's defense are no exception here. But is this really not the same statewide problem as increasing the production of food? By way of illustration, the issue of payment for land has also not yet been resolved. On the one hand, the Ministry of Defense has not been relieved of these payments in the laws that have been adopted but, on the other hand, there is no appropriate article of expenditures in the military budget. So, following the logic of the Russian government, must this issue also be resolved at the rayispolkom level?

#### **Kiev MD C3 Facilities' Readiness Problems**

91UM0734A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov under the rubric: "Combat Readiness: A View on the Problem": "The Battle Flag is in the Safe... Until Better Times?"]

[Text] While pondering the results of the Ministry of Defense commission's work in the Kiev Military District, I involuntarily recalled several of the already publicized lessons from the recent war in the Persian Gulf. By way of illustration, here is one of them. The multinational forces' first and main attacks were inflicted, as we all know, not against tanks and aircraft but against enemy command, control, and communications [C3] facilities. They destroyed what they themselves valued most of all. Because a precisely functioning C3 system is also that fundamental principle on whose survivability everything else depends. But then again the fact that

7,500 people serve the headquarters block in Belgium that numbers nearly 2,500 operations workers is also evidence of the priority of improving C3 within NATO's military structural development.

Why did I recall all of this? Because I have not dreamt that our headquarters also has that ratio. For example, suffice it to say that a guard company that has a strength of 75 soldiers and sergeants according to the TOE assigns 35 men to details on a daily basis. As in any subunit, there are sick people, people on leave, and people on temporary duty assignments. As a result, several entrances in the military district headquarters staff building are closed and the highly decorated Battle Flag is hidden in a safe. There is no one to perform the duty.

This is concerning security. In this case, it is easy to figure out how matters stand with headquarters' services. It is simply an unfeasible task to organize the normal functioning of all of its subunits with the number of people in the independent support battalion which is prescribed by the personnel order. And troop commanders have been compelled to resort to a different type of violation. As it was, by way of illustration, here in Kiev when the Ministry of Defense commission on its very first day of work established that there were two times as many drivers as there should be in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Karpenko.

"Naturally, we carried out the commission's order to correct the situation: that same night we transferred 207 soldier-drivers to other units and even to other garrisons," said Military District First Deputy Chief of Staff Major-General A. Kolomiitsev. "But what has been the result? Transportation problems that, as they say, have always been very large have now become excruciatingly large."

The general was hardly exaggerating. Judge for yourselves how the combat training directorate's several dozen senior officers, the very nature of whose work is temporary duty assignments and continuous trips within the garrison, have one automobile. They have also had to forget about the bus that took the officers to and from work. In general, this is a small loss for our military man with his unspoiled concern about his nerves and spiritual strength. But how will it be with those covered trucks which are designated to deliver officers at the "alert" hour? They have also become laid up. It has now become a problem to cover the 20-30 kilometers in the middle of the night under their own power. Colonel A. Semenov, a directorate section head, managed to find only one method to resolve it: he went to see the military district chief of staff with a suggestion to raise the alert and assembly standard. But this is already a question of combat readiness....

Or imagine this picture. A command post exercise is occurring. They have decided to compensate for the lack of organic drivers using temporary duty people and vehicles from military district units. But they need only specialists for special vehicles and these specialists are now not called up very often from the reserves. As a

result, some C3 facilities were just a single vehicle into which they contrived "to pack" no less than a dozen men.

Naturally all of these facts were reported to the commission. It listened attentively and agreed with everything but... they were obliged to comply with the personnel order. Experienced people told me: they say, Kiev Military District is neither the first nor the last in this leapfrog of a personnel shake out and no one will permit a staff increase in an army being reduced. But, excuse me, this is incorrect: to see how necessary it is to stimulate the effective work of headquarters analysts who are working on military reform and to do nothing in this direction. In this case maybe we actually need to listen to the opinions of my interlocutors—Kiev Military District headquarters officers who say: is it better to reduce by an entire division in each military district but insure everything necessary for the C3 of troops at its expense? From top to bottom.

#### Katusev on Crime in Armed Forces

91UM0735A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Jun 91 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Justice A.F. Katusev, chief military procurator, by V. Badurkin, on crime in the Soviet Armed Forces: "The Procurator Thinks Differently; Again on Crime in the Army"]

[Text] The problem of crime in our Armed Forces has long ceased to be a strictly internal army matter. Concerned by the increased mortality and injuries to their offspring, parents of the soldiers have banded together in public organizations, they are holding demonstrations and protest actions and are seeking the adoption of decisive measures.

There have been numerous complaints from the fathers and mothers to the military jurists. The validity of their complaints has been checked out by a special commission set up under a President's Ukase. And the results of its work published in TRUD on 17 January have evoked numerous responses.

The Chief Military Procurator, Lieutenant-General Justice A.F. Katusev, asked the editors to be allowed to explain to the readers his views on this problem. Here is what he said to our correspondent.

[Katusev] I do not intend to comment on the results of the commission's work. These have been presented to the nation's president. I would like to voice just one notion and that is that the assessments of our labor and the conclusions of the commission on a number of items have caused, to say the least, perplexity among many officers of the military procuracy. Aside from all else, we have been rebuked for the increased crime in the Armed Forces, for the low professionalism of the investigating officers in the troop units and certain other negative factors the solution to which lies outside the limits of the powers and competence of the military procuracy. In the subtext of the final documents, one can trace very unambiguously what is still a rhetorical question, that is,

is the military procuracy needed at all and is its leadership up to it? This is justified by the fact that on the Union and republic levels the corresponding committees have already been set up to defend the rights of the servicemen. The investigating of crimes in the army and the dispatching of justice should supposedly be entrusted to territorial structures which are independent of the command.

In our times, the procedures involving the abolishing of certain departments and the creating of new "modernized" ones is no novelty. Time will tell just how justified are the various reforms, changes and adjustments. Wouldn't we be back to where we started having abolished the smoothly functioning body which is the military procuracy, having disbursed its highly skilled personnel and having reassigned their work to what might mildly be called semiprofessionals?

Let us turn to the statistics.

Last year, the investigators of the military procuracy investigated 99.7 percent of the registered crimes. Due to the intervention by the military procurators, the violated rights were restored to over 8,000 servicemen and 92 percent of the persons accused of "hazing" were held criminally liable. Under our demands over 1,300 persons, chiefly officials, were held liable.

[Badurkin] Aleksandr Filippovich [Katusev], nevertheless, the commission and our editors have steadily received letters from soldier parents complaining of the quality and objectivity of investigations of specific criminal cases....

[Katusev] I certainly am not endeavoring to represent our work in rosy tones. Of course, we do have our flaws. For instance, last year around 150 criminal cases were returned for additional investigation and 20 persons were released by the military tribunals as incorrectly remanded to the court. This is an unconditional flaw in our work.

We also might wish that things were better in the effective struggle against instances of the concealment of crimes by the command of the troop units. Last year around 1,000 such cases were recorded. Unfortunately, this number is not declining now. Just the commander of one of the military construction detachments in the Transbaykal area, Maj V. Arkhipov, concealed several-score crimes. At our request he was removed from the held position. A criminal case was initiated against him. But this need not have happened if our procurators had been working more efficiently.

[Badurkin] Many parents have complained that your investigators often themselves contribute to the concealment of crimes and "close their eyes" in ascertaining the reasons for injury.

[Katusev] I will admit that it is possible to falsify longer the history of an illness or "conceal" an injured person in a civilian hospital from a military procurator. Ultimately, it is possible to persuade the injured person not

to file a complaint and this, incidentally, is most frequently encountered. Although it is virtually impossible to conceal a major crime, a murder or a major injury to a person in the army. Let us proceed from the facts: such instances were not established even by the Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Badurkin] What is your attitude toward the proposal by certain members of the commission to entrust supervision over legality in the troops to the territorial procuracy?

[Katusev] If you want it in a nutshell, this is absurd. We have our own specific features and our own institutions of law. The military lawyers participate in troop measures and exercises and are constantly involved in investigating the circumstances and causes of virtually each conflict based on interethnic problems, not to mention those which in some manner involve the servicemen.

[Badurkin] One of the rebukes leveled against the military procuracy is the increased draft dodging as a result of insufficient preventive work by the investigators and procurators. In fact, desertion has acquired almost a mass character....

[Katusev] Yes, draft-dodging has become the most significant share in the total structure of crime and has caused its increase. Some desert their place of service due to the rejection of the procedures existing in one or another subunit but most often because of disorders. But many commit crimes counting on impunity and connivance on the part of the republic and local law enforcement bodies.

We have a mass of examples where the local police simply ignores the orders to apprehend deserters and which have been drawn up by the military procuracy in accord with the laws which are current, incidentally, in each republic. In Adzharia the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has completely refused to apprehend such persons.

It has also happened that they release violators of the law who have been arrested by the military procuracy and held in the investigatory isolation cells because of the committing of severe crimes. In Kutaisi they released from under guard a certain Zuzibiani who had been accused of desertion and murder. A Teliya who had committed analogous crimes had also been freed.

Deserters and other persons who refuse induction for military service comprise the basis of illegal armed formations. Without these terrorist fighters, the situation in the Transcaucasus would be significantly calmer and peaceful inhabitants would not die at the hands of criminal extremists. Unfortunately, this is not comprehended in certain republics, although the very problem has long since gone beyond strictly domestic republic limits.

Everything is interconnected in the army and society. It is rather difficult to conceive of a solution to many urgent problems relating to ensuring legality, law and

order in the troops without achieving political stabilization in the nation, without a halting of confrontation, primarily between the authorities, without eliminating the interethnic contradictions and without an ubiquitous respectful attitude for the laws.

[Badurkin] One of the worst "bottlenecks" in an investigation is the work of the incompetent investigators in the troop units. And certainly they determine a great deal, particularly at the initial stage of an investigation....

[Katusev] Unfortunately, at times we are forced to involve in the investigation of crimes and accidents investigators from troop units where professionalism on this question for now actually leaves much to be desired. The Chief Military Procurator for five years now has raised the question of introducing regular investigators in the troops. Finally, our proposals have been incorporated in a governmental program for combating crime. Now it is a time to actually implement the adopted decisions.

The planned establishing of a military police with organized structures to investigate crimes and hold investigations will make it possible to substantially improve the quality of the investigations, particularly in their initial stage, before being turned over to the military procuracy. Certainly, officers independent of the command of the troop units should be involved in the investigation and the criteria for assessing their activities will be not the defense of interests or the personal well-being of one or another superior but rather the objectivity and completeness of investigation. Hence, there will be more guarantees for defending the individual serviceman.

We all are impatiently awaiting the "Law on the Status of the Serviceman," "The Law on the Defense of the USSR" and the new legislative enactments on military service for officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"] and updated combined-arms regulations. Certainly up to the present the legal status of a serviceman has never been set out in detail. In essence, nothing was said about the rights of the servicemen even in our military regulations which were in effect for many scores of years. What a serviceman can do in each specific instance is settled by one or another military superior from the standpoint of his own notions on this score. No matter how paradoxical it is from the legal viewpoint, we do not even have a legislative standard which makes provision for restoring to service officers and warrant officers who have been unjustly dismissed from it. Nor have we settled the procedure for the legal contesting of a large number of commander decisions which seriously involve the rights and interests of the servicemen. Very indefinite are the obligations and responsibility of the officials from the republic and local governing structures in relation to the Armed Forces, to persons in uniform and members of their families. For this reason, a serviceman at times feels himself simply impotent when confronted with the service or everyday problems which he runs into, and because of the absence of a clear legislative solution to the question, at times it is simply impossible to defend his interests.

### Narcotics Abuse Increase in Army Noted

91WD0942A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major of Justice N. Karpov, Main Military Procuracy Department Military Procurator: "The Drug Addict... Is Standing in Ranks: Why this Is Occurring and What We Can Do to Counter this Dangerous Phenomenon"]

[Text] Being intoxicated after smoking a hashish cigarette, Junior Sergeant A. Samvel pounced upon an officer, struck him several times, tore his shirt, assaulted two colleagues and attacked a sentry. Only the special measures taken by the commander prevented more dire consequences.

Unfortunately, this incident which occurred at a Far East Military District aviation unit is not isolated. Even more severe crimes are occurring. But the total number of crimes associated with the theft or production and use of drugs in the army and navy exceeded 150 in 1989-1990.

It seems to me that there is no need for extensive commentary to understand how dangerous a drug addict is in the army environment. Here it is comparatively easy for an addict to get hold of a weapon or to seize a military vehicle. And what would be the consequences of his illegal actions in a unit on combat alert? It is even difficult to imagine.

Unfortunately, in recent years we still speak about drugs as a phenomenon. But it is naive to think that the army, for its part, will avoid the criminal drug boom. It is the boom that the statistics are evidence of.

According to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] data, practically every hundredth crime in this country last year was entirely due to drug use. The number of murders, rapes, robberies, and thefts committed by people under the influence of drugs has increased. The number of people convicted for crimes associated with illegal drug trafficking has rapidly increased. If their number doubled from 1966-1975, then they more than quadrupled from 1976-1985.

In 1990, the number of these types of crimes increased by nearly 25 percent and at the same time nearly 50 percent more drugs were confiscated than in 1989. The total number of registered users of mind altering substances alone totaled nearly 143,000 persons at the beginning of 1991. According to militia agents, there actually are 5-10 times more drug addicts.

What are the causes of this, frankly speaking, alarming situation? It seems that this is the result of the expansion of international contacts due to our country's geographic location on the route to Western Europe from the countries of the "Golden Triangle" (Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) and the "Golden Crescent" (Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) where 500-800 tons of drugs are produced annually. There is a sufficiently large source of raw materials in our country: 250,000-300,000 hectares of hemp are being grown in the infamous Chuiskiy Valley



alone. And although an enormous number of "ownerless" drug crops were destroyed last year, the number of offenses associated with their cultivation increased more than 100 times.

Furthermore, according to USSR MVD VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute] predictions, the shift to a market economy may cause an outflow of criminal business assets from the shadow economy and promote the drug mafia's penetration into the USSR. And we might as well admit that aggravation of socioeconomic problems is also fertile ground for the development of drug addiction.

So, judging by everything, the number of problems caused by drug addiction will henceforth multiply, including in the army. Research that we have conducted jointly with our USSR MVD VNII colleagues in one military district yielded the following data: 61 drug addicts were "committed" due to illness last year and there have already been 20 in the first three months of this year. All of them developed a passion for drugs long before their service and did not change their habits in the army. It must be noted that the majority of those suffering from drug addiction grossly violate military discipline and three quarters of them commit misdemeanors and crimes.

Toxic substance abuse is no less serious a problem. So, just during the past year, the use of mind-altering substances took the lives of 16 servicemen. Overdoses are frequent occurrences and their results are, as a rule, tragic. I recall how a group of soldiers from a Far East Military District garrison brewed various vehicle liquids mixed with sugar several years ago in the barracks one night. In the morning, many were unable to stand up by themselves and nine of them could not be saved.

I am certain that those people who want to blame the army for all this will find reason to—they say, there is no order or discipline. In this specific case, there is a reason for such words. But the question about how guilty the army itself is for the spread of drug addiction and toxic substance abuse is far from simple. Let us once again turn to the statistics.

In 1990, every fourth law breaker in our country was a minor. Sixty percent of the drug addicts were introduced to drugs by the age of 19 and 84 percent of them by the age of 24. (As we all know, citizens of the USSR are drafted for compulsory military service until the age of 27).

A "social slice" of this type contributes something to the understanding of the problem: 71 percent of the registered drug addicts have an incomplete middle education, only one of every nine has completed his secondary education, and the fraction of workers among drug addicts is increasing. Indeed, on the whole these social groups are now joining the Armed Forces.

As a result, according to official USSR MVD data, in 1990 alone nearly 2,000 drug and toxic substance substance abusers and more than 300 persons whom the

doctors had already diagnosed as "toxic substance abusers" or "drug addicts" were drafted for military service.

Incidentally, the first revolutionary trial of a seaman-drug addict had already occurred in 1920. The guilty party was sentenced to two months in the stockade and sent to a penal company for three months where, researchers note, he became even more attracted to drug use.

To some extent, that is a typical example. And right now improvements are needed in anti-drug criminal law and in rehabilitative and preventive mechanisms. In this connection, we should mention Mexico where they have created 32 preventive treatment and drug addict rehabilitation centers in which nearly 600 employees work and the highly effective new work methods of Narkonon and Daytop drug treatment centers in Germany. You can imagine how much treatment-educational measures carried out there differ from those used in our health-work treatment centers, preventive clinics, and hospitals. And what does it say if the psychology department of one of our oldest military district hospitals, where we had occasion to visit, does not have its own facilities.

Naturally, they can say to me: do you need to dramatize the situation so much? This is really a problem like any other problem in some of the Western countries' armies. Ours is child's play in comparison to theirs. I would not like to contest that point of view, but I cannot agree in one area: if we do not begin right now, the consequences can also be very serious in our country.

Of course, the solution of the problems for the army may be extremely clear: do not draft drug addicts into the service and close that road to them. But it is not so simple. As a rule, we only manage to recognize a drug addict after the evil has been done to him. Preventive work among minors is difficult: polls among teachers show that one in five have a vague idea of what drug use is and what to do with information about student use of drugs. Can we be amazed that the militia and voyenkoms [military commissariats] do not have the appropriate data and the draft board is simply incapable of conducting an in-depth investigation. Therefore, work needs to be improved everywhere and in all directions.

In our opinion, we need to immediately develop a comprehensive joint action program jointly with the participation of USSR MVD and Minzdrav [Ministry of Public Health]. We will also need to precisely define the procedures for cooperation between the MVD's preventive services, doctors who treat drug addicts, military commissariats, military physicians and other specialists from the Ministry of Defense. Inspections have shown that the orders and directives in force on this score require revision. Specifically, they need to stipulate the organization for the mutual collation of accounting data and the bases and procedures to direct individuals suspected of drug use to undergo medical examinations.

We also need to establish feedback: we suggest military district head psychiatrists notify the chief doctors of drug treatment centers, by place of residence, of those service

members discharged due to illness (drug addiction, toxic substance abuse). Accordingly, the heads of the appropriate local ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Department] notify military commissars. This work will not take up much time and, in the opinion of territorial health organs leaders, will yield unquestioned benefit.

Further. Specialists and scientists from a Moscow institute, who are working on medical-biological problems, have already developed and successfully employed express diagnostics to identify drug users in some regions. Physicians are ready to transfer their experience to the Armed Forces. But why, you ask, not use these tests during the draft for military service or, even better, during the annual physical exam of military commissariat student registrants? Thus, we could prevent groundless deferments from the draft for those who simulate the illness of drug addiction.

We need to seriously approach drug storage organizations. Violations revealed during inspections attest to the fact that the preconditions for theft or loss of narcotics and drugs have not been eliminated at all treatment facilities and military units. It seems that the organization of a special drug service in the Armed Forces should not be delayed.

The publication of brochures, instruction booklets, and teaching-methodological text books about organizing preventative measures and fighting drug use would be a great help primarily for officers and cadets at educational institutions. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has already accumulated good methodological experience. In turn, Armed Forces scientific institutions and laboratories could do their bit by, for example, developing a domestic express test to identify drugs, by creating drug dog training centers, and much more.

I think that only this way, by consolidating the efforts of all interested departments and people who are not indifferent to our society's moral health, can results be obtained in the fight against drug use.

**From the Editorial Staff:** Within the limits of a short article, the author could hardly reveal all aspects of so complex and indisputably important a problem; several of these aspects are hardly touched upon. We hope to continue the conversation which has been started through commanders, political workers, physicians and other specialists who solve these difficult problems during the performance of their official duties.

#### **Military News Briefs, 4 July**

91UM0775A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jul 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Army and Navy: Service News"]

[Text]

**Navy conscript duty has become a two-year tour of duty.  
Sailors have no questions.**

Persons inducted into the Navy in 1988 and in May and June of 1989 are not affected. They will be released into

the reserves after three years of service. Those who are called up later will only serve two years. The minister of defense issued order Number 304 on June 18, 1991 regarding this matter.

#### **Officers receive meat and something else.**

Beginning July 1 of this year officers of the Soviet Army and Navy, and also family members of servicemen, who are serving in the Baltic republics and Transcaucasia, will have the right to obtain food products at state prices. Thus, the USSR Minister of Defense in order Number 305 of June 27, 1991 explained the instruction of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers Number 629 of June 15, 1991. The products will include the following items: 2 kg of meat, 3 kg of fish, 600 g of vegetable oil, 450 g of butter, and 500 g of tea.

#### **The general staff gathers information on persons who need wheelchairs. Probably, not without purpose.**

By September 10, 1991 the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces must present information on the number of families of soldier/internationalists including those who have perished, disappeared, and died, and also on persons who need wheelchairs. Military commissariats have already started to gather this kind of information. Representatives of military commissariats in local areas will visit families of soldier who have fought in Afghanistan and in other countries.

Directive D-40 also pertains to this matter. It instructs the director of the Central Finance Administration to find the means to offer material assistance to soldier/internationalists.

#### **Soldiers from now on will ride in railroad cars with reserved seats. Finally.**

As is known, previously they and civilians who have been sent to military educational institutions have ridden in common cars. But, beginning July 1, 1991 they are permitted to use their travel documents to acquire tickets for trains (reserved seat cars), air and vehicular transport. The basis for this is the order of the USSR Minister of Defense Number 306, which announces the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Number 193 of February 17, 1981 and the disposition of the USSR Council of Ministers Number 1545 of September 15, 1990.

#### **If you have radiation disease you can take vacation at a time convenient for you.**

In connection with the USSR law, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On the Social Protection of Citizens Suffering the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe" the minister of defense has ordered that regular vacations, at a time convenient to them, be granted to officers, warrant officers, and reenlisted and regular servicemen suffering from radiation sickness, as well as to those who are sick due to participation in work on liquidating the consequences of the accident at the

Chernobyl AES and fulfilling their duty in the isolation zone in 1986-1987. In addition, people in the above-mentioned categories can take up to 14 additional days of vacation.

Those who worked in the zone in 1988-1989 also have the right to take vacations at a convenient time. All those who now serve in the evacuated zone, i.e. where no one lives, can take from five to 14 additional vacation days.

### Development, Declining Priority of Army Aviation Training

91UM0740A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant-General of Aviation V. Pavlov under the rubric: "Combat Readiness: Parameters of Quality": "Is it Time to Close the Barn Door?"]

[Text] The proposed achievement of new qualitative parameters during the course of military reform primarily affects troop combat training. However, unfortunately, right now there are quite a few imperfections in these issues. Combat training has begun to lose its priority status for a whole series of objective reasons. It is impossible to consider this to be an ordinary phenomenon. We will subsequently have to make up for what has been lost with huge costs—both material and moral. Since I have more than thirty years of flying experience behind me and I have mastered nearly a dozen types of helicopters, I would like to share some of my views on the development of Army Aviation combat training.

Time changes not only people but also their views on some or other issues. I remember how our teachers and instructors, at the dawn of mastering helicopters, recalled with special feelings their service in fighter aviation where they had the opportunity to fully carry out flights in advanced aerobatic maneuvers and in expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers. But here, they complained, 30 degrees to the right, 30 degrees to the left, a 15 degree dive, but more—meant to end up in such dangerous flight attitudes as g force pickup or wing-dropping. We only learned about spins from textbooks and from these same instructors' stories.

But some decades have passed and the combat application of helicopters in Afghanistan placed an entire series of difficult issues precisely in the area of practical aerodynamics before our scientists, engineers, and designers. Flights under conditions of actual countermeasures by enemy air defenses and the struggle for the survival of the helicopter, crew, and the assault force compelled pilots to exceed helicopter operating restrictions. Only there, during combat operations, did we attain advanced aerobatic maneuvers and in expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers in helicopters. What was considered impossible and intolerable just yesterday became the standard: turns with 45 degree or greater banks and combat application of all types of weapons at dive angles of 30 degrees or greater. And unique helicopter landings on mountain cornices at heights of 3,000 or more meters, evacuation of sick and wounded from inaccessible locations, and delivery of outsized cargoes on an external mounting.... Life and the combat situation forced us to significantly expand the limits of helicopter flight operations.

For example, the statistics of more than 10,000 flights at altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 or more meters convinced us that a well-trained, morally-prepared pilot can normally withstand nearly an hour of flying time

under these conditions. And, according to their technical specifications, helicopters must not fly at these altitudes.

The operating data which generally corresponds to helicopter pilot combat training requirements during peacetime ceased to satisfy in an actual combat situation. Exceeding the design specifications entailed as a consequence the appearance of many phenomena for which both pilots and engineer-operators were not even theoretically prepared for.

Thus, helicopter pilots were compelled to acquaint themselves with unusual flight regimes such as tuck-under, wing-dropping, g force pickup, and the vortex ring....

Each of these cases became a subject of painstaking analysis. We investigated the pilot's actions in each unusual phenomenon, considered all flight parameters, and at what stage during execution of which element it arose. We accumulated experience bit by bit and worked out recommendations for each specific case.

The following personnel performed a great deal of work to scientifically substantiate these phenomena and to develop practical recommendations: Professor Colonel A. Volodko, doctor of technical sciences; Lieutenant Colonels and Candidates of Technical Sciences A. Ustenko, M. Yelkin, G. Samoylov, and G. Kuznetsov; Army Aviation Combat Applications Center commanders and test pilots and heads of the combat training directorate staff Major-General of Aviation P. Kovitskiy, Colonels A. Koshelev, V. Seleznev, V. Tarasov, A. Shurevko, and I. Smirnov, and Air Force GNII [State Scientific Research Institute] test pilots and experts from OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni M.L. Mil which is headed by Chief Helicopter Designer M. Tishchenko.

This is how running time, generalization, and introduction of combat experience was put into practice in army aviation training exercises and activities. Even right now it as been set forth in the training system of both individual crews and aviation subunits. It was also considered during the development of the Army Aviation Combat Training Course.

At the same time, there still are quite a few problems which have not been resolved by the present time and it is difficult to assume when we will seriously begin to solve them. Among them, I would place primarily the expansion of combat and maneuvering capabilities of helicopters that are currently in the inventory.

I will cite this example. Army Aviation Combat Applications Center experts and line unit pilots had already displayed initiative, and I want to especially stress this, at the beginning of the 1980's when they worked out the methodology for the employment of new weapons systems which helicopter weapons systems versions did not provide for. Successful launches from helicopters of air-to-air missiles and of more powerful air-to-surface missiles became the result of this work. And right now units have recommendations for employment of these weapons systems. However, they have not come into



common practice since they have not been accepted into the inventory. The Air Force Weapons Directorate staff and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry are conducting work too slowly on installing missiles and other weapons systems that expand helicopters' combat capabilities. Therefore, Air Force GNII is also making recommendations too late for their application to the flying operations leadership. And combat training is suffering.

Unfortunately, this is not the only instance when suggestions that are so necessary to expand an aircraft's combat range literally get stuck in the impediments and obstacles of the bureaucratic system.

Recently, helicopter pilots had to face the problem of combat with low-speed air targets. A series of operations to train flying personnel to conduct air combat singly and in a group were conducted at the Combat Applications Center. Methodical documents were developed and worked out. A KA-27 helicopter was equipped by experts and innovators which allowed it to tow a sleeve target to work out practical firing by combat helicopter crews.

They undertook, as it is now customary to say, locally to solve this task with enthusiasm. In the unit commanded by Colonel V. Oleynik, experts-innovators developed a sleeve target towing system for the MI-8MT helicopter. The Far Eastern Military District pilots successfully conducted practical fire using their system. It would seem to me, what could be simpler than to introduce these already produced innovations into aviators' combat training. However.... Units cannot legally independently develop or equip helicopters with such systems. They need approval from above to do this. But for many years the Air Force Weapons Directorate staff, MAP [Ministry of the Aviation Industry], and Air Force GNII have been tied up with the resolution of organizational and technical issues associated with series production of these and other systems. Valuable time is being wasted, significant resources are being expended, and the matter is not progressing. Judging by everything, far from everyone in those departments upon whom unit combat capabilities depend to a significant degree have considered the "experience" of the sadly infamous flight of the air enthusiast from the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] to Moscow.

It is obvious that the time has come for a radical review of the organization for conducting test-design, flight-testing, and research work to expand the combat and maneuvering capabilities of helicopters that are in the inventory. The situation can only be considered normal when ideas and proposals that arise in the process of unit combat training reach series production in the shortest possible periods of time. Today we can only dream about this.

To a definite degree, in my opinion, the fact that the Air Force Combat Training Directorate staff and Ground Forces Aviation have been deprived of the capability to themselves conduct contract (ordering) work with MAP

and Air Force GNII impedes the most rapid introduction of test developments. Today these functions have been assigned to the Air Force Weapons Directorate staff and NTK [Scientific and Technical Committee]. And this means that it is they who have the financial resources that have been allotted for all work, including for combat training. This kind of monopoly permits them to utilize resources primarily "at their own discretion" and frequently for research that is not associated with combat training.

Furthermore, in my opinion, we are inadequately utilizing the potential of the aviation branches of service combat applications centers in these issues to conduct independent test work that affects increasing the level of combat training. Here one of the reasons consists of the fact that the centers have not been given the right to make changes and additions to the leadership on flight operations of aircraft and helicopters. The latter belongs exclusively to Air Force GNII alone. As the experience of recent years shows, it practically does not consider the interests of line unit combat training in its activities. Therefore, the introduction of any innovation whatsoever is transformed into prolonged, ponderous, paper red tape between departments and results in huge and, at times completely groundless, expenditures.

Practice clearly convinces us that initiative in the conduct and financing of work directed at increasing the level of unit combat training must belong to those who are vitally interested in it—the combat training directorate staffs. Otherwise, as it stands now, even pilots who have combat experience and a high level of training will not be able to achieve success in combat while employing imperfect and, frankly speaking, inadequate combat-capable equipment.

#### **Central Asian MD Deputy Commander on Bombing Incident**

*91UM0740B Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Jun 91 p 3*

[Interview with Red Banner Central Asian Military District Deputy Commander Nikolay Ivanovich Shumilin by TRUD Correspondent M. Pereplesnin, Ashkhabad, no date given: "When Neighbors Are Fighting, Blood May Also be Spilled in your Home"]

[Text] The echo of the bombing of the Soviet village on the bank of the Pyandzh River rang out throughout the country. It turns out that you can accidentally die from the explosion of an aircraft bomb even during peacetime.... Is this absurd? It is monstrous! The emotional assessment of what has occurred brings to mind something that is terrible but nevertheless an accident. Alas, tragic incidents with a fatal outcome and with wounds and injuries are far from a rarity on the Soviet-Afghan border. It is simply that we previously did not know anything about this. Today Red Banner Central Asian Military District Deputy Commander N.I. Shumilin slightly parts the curtain of secrecy at the request of our correspondent.

[Pereplesnin] Nikolay Ivanovich, how often have air raid warnings been heard in recent years on the border?

[Shumilin] This is the second such instance since the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. We assume that the Afghan pilots' lack of skill and loss of orientation in operations against the Mujahidin were their causes. The war is continuing in Afghanistan and often the areas of the belligerents' active combat operations are directly adjacent to the USSR's State Border. Today the official Afghan authorities control approximately one third of the entire length of the Soviet-Afghan border. The remaining sections of the border are only protected from our side. Access to it is practically open for formations of the armed Afghan opposition from contiguous territory.

[Pereplesnin] But if a clash between Afghan regular troops and the Mujahidin occurs in direct proximity to the border, this could also pose a threat to residents of our border strip, could it not?

[Shumilin] A bullet really does not choose, does it? Let us say just recently—on May 23—the flight of a stray bullet into our territory was recorded in one sector. A bit later, mortar shells that had been fired from that side twice exploded in this same sector on May 29 and June 1. Fortunately, these incidents occurred without injuries.

[Pereplesnin] As far as I know, an exchange of gunfire with neighboring territory is not as dangerous as what has been occurring on the border recently....

[Shumilin] We are increasingly encountering mine-planting activity by the Afghan opposition. In 1989, there was a case of an explosion of a border detail (a soldier suffered contusions). A total of 36 mines were disarmed on our territory in 1989. Last year, we detected 113 mines. The number of accidents has also increased. Among them was the explosion of a truck that was heading for Afghanistan with a UN humanitarian aid cargo. In November 1990, a forester detonated a mine and died. The vehicle in which a border detail rushed to the scene of the accident also detonated a mine (the driver suffered contusions). We have had to disarm 60 mines during the not quite six months of this year. As you can see, the number of mines that are appearing is increasing from year to year....

[Pereplesnin] But, permit me, all of us have very firmly known since early childhood that the State Border is reliably guarded day and night: "No one will slip through and no one will cross...." But it turns out that malefactors can throw their weight around on our territory as if they were at home....

[Shumilin] It is impossible to penetrate unnoticed beyond the "system" (the wire barrier with electronic monitoring). But a several kilometer deep zone lies

between the "system" and the State Border line itself. The majority of incidents also occur here.

[Pereplesnin] How often do you have to fire?

[Shumilin] Just since the beginning of this year, more than a dozen incidents have been registered that have been classified as armed resistance by border violators. According to existing orders, a border guard who has detected a violator, must attempt to detain him without using a weapon. And shots in response ring out only if a direct threat to life arises, in other words, if the violator opens fire.

So, an exchange of gunfire occurred in March with a group of violators who were attempting to sneak into a gold mining region on the Pyandzh River. In April, a group that had penetrated from the Afghan side attempted to steal cattle from our side. When they were observed by border guards, the violators began to fire. One of them was wounded and arrested. In May, four violators attacked our forester. The border guards arrived in time: they arrested all four and one of them was wounded during an exchange of gunfire.

[Pereplesnin] And are there losses on our side?

[Shumilin] Unfortunately, there are also four sad examples. On April 4 1991, a border detail consisting of five men was walking along the monitoring-tracking strip. Bursts of automatic gunfire suddenly rang out. They were being fired at from an ambush at almost pointblank range. Two of our lads died. One of the attackers was killed by return fire and later we managed to seize the entire group of violators—eight men.

[Pereplesnin] This is a quite joyless picture: mines are exploding, bullets are whistling, and people are dying....

[Shumilin] What is even worse is that there is no trend toward a slackening of the alarming situation on the border. As I have already noted, Afghan regular border units are not now capable of controlling the situation along the entire border. We, for our part, are attempting to do everything possible to defend the border and to protect the residents of border areas from possible sorties. The border guards are on constant heightened combat readiness. We maintain constant contact with the official Afghan authorities and we exchange information with them. We at times also appeal to the leaders of the opposition and to commanders of armed groups for the purpose of preventing possible sorties by the Mujahidin. But, as you can see, these preventive measures do not always provide a 100 percent positive result.

Everything I have said is convincing confirmation of how fragile and unstable the peace is. And if someone somewhere pulls the trigger, an evil echo has to respond for far around....

### Investigation Of Bombing Incident: Afghan Pilot Error

91UM0730D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "Regarding the Border Incident"]

[Text] As already reported, on the morning of June 4, the Tajik village of Nanadguti-Poyen, located near the Soviet-Afghan border, was subjected to aerial bombing. Four people were killed and nine injured. Material damage was caused as well.

An investigation of the incident conducted jointly with the Afghan side ascertained the following.

In light of a concentration of insurgents and their combat equipment in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, which borders the Soviet Union, the Republic of Afghanistan Air Force was charged with the mission of carrying out a bombing raid against that concentration, roughly 20 kilometers away from the Soviet border. The Afghan warplane that carried out the mission lost its bearings and dropped its bombs on Soviet territory. Judging from the Afghan authorities' information, a tragic error had occurred, and the pilot was sure that he was unloading his bombs on the insurgents.

In connection with the incident, President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan sent a message to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and Tajik President K. Makhkamov apologizing and expressing deep regret over the incident and offering condolences to the families of the Soviet citizens who were killed or injured.

The Republic of Afghanistan government issued a similar statement.

### Village Bombed In Afghan-Soviet Border Crossing Incident

91UM0730A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "Incident: Bombs Fall on Village"]

[Text] On June 4, at 08:08 hours, Moscow time, an unidentified aircraft flying along the USSR state border with Afghanistan dropped aerial bombs that hit the Soviet village of Namadguti-Poyen (approximately 100 kilometers south of Khorog). As a result of the explosions, four people were killed, and two were gravely injured. One of the wounded died en route to the hospital.

The incident is under investigation.

**From the Editors.** We contacted the Air Defense Forces Central Command Point. Major General of Aviation E. Yasinskiy reported that no violation of the USSR state border had occurred. However, bombs did indeed fall on our side, unfortunately. According to preliminary data that require clarification, the aircraft belongs to the

Afghan Air Force. A forward-based training ground is located on the Afghan bank of the Pyandzh River.

We would like to add something else. Unfortunately, Russian television, in its evening news broadcast on June 4, was quick to reproach air defense soldiers for having failed to take measures. But since no violation of the USSR state border took place, something that is confirmed by objective monitoring equipment and reports from border troops, it is hardly appropriate to blame the Air Defense Troops for something they had nothing to do with.

It is regrettable that this absurd incident led to people's deaths. But the question of how it happened and why bombs from an aircraft flying along the border at an altitude of several thousand meters fell on our territory must be answered by the competent agencies.

### PVO Problem Of Coping With Light Aircraft

91UM0730B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel S. Belyatov: "Reader Continues Discussion: Law With Amendment for Rust"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for March 12, 14, and 15 of this year published a series of articles by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchaev under the overall heading "On Boeings, Cessnas, and Others." Among other things, the articles discussed the need for explicit legal norms with respect to cutting short flights by low-speed aircraft.

Today a senior officer of a directorate of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff shares his thoughts on this subject.

Without yet having fully recovered from their latest reform, the Air Defense Forces found themselves at the center of negative public opinion following the flight of a West German aircraft in May 1987. At the time, measures were quickly taken against those to blame, including legal measures. How effective were those measures? Can we now say with confidence that the possibility of a recurrence of such incidents is ruled out? Unfortunately, no. Moreover, unpunished violations of USSR airspace involving aircraft intrusions up to hundreds of kilometers into our territory in some areas are possible even today, in my view. A whole set of organizational, technical, and legal problems and contradictions account for this situation.

Article 27 of the 1982 USSR Law "On the USSR State Border" states: "The defense of the USSR state border in airspace rests with the Air Defense Troops." A corresponding order of the Defense Minister also charges specially designated alert-duty forces and assets with the mission of repulsing enemy aircraft that attack national installations and installations of the Armed Forces.

The Air Defense Troops perform the dual mission with which they are charged by monitoring airspace in border areas and cutting short border violations by air ships, which can refer to airplanes, helicopters, vertical takeoff

and landing aircraft, gliders, deltaplanes, aerostats, weather balloons, guided and unguided target drones, and so on.

However, let us ask the following question: Is our state, in the form of the Air Defense Troops, capable of putting a stop to any and all violations? Unfortunately, the slogan about our capability is more of the ideological character of the recent past and is in no way borne out in practice. Let us consider certain research findings in this area.

First. In terms of their capabilities, the air defense alert-duty forces can protect the border (at low altitudes—which is precisely where most violations are recorded) only over a few percent of its entire length. And even if we were to put all available forces and assets on combat-alert duty and line them up along the border, we could cover only a small part of it. Incidentally, this situation exists in other countries besides ours.

In order to increase this parameter to 70 percent, it would be necessary to spend hundreds of billions of rubles to build airfields and emplacements for anti-aircraft, missile, and radio electronic troops and to procure equipment and weaponry. The number of servicemen would have to be increased several times.

The unrealistic character of such actions is obvious, and so it is essential to bring the missions of the Air Defense Troops' alert-duty forces into strict conformity with their capabilities.

The reader might have fully legitimate doubts as to the correctness of these calculations. For well-known reasons, I have cited not absolute but relative indices, and there is some error in their computation, of course. Nevertheless, they characterize the state of affairs with sufficient accuracy.

There are many reasons for this: Our border is more than 60,000 kilometers long; our geographic situation makes us vulnerable to attacking aircraft from almost all directions; the limited capability of the Air Defense Troops' assets and equipment, especially in terms of range; the special characteristics of the structure of Air Defense Troops groupings, their rigid attachment to defense installations, and other reasons.

Second. An analysis of violations of the USSR's air border over the past two decades shows that more than 60 percent of them are committed by light-engine aircraft such as Cessnas, gliders, and deltaplanes. Nine out of 10 were flying at low altitude. Light-engine aircraft are virtually harmless, and the overwhelming majority of the violations are committed by them unintentionally—by virtue of technical malfunctions, loss of orientation, and adverse weather conditions.

Because of the low radar conspicuity of light-engine aircraft and the capabilities of our radars, such aircraft cannot, as a rule, be reliably detected. In many cases, information about these kinds of violations comes only from border troops. Attempts by Air Defense Troops alert-duty forces to cut short such flights were almost

always unsuccessful. This stems from the brief time that the intruders spend in our territory, delays in receiving such information from border troops and the poor accuracy of such information, the substantial differences between the flight and technical specifications of our fighter-interceptors and light-engine aircraft, and much more. But despite the poor effectiveness of alert-duty forces' actions in such situations, they continue to be undertaken.

The air defense system, which responds reliably and effectively to combat and transport aircraft, has proved impotent in efforts to combat light-engine aircraft. And this is not the system's fault, as people often try to claim. Our forces were conceived, organized, and developed to fight the combat aircraft of the likely adversary. But the use of these advanced assets to cut short flights by light-engine aircraft, small balloons, and the like is unjustified and too wasteful.

It is quite clear that the alert-duty forces must be relieved of this mission, something that would hardly mean that such violations would go unpunished. Efforts to combat them could employ similar assets at our disposal, and we could make wider use of legal sanctions based on treaties and agreements and act through diplomatic channels.

Third, international air law recognizes that airspace over a state's land and water territories constitutes territory of that state. However, not a single multilateral treaty contains a norm to this effect. Under the 1944 Chicago Convention, airspace is not characterized as territory. The same position is taken in the USSR Constitution. But the USSR Law "On the USSR State Border" and the USSR Air Code say the opposite.

Despite these conflicting views, one can make the general statement that our legislation does characterize airspace as territory. But there is another hitch: Not one normative act, including in international law, defines the upper limit of airspace. Logically, this would be approximately 100 to 110 kilometers—the altitude of low-orbiting spacecraft. I want to point out that the discrepancies in legal documents and their incomplete character, which leaves room for conflicting interpretations, does little to bolster the confidence of Air Defense Troops officers.

In my opinion, the defense of the air border should be based on principles other than those governing the land (water) border. The latter constitutes a surface, while the air border is a volume. Objects in the two environments move about in accordance with different physical and mechanical laws. An air border as such is a derivative of a land border. In practice, however, we are dealing with a kind of extension of norms and regulations governing activities in one physical environment to another environment, something that largely foreordains the lack of effectiveness of those activities.

Fourth. The dual mission of the Air Defense Troops introduces a significant contradiction in the development and functioning of the air defense system. In peacetime, the protection and defense of the border



becomes paramount, and this inevitably leads to the weakening of air protection for vital installations as a result of the redistribution of air defense assets and equipment and their siting closer to the border. Today a large proportion of air defense radars are in immediate proximity to the border. This increases their vulnerability. Cutbacks in the Air Defense Troops further compounds this contradiction.

Fifth. The law does not define the rights and responsibilities of alert-duty forces with respect to intruders. It can only punish officials for any (!) violation of the air border. The lack of legal safeguards naturally leads to the unjustifiably high tension associated with alert duty.

The problems and contradictions involved in organizing and performing combat alert duty, in conjunction with other problems, must be solved as quickly as possible. And we must start by establishing a scientifically substantiated normative and legal base, which is to say by revising the law "On the USSR State Border," the concept of military reform, and other documents.

#### **Description Of YAK-141 VTOL Multipurpose Fighter**

*91UM0754A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Jun 91 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel A. Manushkin: "Meet the YAK-141, a Vertical Takeoff and Landing Aircraft Unmatched Throughout the World"]

[Text] The international air show at Le Bourget is over. This time the air show was the most representative in its entire 80-year history. The innovations of the Soviet aviation industry occupied a worthy place among the research and engineering developments of 1,721 firms. This is especially true of the MIG-31 fighter-interceptor and the BYE-42 Albatros amphibious aircraft. The Albatros was toured by French President F. Mitterrand, who found the aircraft more interesting than the others.

The opportunity to learn about the YAK-141 multipurpose vertical takeoff and landing fighter came as a surprise for specialists and the press.

Today we tell our readers about this aircraft.

In July 1976, on the deck of the Soviet Union's Kiev aircraft-carrying cruiser, foreign intelligence detected a vertical takeoff and landing naval aircraft, which became the subject of vigorous discussion in relevant foreign circles. It was the YAK-38, which NATO circles later dubbed the Forger. Its development in the Soviet Union was prompted by the need for an aircraft that could provide direct battle support from the air and take off from dirt sites of limited size near a frontline. Such work had been under way in the USSR since the 1950s. The vertical takeoff and landing aircraft that were developed (they have been used as both carrier and embarked aviation) have been successfully used both in our country and abroad.

And now comes a new revelation. The international air show at Le Bourget featured for the first time a model (one of 10) of the YAK-141 and a prospectus with its tactical-technical data.

"This plane is unmatched throughout the world," said Aleksandr Grigoryevich Dondukov, general designer of the A.S. Yakovlev Experimental Design Bureau, after retruning from the air show. "What is remarkable about the aircraft? An aircraft capable of a supersonic speed of 1,800 kilometers per hour has been built for embarked aviation for the first time. By comparison, the British Harrier aircraft, intended for the same purpose, has a maximum speed of 980 kilometers per hour, and the American AV-8B has a speed of 1,010 kilometers per hour.

"In addition, whereas the Harrier can carry a payload of up to 900 kilograms on its external stores, and the AV-8B just over a ton, our YAK-141 can carry more than two and one-half tons.

"And that's not all. The Harrier's maximum flight altitude is 11 kilometers, while the Soviet YAK-141's is 15 kilometers."

Vladimir Grigoryevich Kuznetsov, chief designer at the A.S. Yakovlev Experimental Design Bureau, visited our editorial offices and said that the new aircraft's maximum takeoff weight is nearly 20 tons. Its range with vertical takeoff is 1,400 kilometers, and 2,100 kilometers when taking off with a short run and carrying external fuel tanks. The powerplant includes two RD takeoff engines and one R-79 takeoff and sustainer engine.

Its armament consists of an 80-millimeter gun, guided missiles, and unguided weapons that are mounted on the wing points of the external stores. In other words, this is a multipurpose aircraft designed to intercept airborne targets and to engage in close-range maneuver combat, as well as to launch strikes against targets on the ground and on the water. The weapons guidance system includes a multiregime radar with integrated detection and identification and can guarantee mission accomplishment using various types of weapons.

The YAK-141's piloting and navigation system allows both manual and automatic aircraft control from takeoff to landing at any time of day, in different weather conditions, and in all geographic latitudes. The aircraft can take off from both ships and from takeoff and landing sites of limited size.

Why is such an aircraft needed? The war in Iraq showed that the Americans sought first of all to knock out the enemy's airfields. This one of the reasons why the Iraqi Air Force remained virtually idle.

Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft do not need the classic takeoff and landing strip. In certain conditions, the aircraft can land on a site of small dimensions. This is why the US and Britain are working to develop a similar prospective aircraft that will fly and be used after the year 2000.

We too have considerable accrued flighttime in vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, in particular at the A.S. Yakovlev Experimental Design Bureau. This was also demonstrated by the YAK-141 presentation at the Le Bourget air show.

The air show also featured a video about the aircraft. But why wasn't the YAK-141 itself there? We'll reveal a "secret." The YAK-141 is an experimental aircraft. Only four models have been produced. And only two of them fly. Incidentally, S. Sinitsyn, the firm's chief pilot, was the first to take the aircraft into the air and is now testing it in various modes.

At the end of our discussion, chief designer Vladimir Grigoryevich Kuznetsov complained:

"We have solved all the technical problems. But what about the financing? We had difficulties for the past two years. And this year the question of financing is simply up in the air.

"The aircraft is not in series production. And it is not yet known when it will be, or if it will be altogether. Yet the YAK-141 has already managed to set 12 world records. (Documentation for them has been submitted to the International Aviation Federation for confirmation.) Take the record for maximum rate of climb to an altitude of 12,000 meters. That record belonged to the Harrier, and no one had been able to break it since 1980. But the YAK-141 did break it. Moreover, it climbed with a 1,000-kilogram load, while the Harrier carried no load."

In short, the A.S. Yakovlev Experimental Design Bureau has developed a first-class aircraft. Time will tell if it finds widespread application.

### **Belikov Notes Aspects Of MIG-31 Design**

*91UM0730C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
31 May 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Article by B. Belikov: "Soviet Interceptor in the Skies over Paris"]

[Text] A long-range, supersonic, all-weather MIG-31 fighter-interceptor prepared at a series-production plant for demonstration flights and ground inspection by visitors at Le Bourget has returned to an airfield outside Moscow.

The two-seat, 46-ton aircraft can fly at a speed of 3,000 kilometers per hour at stratospheric altitudes, to which it can soar from the ground in just seven to eight minutes. If necessary, the aircraft, with in-flight refueling, can patrol an air border without landing for eight hours, carrying under its wings and fuselage a half dozen missiles for destroying targets at long and medium distances. Needless to say, it is a formidable aircraft, which NATO has dubbed the Foxhound.

"The main feature that distinguishes the MIG-31 from any other interceptors of this class throughout the world," said E. Kostrubskiy, deputy chief designer at the A. Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau, "is the unique capabilities of its onboard electronic equipment, which turns the interceptor into a kind of mini-AWAKS. Developed primarily to combat cruise missiles, it is equipped with a powerful radar with a so-called phased array antenna. This antenna is what enables it to engage in extremely broad airspace surveillance and gives the interceptor's electronic eye its long-range vision. The navigator-operator sitting in the rear cabin monitors the air situation on a radar scope."

To use the professional jargon, the MIG-31's onboard equipment can simultaneously track up to 10 targets, which is to say to monitor their change of position and maneuvers. Of course, this is done by means of a computer operated by the navigator. In addition, data is also received from ground control and guidance installations, as well as from other fighter-interceptors operating in a single group. A prospectus prepared for the 39th international air show at Le Bourget shows a schematic drawing of a group of four MIGs, the electronic fields of whose radars are spanning an area of 600 kilometers in frontage.

"Note the arrows extending in the drawing from the wingman aircraft to the commander's MIG-31," said Kostrubskiy. "They represent the two-way communication link via which all data is transmitted to the flight leader's aircraft. At his command, targets can be assigned in accordance with the tactical intentions. Incidentally, with its onboard armament, each interceptor can simultaneously engage up to four attacking aircraft."

Groups of fighter-interceptors can be used in other ways, as well. For example, one group can monitor an assigned sector, tracking everything that appears in it; if necessary, it can then guide a second, attack group that is waiting in "aerial ambush," so to speak, and that has in no way allowed itself to be detected and has maintained radio silence up until the moment it launches a decisive attack.

On the wall of the office in which our conversation took place, there hangs a blown-up illustration from a foreign journal. A pilot from a NATO air unit had photographed a MIG-31 as it was executing a chandelle "somewhere over the Bering Sea." The time of such fleeting encounters has passed. Late in the first 10 days of June, Honored USSR Test Pilot V. Menitskiy, chief pilot of the A. Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau, and navigator-operator Yu. Yermakov will take the MIG-31 to the international air show at Le Bourget, outside Paris.

Technicians will open [otstyukuyut] the sharp-beaked [ostroklyuvyy] fairing [na nosu], and the interceptor will come to a standstill on a tarmac with its all-seeing radar open to public viewing.

### Problems of Fire Safety Systems Viewed

91UM0714A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jun 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Massalskiy, correspondent for the Northern Fleet's newspaper NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARAI: "The Freon 'Jinni': How Do We Tame It?"]

[Text] During a stormy night at sea the damage-control alarm roused almost the entire crew of the destroyer Bezuprechnyy. The chemical fire-extinguishing system (OKhT) in the kerosene storage compartment had been activated. It was soon determined, however, that this was a false alarm. Water had entered the compartment through loose rubber seals on the hatches of the upper deck, causing a short in the sensor's electrical circuit.

A month before the ship had left on the cruise, there had been another false activation of the chemical fire-extinguishing system—also in the kerosene storage compartment—and several seamen were poisoned by a considerable quantity of toxic Freon which entered the compartment. Is there any connection between these two incidents?

In the incident prior to the cruise one of two seamen sent to do some work in the kerosene storage compartment decided—"foolishly," he said later—to flip the switch on the manual fire-extinguishing system. The fire-extinguishing mixture began entering the compartment. Both seamen lost consciousness. Senior Seaman V. Romanko was poisoned by the toxic Freon fumes in an attempt to rescue his comrades and died. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star. Several men were hospitalized. The question is why the seamen sent to find the two long-missing sailors did not immediately don their personal protective gear. Why was the damage-control alarm on the ship not activated? It was all because the sensor in the kerosene storage compartment was not activated, and the control post received no message that the fire-extinguishing system had been turned on.

"The operating principle of the sensor is such," Captain 3rd Rank S. Kharlamov, commander of the electrical and engineering division, explained, "that it is activated only after the Freon passes through the pipes to the sprayers. The trouble is that there is clearly not enough pressure in the system to activate the sensor. This was confirmed by an experiment we conducted following the tragic incident. Instead of Freon, air was forced through the pipes under the same pressure, and the sensor was not activated this time either.

And so, the seagoing specialists have grounds for complaining to the designers and builders, who have not yet succeeded in providing the surface ships with highly effective systems for warning when the Freon fire-extinguishing units have been activated.

Another aspect of this problem is that surface ships lack equipment to indicate high concentrations of Freon in

the compartments and rooms. And it is far from always possible to detect this by smell.

"I have encountered leakages of Freon three times," Captain 3rd Rank S. Vasilyev, executive officer on the Bezuprechnyy, said, "and each time the smell was different from anything else. It reminded me now of cologne, now of spoiled food, now rotten hay...."

Some people do believe that Freon can be identified by its smell. This, the human sense of smell, is not a reliable indicator, however. Lighting a match is an equally unsuitable method of detecting Freon in a room. If it goes out, this means that the fire-extinguishing mixture is present and displacing the oxygen. "Only a kamikaze would resort to this," Sr Lt A. Islamov, chemical service chief on the Bezuprechnyy, joked somberly.

It goes without saying that it is extremely dangerous and is forbidden to experiment with matches in a kerosene storage compartment or a magazine.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Medical Service A. Kulikov, chief of the toxicology and radiology laboratory of the fleet epidemiological detachment (SEO), sailors are poisoned by Freon every year, sometimes dying as a result. Naturally, this is sometimes caused by basic illiteracy and sloppiness, by failure to observe the safety rules. This is not the basis of the problem, however. Among other things, it lies in the absence of gas detectors on the surface ships, a fact already mentioned. They do exist and are installed—on submarines, for example, on which the presence of gas is constantly monitored on a comprehensive basis. In our branch, though, it is felt—experience has shown this to be true, at any rate—that this kind of monitoring is not feasible on surface ships. And even the flag chemical warfare officers for the fleet surface-ship forces lack instruments enabling them in emergencies to detect the presence and the concentration of Freon in the ship compartments.

Some people believe that the very fact that the fire-extinguishing system is not active or is suddenly activated demonstrates the presence or absence of Freon in the compartments. The task is one of eliminating false alarms.

Medical personnel are firmly opposed to this principle, however. Lieutenant Colonel Medical Service Kulikov cited an example from the not-too-distant past. A false activation of the OKhT system caused a large amount of Freon to be poured into the magazine on one of the ships. All of the compartments were thoroughly aired out. However, air samples taken to the laboratory from certain compartments contained Freon in concentrations capable of poisoning people. In addition, a secondary concentration of Freon was produced by its evaporation from areas difficult to ventilate. The personnel were therefore evacuated from two crew quarters. Not until three days later did a second test of the air by means of a chromatograph (and, I was told, only two of the fleet's shore laboratories have these instruments) indicate a normal situation. Just what if this had occurred not at the base, but at sea?

Freons are compounds whose molecules contain simultaneously atoms of chlorine and fluorine. One variety of Freon is used as a fire-extinguishing agent on ships. Despite all its advantages, it also has a significant deficiency which can outweigh all the plusses. I refer to the great toxicity of Freon. I have, to be sure, heard people on the ships say that it is easier today, that a far more toxic substance, carbon tetrachloride, was previously used as the inhibitor. Poisoning from this substance was far more serious. The comparison is valid, of course. Incidentally, leftover carbon tetrachloride is still being used on some ships. But would it not be better to compare the situation not with what was, but with what should be in the interest of protecting the health of the personnel?

Since the campaign against the use of Freon is being waged worldwide, I would say, we need persistently to seek a less toxic replacement. I believe that we should also not ignore foreign experience. According to Captain 1st Rank M. Petrovskiy, chief fleet mechanic, he has read articles on the adoption by foreign countries of fire-extinguishing systems which are no less effective, but safer. I could also mention a visit to one of our garrisons, where space industry specialists told about some very interesting innovations of theirs in the field of firefighting systems. The Fire Prevention Institute of the USSR MVD also has some interesting developments as good as those in foreign countries. At a conference at one of the Navy's scientific research institutes Capt 1st Rank Petrovskiy himself saw some new nitrogen generators developed by specialists far removed from the Navy. The question is whether we are capable of overcoming the interdepartmental barriers.

The science and industry directly serving the Navy's interests are probably not dozing. Particularly since the list of causes in the Navy's finding from its investigation into the loss of the submarine Komsomolets included the following: study the possibility of developing fire-extinguishing agents with less effect upon the ozone to replace the coolants (read Freon), new damage-control systems using nitrogen, and self-activating extinguishing components. This research and production process could be dragged out a long time, however, because of the well-known sluggishness of our monopolistic industry, little interested in altering the established system for providing the ships with the current OKhT systems. This is far from an idle question in view of the fact that the sailors are frequently involuntary prisoners of the Freon "jinni," which, upon leaving the bottle, can cause plenty of problems even before the damage-control bells begin ringing.

#### **Causes of Navy's High Accident Rate, Potential Solutions**

91UM0786A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jul 91  
Union Edition p 7

[Article by Colonel of Justice (Res) N. Romanov, Captain 1st Rank A. Khraptovich, former nuclear submarine commander, and A. Yemelyanenko, USSR people's

deputy: "Without Hope for Escape? Reasons for High Accident Rate in the Navy"]

[Text] As soon as the censorship was lifted, we began to learn that thousands of people perish annually in the military service—in peacetime!; that military aircraft do not always make it to the landing strip; that tanks, together with their basic loads of ammunition, explode right in their depots; and that catastrophic fires occur in nuclear submarine compartments. It is no longer a secret that armaments and munitions depots blow up into the air, that reactors explode, military ships sink, and ballistic missiles burn in the tubes of underwater missile strategic cruisers [submarines].

Multiple facts of the mass deaths of military personnel as a result of accidents and catastrophes have become the subject of analysis for our expert group, working under the umbrella of a special commission created in accordance with the USSR president's decree of 15 November 1990 "On Measures To Implement Proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers."

Incidents of this kind make up a considerable part of the loss statistics in the Soviet Army and Navy; they are accompanied by considerable material damage, discredit the Army and the Navy in the eyes of the public, and often cause political reverberations abroad.

The conclusions our group arrived at and specific legislative proposals are described in the supplement to the special report to the USSR president; we hope that they will be carefully considered and implemented. Through this newspaper, however, we would like to attract public attention to only a few points of principal importance.

Those who have tied their destiny to the Navy are particularly troubled by the increasingly frequent incidents of serious breakdowns, ship collisions, fires, and other emergencies in Navy units and formations. According to the Chief Military Procuracy, during the past five years (1986-1990) 1,283 people perished in the Navy. According to the official version, of these only 169 officers, petty officers, and seamen lost their lives because of accidents involving armaments and military equipment. In our opinion, the real picture is far more dramatic.

Our group has analyzed a considerable number of submissions from the Chief Military Procuracy and the USSR Procuracy regarding the facts concerning deliveries of substandard armaments and military equipment to the troops and the Navy, which often become the main reason for future tragedy. In various years, this problem was raised by commanders of ships and units, staff officers, and representatives of the Navy's permanent state acceptance commission. The information arrived on a timely basis at the Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and, without question, at the CPSU Central Committee. In December 1986, the Politburo even held a special session...



If anything has changed since then, however, it is the procedures for rewarding high-ranking officials for developing and creating new technological prototypes: Defense industry generals no longer have the right to nominate generals and admirals from high staff quarters, inspections, and acceptance commissions for decorations, next-level stars, laureate titles, and attendant prizes. Now those who show themselves well are rewarded by their superior commanders. As for the rest...

From the submission of the Main Military Procuracy, dated 31 March 1989, to USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, it follows that as of 20 February 1989, because of not meeting the requirements of contract specifications, unfinished conditions, and other deviations that substantially reduce a ship's combat capabilities, for 1988 alone acts of acceptance were not issued for eight nuclear submarines, 16 ships, and three support vessels...

What was the reaction to such a troublesome signal? Two and a half months later I. Kapitanets, interim acting commander in chief of the Navy, signed a reply which said the following: "As a result of consideration by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Procuracy's charge that ships and vessels 'with major deficiencies' are accepted by the Navy has been completely lifted from the Navy and the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry... Not a single ship on which the work and testing was not completed was accepted by the Navy, **unless it was authorized by special permission of the USSR Government**"(bold by authors.—ed.).

Let us be even more precise: The date of the reply falls during the time when a government commission that investigated the circumstances of the destruction of submarine Komsomolets, named construction deficiencies in the vessel among the reasons for the tragedy...

A study of a criminal case on the destruction of the Komsomolets showed us that among the possible causes for the death of seamen in the emergency flotation chamber (VSK), and outside of it in the frigid Norwegian Sea, were deficiencies in the construction of the apparatus. This deficiency was known five years before the catastrophe, but even now, two years after the destruction of the submarine, the Navy command permits some nuclear submarines to be sent to sea with exactly the same deficient flotation chamber. Should something happen, the seamen have no hope for escape because of jams in exit hatches and other defects that prevent the seamen from leaving the sinking submarine.

The Armed Forces and the defense industry are tightly tied together by mutual interests and gripes. This is, if you wish, a kind of a backbone of the administrative command system, which all of us continue to combat, with all its inherent and far from overcome sins: window dressing; gigantomania; whitewash, with complete indifference to the position and opinion of ordinary people; interpenetration of bureaucratic structures of the Army and Navy high echelons and those of the defense industries, where they have long tried to "overlook" the negative and have welcomed reports about the very, very best...

Unfortunately, much of this still exists to this day. Take, for instance, the "demonstration" of the Northern Fleet forces for the country's high leadership in 1987. In an effort to convince the high-level guests that we are second to none in this area, they attempted to paint such an upbeat picture that it only brought out ironic smiles and puzzlement among the specialists. Meanwhile, the bitter truth that sometimes breaks through to the pages of the open press is seen by the Armed Forces command as something that undermines combat readiness, divulges military and state secrets, and is a discreditation and insult.

What else, one might ask, can explain the fact that while we are spending on defense enormous financial resources that constitute a considerable part of our national income, we nevertheless do not have appropriate study and training facilities or technical and service bases? The living conditions of the lower rank military personnel cannot be called anything but beggarly, which in the final analysis cannot fail to produce considerable shortcomings in the selection, assignment, and training of personnel. Which, again, is ripe with grave consequences.

Now one can frequently hear high military brass complaining that not enough money is being allocated from the budget, but they rarely stop and think about whether this money is spent rationally. Times do change: In the environment of glasnost and public control far from every minister can manage to get even a million over the already approved budget. This means that internal reserves need to be mobilized; that priority should be given to those ideas and designs that can ensure the required level of combat effectiveness of the troops and the Navy with minimal expenditures of time and resources—which would be in line with the currently accepted doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency, and the military reform that is underway...

Alas, one of the main reasons for repeated emergencies and catastrophes in the Navy is the nonacceptance of constructive suggestions aimed at raising Navy combat readiness; at the reliability, survivability, and safety at sea; and at perfecting collective and individual means of personnel escape. Even those that do not require special expenditures but represent essentially effective means of saving ships and crews are being declined under far-fetched pretexts. Believe us, we could offer many examples of this...

The extensive service record of two of us, and work in the organs of military justice, service at the Navy training center, and the detailed study by the presidential commission of criminal cases and submissions by the procuracy, give us the right to state: The main reasons for deaths of personnel in Navy units and formations are well known to specialists but, to our bitter regret, are not being dealt with. As before, ships are accepted for service and sent to sea without full-scale testing, or sometimes with non-working material components, without appropriate means for collective escape and individual protection. Most often, let us repeat, it is technical malfunctions that become the primary reasons for accidents.

Another side of the problem is the low level professional training of some crew members, especially among the commanding ranks; as a result, because of incorrect or belated actions technical malfunctions grow into accidents and accidents into catastrophes.

During the subsequent departmental analysis and in the course of procuracy investigations this "model" of tragedies, as a rule, does not surface. Just as nobody seriously tracks the entire chain—from the design, construction, and testing of the ship and its separate systems, and the formation and training of the crew, to the smallest details of pre-cruise preparation. Many command-link and military industrial complex higher administrative echelon culprits responsible for emergencies and catastrophes often remain "outside the frame." To this day, they quite often remain legally invulnerable; they move up their career ladder unimpeded, and receive new ranks and decorations.

It is time to dig deeply into all of this. The work of our expert group only slightly lifted the stratum of old painful problems. It is necessary to have a comprehensive look at the situation in the Army and the Navy by a fully empowered commission of independent competent specialists with the participation of people's deputies.

Is the Union parliament capable of making such a step today? Or should the USSR president do it, since, as is known, his apparatus includes the Department on State Defense and Security? We do not have answers to these questions, but we are firmly convinced of one thing: The concept of military reform that is being developed now within the walls of the Ministry of Defense and is to be discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, may remain no more than a forced imitation of change unless it receives a timely and comprehensive appraisal of independent specialists, and unless its implementation is put under the open and objective control of legitimately elected organs and, of course, the public.

In our opinion, there is no other way to overcome high accident rate in the Army and the Navy.

### **Inspection Finds Serious Flaws in Pacific Fleet Readiness**

91UM0788A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Jul 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Mikheyev, Pacific Fleet: "Continuous Crash Campaigns—That's What Service Is Like on Some Ships"]

[Text] This destroyer is but three years old—too soon to worry about its fate, it would seem. But its other siblings in the series, just two or three years older, break away from their moorings more and more rarely due to "technical difficulties." Why? Five or six years, after all, is not all that old for a ship.

A meeting was convened in the spacious wardroom, which extended from one side of the ship to the other. The results of a fleet staff inspection of the ship's readiness for combat were being summarized. There was

little being said: All speakers ended their reports with the word "ready," with the only exception being the representative from the technical maintenance department, who fixed a firm deadline for getting the air conditioning units on line—one entirely within the means of the specialists.

The mood of the ship officers, and even of the staff officers, was high: The ship was as ready as it would ever be. This made what fleet chief of staff Vice Admiral N. Martynyuk said surprising and sobering:

"Almost 40 percent of the crew consists of youngsters not yet approved for standing watch. Only the fleet commander can make the decision to certify the ship."

Ship commander Captain 2d Rank S. Shishkin asked for the floor on the spot, and he spoke resolutely about the crew's ability to execute its missions, saying that many of the young seamen had already passed their tests.

There was no mention, either now or later on, of why the crew of this ship, which was about to embark on a distant cruise, was manned as it was. Apparently it was assumed that everyone knew about the situation in the country, and about the difficulties of conscription, and that no one was going to ask useless questions about that. But in fact, the word "manning" is entirely inappropriate here. What really happened was that young seamen who had changed into the navy uniform just a few weeks ago had been hastily loaded aboard ship. Such was the concern displayed for the crew at its home base!

The home base.... As fate would have it, the ship was registered in a place where winter locks the bay shut with ice for almost half a year. This has a bad effect on the health of the ship—that is, on its technical readiness. After its first winter of this kind, the destroyer did in fact "fall ill"—so badly that it was unable to fulfill its normal mission for a long time. Who gave any thought then to the pier, which was so ill-suited as a mooring for such ships? Or about the fact that one of the main engines had to be kept constantly operating, or the problems of supplying electric power from shore? Or about the additional watches that would have to be stood because of the low manning of the crew? Did the base assume even part of the load that fell upon the shoulders of the seamen through no fault of their own? The crew was worn down by patrols, garrison details, and "allocations" to house-keeping jobs of the most diverse sorts. It was easiest of all for the commission to simply assert that they didn't know how to organize field days aboard ship.

And the ship felt itself to be a total stranger when it stopped in Strelak Bay during a transfer. It stood on the roadstead for a week, and the shore services did not respond to any of its needs—not a liter of water, not a gram of bread was brought up, and they couldn't even find any mooring room for it at the pier. To load armament, they could, but only for that. Winds were up to 17 meters per second, but the base didn't allocate even a single tug, and the ship collided with the pier.

The transfer to Vietnam, to Cam Ranh, may be called successful. The selfless work of experienced mechanics—Captain 3d Rank V. Yakshin and Captain Lieutenant N. Voznyuk—compensated for the shortage of specialists, and neutralized the incompetency of some seamen. An exhausting two-shift system was used at all posts of the underway watch, and not everyone could endure it over the many days of the cruise.

Despite all of this, the mechanics were able to achieve the most important thing—dependable forward progress, and the ship moored at the base in Cam Ranh on the appointed date. It was the hope of the crew that now everything else would be set right. "Everything else" meant, first of all, the professional development of the young generation of officers and warrant officers, who had recently occupied posts new to them (this was true of a third of the entire crew). In other words the ship should have been sent out on a basic training mission.

But while this was the belief aboard ship, it was not so in the headquarters to which it was temporarily subordinated. Almost three weeks passed, and what did the seamen do all this time? Cleaned house, of course, preparing for an inspection of the ship: It was communicated to them on their very first day here that the fleet commander was coming.

What does cleaning house mean today aboard a ship with an inexperienced crew? The entire burden fell upon the "green" seamen. Usually, not more than half the personnel showed up for work. Of course, the command did take the appropriate steps, and neither the warrant officers nor the officers knew any rest. Public cultural and sports functions were cancelled, and the afternoon swim was an unfulfilled dream. All of this created more tension in an already tense atmosphere in the raw collective. And the effectiveness of the work didn't increase.

The commander's visit was postponed to a later date, but the noise created by the house-cleaning efforts did not abate. In the meantime, the weapons and technical resources aboard ship were left uninspected and unchecked for almost a month.

The paradox was that the ship's officers themselves were unable to find a way out of their unenviable role as taskmasters! Even here, in Cam Ranh, with the ship almost fully manned. No leaves, no passes. This was an ideal possibility for trying to implement the wisdom of the ship's organization and regulation manual, to display the best in organizing training and service. The best was achieved, except in the totally opposite direction: "To live in such filth," the commanders and chiefs taught, "means to cause the crew's disintegration!"

Today it is clear to even the young seamen that the people aboard ship are actually prisoners of this iron behemoth, which is designed in such a way that its maintenance would require an entire legion of housekeepers.

I spoke with Petty Officer 1st Class Gapeyev and his subordinates beside a cruise missile container: They were fruitlessly attacking the rust—this was only the second time they could do so in the last three weeks. But, he smiles: What could he possibly do about it? Try as one might, no one can make any sense of why there are so many turnbuckles on the life lines. They have to be cared for like small children: Almost once a week they have to wrap them in either cellophane or oiled transparent paper. Officers who had visited American ships are now astounded by the lack of love our designers display toward their offspring. Consider in particular the primitiveness of the air conditioning units. The seamen seem to spend all of their time in this tropical climate working endlessly with wrenches on these cumbersome and primitive machine units.

One of the first combat training functions conducted aboard ship during the month had a rather loud but strange name: "Demonstration Combat Exercise: Damage Control in Response to Major Damage." When it comes to demonstration exercises, the navy regulations state that they must be prepared for meticulously, and they must be conducted with a well trained crew. Neglect of the actual training level of the personnel was so obvious that I asked for an explanation from the ship commander. He simply shrugged his shoulders: The exercise was planned by the higher staff. The same could also be said for the flagship, because even it had been given instructions from above. But Captain 1st Rank V. Floryak knew what I was getting at—the approach to combat training in general.

"You must understand," he said, "that the ships are supposed to come to us completely debugged, ready to fulfill any mission. But instead, you can see what we get."

To be honest, everyone aboard ship was generally rather unconcerned about such a beginning of combat service. The older officers assured me that the crash-campaign approach was a normal state of affairs for their crew. And they offered persuasive examples of this. Here is just a brief survey of the most recent past.

In spring of last year the crew was preparing for a visit to North Korea. They naturally made their preparations with eagerness and enthusiasm that could not but assume the form of a lengthy crash campaign. But the visit never came about. Instead, the ship sailed for Vladivostok, where it received countless "visits" by different fleet commissions. Preparations for firing the antiaircraft missile complex were started by that time, and everything else aboard ship was forgotten. Then in fall, drydock. That meant unloading the ammunition, helping the workers, and reloading the ammunition. God himself dictated the crash campaign this time around, all the more so because the crew was experiencing an acute shortage of personnel at this time.

Nonetheless, it is still difficult to become used to crash campaigns, all the more so if they are conducted for their own sake, and unendingly. The only thing they do well is

get the crew out of the habit of planned training and organized service. When the excitement of the ship inspection died down and combat training returned to the agenda, it was "suddenly" revealed that the crews of the combat stations were so raw that you might as well bring the crash campaigns back. Base training prior to combat exercises couldn't do anything to improve the situation. The effect of the crash campaigns spread even as far as combat discipline: The attitude toward training exercises at combat stations was the same as toward ship details—something that could be dispensed with whenever desired. But the main thing was that officers had forgotten how to teach their subordinates. Perhaps because many of them had ceased learning themselves, having become satisfied with just the most necessary skills after being certified to command and to stand watches.

Continual crash campaigns deprive people of their individuality. People are looked at as a work force that must finish its routine work on time—and that's all. There was a time when crews could get a vacation from crash campaigns by serving combat duty, during which no one hindered them from organizing their work according to plan. But this was not so at Cam Ranh.

No cultural program of even the slightest substance for acquainting the sailors with their host country was

organized during all of this time. Perhaps this is the norm here at the base. As is disregard in general for the elementary needs of people.

What I can't understand is that during the entire time of the crew's presence in Cam Ranh, it spent less than half of the hard currency allocated to it for the purchase of foodstuffs. The destroyer's deputy commander for political affairs is certain that food is not being purchased because certain higher authorities give the O.K. to go shopping only once a month, and even less frequently. But on the other hand, storekeeper Senior Warrant Officer A. Fomichev asserts that his food requisitions are satisfied completely, because he draws them up not in accordance with need but with regard for storage capabilities.

No one aboard ship knows the total of the amount spent on purchases of foodstuffs for the personnel. Once storekeepers are issued foodstuffs on the basis of their requisitions, their accounts are closed for that amount.

The destroyer is coming to the end of its combat service. In mid-August it will set sail for the motherland. It is difficult to imagine what awaits it in the immediate future. One thing is for certain: The only fair wind it could enjoy would be the wind of the changes that are occurring, albeit with difficulty, in our navy.



### Defense and State Security Committee Chairman Views Reform

91UM0785A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian  
No 6, 8 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with L. Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee, by unidentified SYN OTECHSTVA correspondent, place and date not given: "Military Reform: Will We See Better Times?"]

[Text] The recent fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet has not brought any tangible results in regard to providing a legal basis for military reform. Will this issue be resolved at the upcoming session of the Union parliament? This is the topic our correspondent discusses with L. Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee.

[SYN OTECHSTVA] Leonid Vasilyevich, the tense domestic political situation, especially in the Baltics, has brought forward again the problem of the role and place of the Armed Forces in our society. The prevailing current opinions of the Army are sharply critical. What is the position of your parliamentary committee in this respect?

[Sharin] Our committee has not had a chance yet to gather in full attendance in order to analyze the situation in the Baltics and to appraise the actions of military units in these events. Therefore, I am only prepared to offer my personal opinion.

The news of the tragic events in Vilnius on 13 January reached me in Germany where I, as a member of a parliamentary delegation, was studying on-site the terms of our troop withdrawal. For the first two days the only information we could get was from German sources and those Soviet periodicals that are distributed in the FRG. I want to mention at the outset that these events were being covered one-sidedly and with prejudice. The essence boiled down to the assertion that Moscow had used military force to keep Lithuania from seceding from the USSR.

However, the blood spilled in Lithuania is only a consequence. The underlying causes for the tragedy that took place there lie in the consistently anticonstitutional actions undertaken—and still being undertaken—by the Supreme Council of Lithuania since the republic declared its sovereignty at the beginning of last year. These events had been brewing for a long time. In one of my appearances at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet I expressed our committee's utmost concern at the fact that the military in the Baltics are being subjected not only to verbal insults but to threats of physical harm. Our committee had been insisting on taking cardinal steps in order to defuse this explosive situation. Unfortunately, this was not done. Moreover, the situation had been growing increasingly tense. Take, for instance, Landsbergis' statement that Lithuania is in a state of war with the Soviet Union. I will tell you, without going into details: In Vilnius the Army was

skillfully provoked into action. I do think, however, that in that difficult situation the military commanders should have shown more restraint.

[SYN OTECHSTVA] So it turns out that by not taking the appropriate steps in the Baltics the political leadership of the country exposed the military to the bullets of separatists, and now it is the same military that has to answer for this?

[Sharin] Yes, they have to. I believe it was an unforgivable mistake on the part of the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee to appeal to the Army for help, as was, correspondingly, the decision of the commanders of the Vilnius garrison to provide such help. At this point it is hard to tell who is at fault and to what extent, and therefore who should incur what punishment. But in any case the official personae who ordered the troops onto the streets exceeded the powers given to them.

Our committee expressed a long time ago the unequivocal opinion that the Army should not carry out police functions, or any other functions that are not inherent to it. Its main task is to protect our Motherland from external danger. Law and order should be ensured exclusively by the Internal Troops, which, by the way, should be recruited on a volunteer basis.

The idea of the Army's nonparticipation in internal political conflicts is part of the military reform concept.

[SYN OTECHSTVA] But concepts not formalized in the appropriate legislative acts remain no more than good intentions. It is also obvious that the Union parliament is not displaying any activity in this direction. The concept of military reform offered by the Ministry of Defense so far has been accepted as a basis; at your committee's suggestion its further development was commissioned to the USSR Council of Ministers, and now to the Cabinet of Ministers. When will this document be presented for the deputies' consideration?

[Sharin] True, military reform today is in the hands of the government. Despite all the difficulties related to the preparation of this document, it will be presented to the fifth session of the national Supreme Soviet. In addition, the deputies will discuss the USSR draft laws "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" and "On the Status of Military Personnel."

These draft laws have been sent to the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics. Not all the republic parliaments have expressed their opinion and comments on these laws, but the majority have done so.

In general, our committee has been trying lately to consult with the Union republics on all issues related to defense policy. It is another matter that not all republics wish to participate in this process. But then, this is our common problem that is characteristic of the complex domestic political situation in the Union.

[SYN OTECHSTVA] In that case, is there any guarantee that this same law "On the Status of Military

Personnel," after it is adopted by the Union parliament, will become mandatory for compliance throughout the country?

[Sharin] Nobody can currently provide this guarantee. Until the new Union treaty is signed there is no mechanism that obligates all the republics to unconditionally comply with Union laws.

The situation at this point is such that we need to sign an economic agreement as soon as possible. Otherwise, there will be no money to maintain the Army. The crisis situation our society and the economy are in is having a direct effect on the Armed Forces as well. This is unavoidable—the Army is a part of society.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] All of this will hardly add to the optimism of officers and military personnel carrying out fixed-term service, who have long been waiting for the law on their status and are hoping for the creation of a state mechanism of social protection and an improvement in their material situation.

[Sharin] Yes, unfortunately it is true. On the other hand, we understand that it is necessary to act without waiting until the Union treaty is signed. Resolution of the problems that have accumulated in the Armed Forces can no longer be delayed. I think that sooner or later common sense will prevail in the relations between the republics and the Center.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] Well, let us hope so. Let us count first of all on the strong nerves and patience of those who have chosen the profession of defender of the Motherland and deserve better than the current attitude on the part of society and the state. In concluding our conversation, I would like to touch upon one more problem: regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former GDR territory—especially in light of the fact that you recently visited Germany.

[Sharin] The conditions for the withdrawal of our troops are laid out in the treaty on German unification, which has already been ratified by the German side. The treaty takes into account many details of this unprecedented redeployment of more than half-a-million-strong group of troops and all its combat equipment. Many, but not all of them. Property issues related to this withdrawal still need considerable work and clarification. In addition to residential buildings, we are leaving in Germany air fields, training centers, and command posts—in short, a developed network of military infrastructure that provided for the normal functioning of this group of troops. Thus, an issue of appropriate compensation will have to be resolved. If we reach an additional agreement on this issue with Germany, I think that the Union parliament will ratify this treaty.

The Soviet military contingent on the territory of Germany is the army of the victor country. Since we have reached an agreement on the withdrawal of our troops, we should not forgo our legitimate interests the way we have done, unfortunately, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By the way, the German side understands this well and is ready to make certain concessions in order to have the treaty ratified by the Soviet parliament.

As is known, the bulk of the troops and equipment are to be taken out of Germany by rail through the territory of Poland. One billion Deutsche mark has been allocated specifically for the purpose of this transit. But the Poles decided to profit from this, and have been asking an impossible price for the transit. We told the Germans that we have no intention of playing these games. If they want the Soviet troops to be withdrawn strictly on schedule, let them talk to the Poles. Whether they put pressure on the Poles through diplomatic or economic channels or agree to pay additional amounts is their own business. It is interesting that Poland is trying to present the increase in rail transportation tariffs as a reaction to the events in the Baltics. But this is only a political game, behind which is the desire to profit at somebody else's expense.

Furthermore, the Germans have allocated almost 8 billion Deutsche mark for residential construction in the USSR. They have affirmed their previously stated intention to use their own resources in this construction. At this point, German companies are studying the conditions for the realization of this grandiose project.

And lastly. We have encountered in Germany the unpleasant phenomenon of desertion. As of today, 74 people are considered to be deserters, and about 300 more military personnel are "on the run." In proportion to the half-million strength of the troops this is not very many. However, according to our law desertion is considered to be a military crime, and a person who has committed this crime is subject to punishment. The Germans, however, consider the deserters to be people who have asked for political asylum. Our parliamentary group has conducted an investigation in each specific case. There are no political motives behind any of them. Cupidity and greed are enticing the military to commit this crime.

This is not surprising, though. Our society today is suffering from the disintegration of such moral values as honor, conscience, and fidelity to one's duty. Today's heroes are lucky cooperative members or just cunning dealers who manage perfidiously to grab a million.

Selfless service to the Motherland and the people is somehow out of fashion these days. But this is a separate conversation.

### Market's Impact on Naval Purchasing

91UM0765A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
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[Article by Rear Admiral A. Slavgorodskiy, deputy commander in charge of rear services of the Leningrad Naval Base: "Many Expenses, No Income Anticipated: The Navy Rear Services and the Market"]

[Text] In many respects, the restructuring of the national economy is proceeding chaotically; old links and approaches are simply being destroyed, instead of gradually being replaced by new ones. The impact of this situation is being increasingly felt by the Army and Navy, which by their nature cannot be mechanically transferred into a market environment. This is the topic the deputy commander in charge of rear services of the Leningrad Naval Base contemplates in his article.

In a practical sense, currently the situation is such that the Leningrad Naval Base rear services units cannot especially count on the central supply organs. The main reason for this, in my opinion, is that the mechanism of contract obligations and planned deliveries in the country has been destroyed. It may sound as a paradox as we approach the 21st century, but the Soviet economy is sliding toward common barter. For instance, the rear services need bread delivery vans. We approach the manufacturer and hear in reply: "If you get us so many tons of metal, we will deliver the vans..." But we are not a metallurgical plant! Meanwhile, we desperately need bread delivery vans, since the Leningrad bakeries categorically refuse to load their output into transportation that is not specially equipped for this purpose. So we have to hustle, get involved in complicated commerce, and resort to risky compromises. In doing so, we encounter another paradox of our times: Instead of competition among the producers, there is competition among the... consumers. The one that pays the most gets the product. The manufacturer simply dictates his will. So far, it does not look much like a market. Still, we have to hustle, try to establish connections with enterprises that are suppliers of particular products or materials that are necessary for the normal functioning of units and subunits. This means, for instance, that the clothing service has to establish contacts with 60 suppliers. The rear services cannot work effectively in this mode due to their organizational and staffing structure, which is "tailored" to working in an environment of centralized deliveries. I am convinced that this structure must be revised without delay.

Or take transportation. In the past, supplies were delivered from various regions of the country in a planned and centralized manner. We only needed transportation to get things from the unloading station to the warehouses. Now we have to send trucks to tens of cities: Samara, Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, Grozny, Vitebsk, Grodno... The volume to be hauled has grown dramatically, while the vehicle pool and the limits remain the same. So-called overhead expenses have also grown. As is known, the Army and Navy do not have any income,

so how are we to cover these expenses? Moreover, the military budget has been cut, while the cost of living has gone up many fold. If such trends are to continue, it is easy to imagine in what situation the Armed Forces may find themselves. Nobody advocates, of course, slowing down the country on its way to a market economy; the point, however, is that a structure such as the Army needs to be integrated into the new economic order in a way that will not be detrimental to the combat readiness and legitimate interests of military personnel.

What is needed, as I have said, is to prevent economic links from snapping like a ship's mooring lines in a sudden hurricane. We know that the USSR president actively supports the position that economic ties should be retained for this year. At the same time, in the current conditions many suppliers are benefiting from not fulfilling planned deliveries. Why? Because they pay a minor fine and then have an opportunity to sell their output at contract prices instead of state ones. Take, for instance, procuring potato stocks for the Leningrad Naval Base. We buy it at state prices—30 kopeks a kilogram; procurement agents from the northern regions were offering two to three times the price. Therefore, a sovkhoz [state farm] or a kolkhoz [collective farm] will happily pay us the 3,000 ruble [R] fine for not fulfilling the contract and... go on to earn R30,000-R40,000 in profits.

Of course, we do not just sit and pine. First of all, we actively develop auxiliary services and plots attached to food preparation facilities, and we try to use the available land with maximum effectiveness. We have opportunities to use this approach everywhere—in training schools, units, and subunits. We also have examples of ambitious handling of affairs when, other conditions being equal, local commanders find a way to supply their personnel with "homegrown" meat, fresh herbs, and vegetables all year round. This is the way things are done in the unit commanded by Colonel A. Kupriyanov. To the extent that resources and finances allow, we are also developing some promising projects. We are planning, for instance, to create our own animal husbandry complex that would satisfy 90 percent of the Leningrad Naval Base personnel's needs in meat, milk, and other products. This project is in the development stage right now. We can probably afford to build the necessary structures. More difficult, from the financial point of view, is the issue of building purification facilities, which of course we cannot do without. In this, we need serious help on the part of central organs.

We have no right to jeopardize supplies for units, ships, subunits, and military schools. We do what is in our power. All of this could move much faster if, together with the revision of the staff structure of the rear services, substantial changes were made in the guideline documents that regulate the commanders' financial activity. Right now it is under numerous restrictions dictated from above. In the environment of a market economy this ties up the commanders' economic activities, and their initiative and enterprise.

### Struggle Against Anti-Draft Agitation Viewed

91UM0750A Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 91  
(Signed to press 08 May 91) pp 24-29

[Interview with Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, by correspondent Ya.V. Renkas: "Who Is Thwarting the Military Draft?"]

[Text] As a result of the anti-army campaign among the draft-age youth, the induction of youth for military service was essentially thwarted last year in a number of regions of the nation. Colonel Ya.V. Renkas, our correspondent, interviewed Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, on this matter. The substance of their conversation is presented here.

[Renkas] Grigoriy Fedotovitch, what do the numbers for this latest fall induction look like?

[Krivosheyev] Here they are. The overall induction plan for local agencies of the military directorate was fulfilled by 84.6% (10-31% for the Baltic republics, 10.9% for Georgia and 33.4% for Armenia). I would point out that in most regions of the nation the governments of Union republics and the kray and oblast executive committees took an indifferent, passive attitude toward the induction campaign. And this occurred in the face of active resistance by certain political parties and social movements in the Baltic area, the Transcaucasus, Uzbekistan, a number of oblasts in the western Ukraine and to a significant degree, in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev.

[Renkas] And what are the results?

[Krivosheyev] It is as though there is no longer either a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or a Constitution of the USSR or laws giving the USSR exclusive jurisdiction in these matters. The republics' own laws and decrees are appearing like mushrooms following a warm rain. Their authors appear to be more interested in how to replace the military service for the youth, that is, how to avoid serving at all. And if someone does serve, it has to be right at the doorstep of his own home. All told, the republics passed more than 30 such pieces of legislation last year.

[Renkas] Could you be more specific?

[Krivosheyev] I not only can be; I need to be. In the Baltic republics, for example, this legislation essentially amounts to total disregard for Union legislation, to a direct refusal to observe the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty and consequently, to the refusal by young citizens of the republics to perform active military duty. What is more, they have set out on a path of establishing their own national military formations.

The actions of republic authorities in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova also smack of this approach. The latter has gone even farther. Its Supreme Soviet has decreed that all citizens on active military duty in other regions of the USSR be returned home.

The president of Uzbekistan has issued an ukase calling for a halt to the induction of youth from the republic to serve in military construction units stationed beyond its borders, effective as of the fall of 1990. They are also considering the establishment of 34 military construction detachments there to serve the needs of Uzbekistan. And this is at a time when, under an ukase issued by the President of the USSR on 15 November 1990, all such detachments in the Armed Forces are to be completely disbanded in 1992.

Decrees passed by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on 30 July and 10 October 1990 call for draftees to perform their active military duty mainly within the Ukraine, and set forth a number of other requirements which are clearly not within the republic's jurisdiction. The implementation of these demands directly affects the possibility of conducting the draft at all. It has in effect been halted since November of last year.

[Renkas] The mass media report and our readers write to say that in certain Union republics extremist elements are encouraging the youth to evade the service, to desert, to destroy their military registration cards or return them to the military commissariats or the USSR Ministry of Defense. The authorization to commit anti-army acts is accompanied by threats of physical reprisals and with the humiliation of servicemen and workers with the military commissariats. What can you say about this?

[Krivosheyev] It is no exaggeration to say that in the fall of last year the situation surrounding the draft became extremely difficult. It could not be compared with anything not just since the war but perhaps even in the entire history of our state. This was caused by the same thing I have mentioned: organized efforts by extremists, separatist and nationalistic groups and movements to destroy the Armed Forces of the USSR. These efforts are the following. In the first place, there is psychological and ideological conditioning of the population, primarily the draft-age youth. The mass media are being used to "intimidate" people by describing "savage" conditions in the military units and subunits. The military service is depicted almost as an indefinite prison term in which, they allege, the soldier is degraded spiritually. All possible means are put into play: lies, slander, the juggling of facts, and all sorts of rumors. Youth willing to fulfill their constitutional duty are labeled as nothing other than "enemies of the people," since they will serve in an "army of occupation." In the second place, there is active practical resistance to the draft, essentially a boycott. The separatists have no scruples about their choice of means. They set up blockades, arrange pogroms on military commissariats and persecution of the workers.

As they conduct this policy in matters of national defense and oppose the draft into the Armed Forces, certain state figures and leaders depict such actions as a struggle for the good of the people, for the creation, they say, of better conditions in the military service. In reality they are concerned only with their own selfish interests. They are indifferent to the level of the USSR's defense



capability and to the fate of the young people, the sons of peasants and workers, who make up the bulk of army and navy personnel. For the sake of their antipopular, separatist objectives, they encourage the youth "with their protection" to break the law, urge them to commit crimes.

[Renkas] And are there many such instances?

[Krivosheyev] As many as you like. Articles specifying punishment for draft evasion have been removed from the Lithuanian SSR's criminal code, for example, and law-enforcement agencies and local soviets are instructed to protect citizens refusing to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR, because this is portrayed as serving in the "army of occupation" of a foreign state."

Georgia's Supreme Soviet has also approved changes in republic law which abolish previously specified criminal liability for evading service in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

As a result of such anti-constitutional acts more than 5,000 servicemen had deserted their units by the end of 1990, most of them draftees from the Baltic republics, Georgia and Armenia.

[Renkas] The following figures were recently published in the press: In 1989 6,647 people evaded service in the Soviet Army; 256 were convicted of this. The number evading the service grew five-fold in the spring of 1990. Only slightly more than 30 were punished. The very fact of such large-scale evasion of the service is depressing. But how does one explain the fact that the number of gross violations of the law has risen sharply, while at the same time the level of accountability applied to the violators has been reduced even more drastically?

[Krivosheyev] This is due to a relaxation of efforts by law-enforcement agencies, a reduced sense of responsibility on the part of a considerable number of draftees for the fulfillment of their constitutional duty to defend the socialist homeland, and a deterioration of discipline in the nation as a whole. The military commissariats submit to law-enforcement agencies the names of all individuals evading military service for purposes of holding them accountable. During the past two years, however, only an insignificant number of these people have been convicted of evading the draft. But each time one goes unpunished, this reduces the sense of responsibility even more in the draft-age youth. Clearly the Ministry of Defense cannot prevent this negative occurrence by itself.

Agencies of the military procuracy help us with great reluctance in this matter, frequently taking the position of sideline observers. Here is just one example. Back in January of 1990 the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat sent the judge advocate's office at the Novosibirsk garrison documents for filing criminal charges against I. Filimonov and A. Demidov, who had fled the oblast induction center. Not until a year later was the military commissariat able to put Demidov into

the service, and no steps have yet been taken by the judge advocate's office against Filimonov.

[Renkas] The frequent cases of draft evasion is attributed to an alleged all-pervasive system of "dedovshchina" in the forces....

[Krivosheyev] There is no disputing the fact that "dedovshchina" does exist in certain subunits or that there are unfortunate deaths and maimings of servicemen. And we have to be alarmed and concerned about this. But are these occurrences, not so very frequent, not proportionate to the totally rampant crime in the society, to the cruelty and violence we hear about every day in the media? Is the incidence of accidents in the military relative to the number of personnel actually any greater than in any labor collective in the nation? No! But then the army is a setting for human activity with a heightened level of danger. Despite this, an absolute majority of the units exist without "dedovshchina" and other extraordinary events.

[Renkas] Women and mothers of soldiers have repeatedly held mass meetings in front of the building housing the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow, blaming the military leadership for the deaths of sons helping to "extinguish" inter-ethnic conflicts. What is being done to meet the demands of the soldiers' mothers?

[Krivosheyev] Committees of soldiers' mothers have been formed in many cities lately. They recently held their All-Union congress. Their representatives were received by the President of the Soviet Union. As a result of the meeting he issued an ukase on 15 November 1990. A special commission was formed and is functioning to verify the objectivity and thoroughness of investigations into the causes of deaths and injuries of servicemen and military construction workers in peacetime. The ukase also calls for the disbandment in 1992 of military construction detachments (or units) working on the construction of facilities for the national economy under civilian ministries and departments, with the exception of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, the USSR Ministry of Communications, Rosvostokstroy [expansion unknown] and the Main Administration for Special Construction under the USSR Council of Ministers. As a result the induction of citizens of the USSR for active military duty in these military construction detachments (or units) will be halted in the fall of 1991.

The USSR Ministry of Defense has established close ties with many productively functioning committees of soldiers' mothers. Members of the command elements of garrisons and military units participate in the work of these committees, which is producing positive results in the elimination of conflicts arising in some places. The army and navy leadership, as well as the committees of soldiers' mothers, have proposed to the nation's highest legislative bodies that a way be found to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts without the participation of servicemen, particularly first-term personnel.

[Renkas] There has recently been a trend among the directors of higher educational institutions of the Union

republics to register school children and trainees at vocational and technical schools early for purposes of removing them from induction into the Armed Forces. These are also illegal acts, are they not?

[Krivosheyev] Absolutely. The induction commissions therefore reject the idea of granting draft deferments for these individuals, which is causing them to send complaints to all levels of authority. One has to work hard and persistently to explain to those complaining that they are being registered at institutes in violation of the established rules and legal provisions, and they therefore are not entitled to deferments.

Central agencies receive a large number of requests for draft deferments for students in night and correspondence divisions of VUZ's and trainees at vocational and technical schools for two years after they complete their training, and for students of secondary special educational institutions entering them with a secondary education. This possibility does not exist today, however.

[Renkas] Will there be changes in the new legislation pertaining to the induction for active military duty?

[Krivosheyev] Basic new laws of the USSR on defense, universal military duty and the military service, and on the status of servicemen are presently being readied for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Bills to reduce the service term in the army and navy from three to two years have been submitted to the nation's highest legislative body. The matter of providing financial compensation to families for losses suffered as a result of the death of a serviceman or military construction worker in peacetime is being considered. Under the Ukase On Emergency Measures to Strengthen the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen mandatory state personal insurance for the soldiers was established as of 1 January 1991. Youth whose brothers have died while serving in the military are exempted from the draft. Married draftees are assigned to military units near the family's place of residence. A special program of social security for servicemen and their families approved by the government of the USSR calls for increasing pay and allowances for first-term servicemen in 1991, together with other measures. The matter of establishing mandatory annual leaves and weekly days-off, and improving clothing allowances and food provisions for first-term servicemen is being considered. Benefits provided for civilians are being extended to soldiers serving in areas contaminated by the Chernobyl AES accident.

[Renkas] The active preparation of a Union treaty is presently underway. How do you feel its substance will be reflected in the principles for manning the military?

[Krivosheyev] It is our conviction that the Armed Forces of the USSR must be united and be structured in accordance with provisions on defense matters in the Constitution of the USSR and the Law of the USSR On Universal Military Duty. Since our state is multinational, its Armed Forces must be international and perform their duties in the interest of all the peoples of the USSR, and not be split up among national billets.

In view of the need to form strategic forces in various regions of the nation, the underlying principle for manning the Armed Forces of the USSR should involve preserving and legally establishing the extra-territorial principle. This means that the army and navy should be replenished with draftees residing, as a rule, outside the areas in which the military units and formations are stationed (or formed).

[Renkas] Despite this, certain republics have adopted decisions to have their youth serve within their own territories and to establish their own national military formations....

[Krivosheyev] A number of republics are indeed promoting the theory that it is "unacceptable" for young citizens of the indigenous nationalities to serve outside their area. Ukrainian authorities, for example, have adopted a decision that their youth should serve within the republic. A considerable number of young people from Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Odessa, Chernigov and other oblasts express a desire to serve wherever necessary to protect the USSR, however.

If we view defense as the joint mission of all the Union republics, one can question the territorial principle of manning the Armed Forces. Russia, for example, cannot provide enough men for the troops and naval forces stationed on its territory, while other Union republics, on the contrary, have considerably more draftees than needed to meet the needs of the troops stationed within their territories.

In short, national formations are not acceptable from the military standpoint. They cannot meet the realistic needs of national defense.

[Renkas] Today there is a lot of discussion about the problem of alternative service. What can you say about this matter?

[Krivosheyev] In accordance with the well-known decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet this matter was studied in the USSR Ministry of Defense, and a definite position was worked out on the concept of nonmilitary service. It is essentially the following. This service, which is exclusively civilian, can only be voluntary, and the size of the group of citizens enlisted for it cannot be rigidly set by any sort of overall quotas. Otherwise, under international law, it would amount to forced labor. I feel that the term of alternative service should be longer than that for first-term active military duty. A three-year term is being proposed; 18 months for individuals with a higher education. This is consistent with the system in other nations which have this kind of service.

Alternative service may be performed at civilian facilities in any area of the nation. In addition to the individual's application, the need to assign citizens to this kind of job must be validated by written petition from those public, religious or other officially registered organizations of which the citizens are members.

I would like to mention in conclusion that in all ages military service, although difficult, has been considered

a thing of honor and glory. The older people who experienced the Great Patriotic War and postwar conscripts recall the service as a rigorous but necessary school of manhood which gave them a real send-off into the rest of their life and equipped them with knowledge, experience and good counsel for the years ahead. Millions received this schooling. At one time a young man considered it an abasement of his manly dignity to remain outside the military. Every boy dreamed of learning to fire accurately, to operate a combat vehicle confidently, to parachute fearlessly from the hatch of an aircraft. Have we truly lost all of this?

We must admit that the prestige of the military service has begun dropping in recent years. There are many causes. The main one, I believe, is that we have maintained too large an army, frequently used the soldiers for work not a part of the service, put too much pressure on the personnel and not shown enough concern for the living conditions and leisure-time possibilities of the servicemen. The army has not escaped the negative

developments affecting the entire society. Attempts to keep them concealed outside the base gates and within sealed files stamped "Secret" have only exacerbated the situation.

The decline in military-patriotic indoctrination and the anti-army propaganda in the mass media have not helped to strengthen the prestige of the military. And this is at a time when passions are roused and there is heated debate about what kind of Armed Forces we need, about who is to stand out in the bitter cold with an submachine gun, guarding his assigned post, who is to perform combat duty in a submarine compartment, protecting his native shores, and who is to experience the super-human pressure in an aircraft cockpit, guarding his sector of the sky. The military service allows for no breaks or pauses. The nation must live and work in peace.

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### Novaya Zemlya 1950's H-Bomb Tests Recalled

91UM0712A Leningrad CHAS PIK in Russian No 20,  
20 May 91 p 4

[Article by Anatoliy Pavlov, co-worker from the Morfiz-pribor [Maritime Physical Instrument] Institute: "They Treated the Test Dogs in the Interests of Science But We, the Irradiated Sailors, Were Simply Forgotten." For 33 years silence was kept by a tracker from Zone D, the epicenter of the hydrogen explosions on Novaya Zemlya; CHAS PIK describes itself as the "newspaper of the Leningrad Union of Journalists"]

[Text] Only recently has the press begun to publish memoirs about the atomic weapons testing in the region of Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. I have not encountered any articles on the testing of the hydrogen (thermonuclear) weapons, only the brief recollections of A.D. Sakharov in his last interview on 14 December 1989 where he described the testing of a thermonuclear charge in August 1953 and the world's first Soviet hydrogen bomb on 22 November 1955.

After long hesitation (by my military specialty I am a code clerk and the content of encoded correspondence is a state secret without any period of limitation), I resolved to write to CHAS PIK about what I had seen on Novaya Zemlya. This is my duty to the victims of the testing as they at present are continuing to perish (the word "die" does not come tripping off the tongue) or eke a meager existence in hospitals. Even legally, they are not considered participants in the nuclear weapons testing.

In February-March 1958, there was an entire series of explosions on Novaya Zemlya, and each explosion, as the scientists feel, was the equivalent of 15 (!!!) Chernobyls. However, there apparently were no witnesses or victims in them. After completing our service we were discarded as unnecessary rubbish, having been obliged to keep silent about what we had seen. My military card does not indicate the number of the units where I served. Accidentally, only one document has survived, a written commendation.

By chance, in 1958, I ended up in the very thick of events, first at the command post of the state range on Novaya Zemlya and later in the area of the epicenter of the explosions in February-March 1958.

...My path to Novaya Zemlya began from the Naval school, the only one at that time in the USSR. The military commissariat told me that I would be sent to a secret navy underwater school.

And then eight comrades and myself ended up in Beluzhaya Guba. We, the code clerks, were the first to learn any news on Novaya Zemlya. The "old hands" told about the testing held the previous year. Then the radioactive cloud passed over Beluzhaya toward Amderma on the mainland. For several days the garrison went about in gas masks and fed on dry rations. It was prohibited to use water in the lakes.

In January 1958, documents began to be received on the pending exercises. With each day the flow of coded telegrams increased. Several films were shown with a "secret" classification on the testing of the nuclear weapons and measures of defense against them. We did not consider these films serious. What could we do? Put on our gas mask and wait. During all my service I never saw either protective cloaks or dosimeters.

Hanging in the staff was a map of Novaya Zemlya where zones were designated according to degree of danger. Beluzhaya was in the zone of possible injury to glass from the blast wave. A day prior to the testing over the intercom radio an order was broadcast from the garrison chief Rear Admiral Lutskiy that during the designated interval of time we were not to go near the window glasses and not go outside without a gas mask. This was the entire range of protective measures.

Soon thereafter, the date of the exercises was set, the so-called 0 hour. A state commission flew in, including the chief of the Sixth Directorate of the Navy, Rear Admiral Fomin, and his assistant, Rear Admiral Voshchinin, and the nuclear physicist Tsytkov.

The first detonating of a hydrogen bomb was in mid-February. My duties included delivering to the staff communications center the coded messages from the command post. The command post was located in an area fenced off behind barbed wire. At the entrance was a sentry. At the entrance of the command post itself was another sentry. The command post was a tall, heavy building with massive doors. Opposite the entrance on the wall hung a brightly illuminated map of a portion of the Kola Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya. The illuminated points on the map indicated the location of aircraft carrying a hydrogen bomb. Opposite sat the operators and they had direct contact with the aircraft.

Finally, one of the operators reported: "The aircraft are above us." I dashed out of the room. Several generals also went out to look.

In the sky there were scattered storm clouds and between them, directly overhead at an altitude of 10,000 m, there were three airplanes. Behind them were thick white contrails. They were ordinary aircraft but our attitude toward them was unusual, somewhat mystical. They were carrying a terrible load. When I went back into the command post, the operator was transmitting to the carrier aircraft the signal "cloud" and according to the procedure chart this meant: "Ten minutes remaining until the explosion."

Some five minutes before the explosion, virtually everyone had gone outside and was standing to the right of the building. In front stood Vice Admiral Fomin, behind him Voshchinin in his new admiral's shoulderboards and then Rear Admiral Lutskiy with Tsytkov and civilians. Someone from the retinue pointed where we should look: "Over there, between those uprights."

The blinding polar sun as well as the blinding snow-covered plain created the impression that in this world of



light it would be impossible to see any other outburst. The seconds dragged on agonizingly long. I was afraid to glance at my watch and miss the moment of the blast. But then suddenly at the very horizon in the quarter of the sky there flashed a dark red burst (at the center bright and along the edges less bright strips). The burst lasted around a second but I perceived it as double.

Everyone stood silently for about a minute. Then at the site of the flash, a narrow gray column began to rise rapidly. At the end it slowed down its movement and was gradually turned into the classic mushroom. It rose for a certain time, inside one could see movement and then it stopped and began to move and break up.

When I got to the command post, anxious meteorologists were running up with the warning that the wind had picked up in our direction. Sometime later, I went out again to look at the radioactive cloud. It looked like a large thundercloud and seemingly was moving toward us. It was a little frightening. But soon thereafter I learned that the cloud had turned toward Spitsbergen.

The fuss calmed down. I was summoned by Vice Admiral Fomin and given a ("personal" and "very urgent") telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Gorshkov. I quickly drove to the staff. Along the way I became acquainted with the contents of the telegram. It stated that 0 hour had been 1159 hours (for some reason, the explosions were always precisely at 59 minutes). The explosion had occurred over the ice at Cape Sukhoy Nos. It was stated that at the epicenter was pure water.

On 23 February, there was a very powerful blast, although the report on it stated that the explosion had provided 80 percent of the calculated power. The Americans immediately announced over the Voice of America that the Soviet Union had carried out the world's most powerful explosion of a hydrogen bomb.

The blasts continued all of February and March. When we were not on duty, having spotted the familiar three aircraft, we lay down on the snow of the barracks roof and watched from there.

After the exercises, officers arrived from Karmakuly (this was between Beluzhya and the epicenter) and described their impressions. They, it turned out, had assembled on the roofs of the huts with chairs and comfortably observed the explosion. The burst was not dark red for them but rather blinding and the blast wave threw them into the snow drifts along with their chairs.

At the end of March (on the 29th or 30th), the last explosion was held. We were still encoding the reports on the February-March exercises when over the radio they broadcast a governmental announcement on the unilateral renunciation of nuclear testing by the USSR. Even without this announcement we were aware that for a certain time no more testing could be held. The range was not ready and it would take several months to prepare. Against the background of this announcement, it was very strange to read the telegrams from Moscow

demanding acceleration in every possible way of preparations at the range for the autumn testing.

At the end of April and the beginning of May, two vessels arrived from the mainland with the necessary materials, personnel and animals. One was a naval vessel the Baykal which entered Beluzhya and the other, a civilian vessel, a diesel electric icebreaker of the Lena class headed into Zone D, to the epicenter.

The Lena soon became stuck in the ice. From Moscow there followed telegrams demanding that the preparation of the range be sped up. The Lena required a military code clerk. I was summoned to fly there. I knew that there was radiation there but I was absolutely certain that our own communist party and our "most humane command in the world" would not sent Soviet servicemen where it would be dangerous to life or health.

I flew for an hour and a half and then among the snow plain I saw the toy-like ship. We made three circles around the ship, we landed and taxied up to the very side.

The ship was very comfortable. But that was above decks. In an enormous damp hold there were several hundred construction soldiers. Along the walls were double-tiered bunks, the enormous space was illuminated by one light and in the middle were two stoves. The men slept in the bunks in their clothes.

I spent the entire summer in Zone D. The command viewed my work as worth a bonus of 100 rubles (ten after 1960) and gave me a written commendation "For Carrying Out the Assignment of the Navy Commander-in-Chief." In the autumn, I returned to Beluzhya. Regardless of the governmental announcement of the unilateral halting of nuclear testing, plans were being made for another series of explosions.

Over the summer, new buildings appeared there. A new command post was built as an underground shelter which could not be reached by daylight. There were ship doors and these closed airtight. Inside, there was everything necessary for a normal life over a long period of time.

I did not participate in the autumn exercises. I flew off to Vaygach Island in a twin-seat jet fighter in order during the hydrogen blasts to escort the foreign vessels along the Northern Seaway. But this was another story....

After completing my service I said that I had served on a minesweeper. My specialty was signals. This is what we were taught to say. It was only many years later that I told my wife and my children about my service.

Only in my dreams for long years did I relive what I had seen on Novaya Zemlya. For five or six years, I had the most terrible dreams with nuclear explosions. Life was now seemingly split into two parts: before the testing and after. My views about things changed and I had a certain new understanding of the world and myself in it.

Until recently, I still corresponded with many veterans from Novaya Zemlya. Then for various reasons the

correspondence halted. Their fate was not an enviable one. Some died, many had a bad family life with divorces, they drank and fell severely ill. I did not find any healthy ones.

I was very quick to feel the consequences of the testing. At the age of 19, upon being admitted to the navy underwater school, I underwent two strict medical exams. The conclusion of the commission was that I was "healthy!" At the age of 21, after the testing on Novaya Zemlya, I entered a naval school. I was rejected.

At the end of the 1970s, skin cancer was discovered and I had no doubt as to the reason of its occurrence. An operation was made. When at the oncological institute they asked me whether I had ever been involved with radioactive substances, I was forced to answer "no."

Why were we thrown out of the range, like unnecessary rubbish, with only the right to remain silent, even when dying? Why did they not monitor our health, and why did they not assign to medical facilities the personnel who had undergone many-score Chernobyls? They treated the experimental dogs in the interests of science. But they simply forgot about us, the irradiated sailors. We (because of secrecy) could not be mentioned.

In the last article by A.D. Sakharov published in the magazine TIME, it is stated that one megaton would carry off the lives of 10,000 people. This is not counting those who would fall ill. If one superimposes this figure on the 629 megatons detonated in the world, terrible figures are obtained!

We continue to pay a terrible price for the nuclear testing.

### **Krivosheyev on Anniversary of Start of Great Patriotic War**

91UM0733A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview, published under the heading "On the 50th Anniversary of the Start of the Great Patriotic War," with Colonel-General G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Major Yu. Rubtsov: "Once Again on the Price of Victory"]

[Text]

[Rubtsov] Grigoriy Fedotovitch [Krivosheyev], the reader might well be surprised that we are discussing the price of victory on the threshold not of its regular anniversary but rather the 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War. Here the logic is that both the defeats of the initial period and the subsequent victories of our Armed Forces have their roots in the eve of the war. I would like to hear your opinion: To what degree was the Red Army ready to repel Nazi aggression?

[Krivosheyev] On the eve of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces numbered 4,827,000 men. There were just 2.9 million men in the border military districts (the remainder were stationed in Siberia, in the Far East and along the southern frontiers of the nation). We had 56

divisions in our first echelon. This small-sized army took the blows of the aggressor's superior forces. On a number of sectors, the enemy in quantitative terms surpassed the Soviet troops by three- or four-fold. Can one assert here—and at present this is no rarity in the press—that we fought with numbers and not with ability? Of course, there was not always enough ability but the troops were clearly insufficient.

In terms of the number of tanks and combat aircraft, we were superior to the enemy. But far from all of the tanks and aircraft could oppose on equal footing the corresponding types of the enemy equipment. For example, of the 14,200 tanks located in the Western military districts, over 10,000 units were of obsolete design. Moreover, a significant portion needed major and medium overhauls. If one considers that the first unexpected attacks by the Nazi army in addition knocked out a large number of tanks and aircraft, it becomes clear that the numerical and qualitative superiority of the aggressor was strengthened.

By the start of the war, our troops lacked antitank and antiaircraft weapons. In conducting defensive engagements, the Soviet troops were almost unprotected against air strikes and enemy tank strikes. All of this caused the retreat and the high human and equipment losses.

[Rubtsov] Could you give certain concrete facts and figures?

[Krivosheyev] The General Staff archives contain documentary evidence of the heroic resistance by the Soviet troops and their difficult situation in which they found themselves in fighting against the numerically superior aggressor. For example, here is a report on the losses of the 34th Army of the Northwestern Front just for the period of 12 through 30 August 1941. Of the 4,434 commanders, 2,375 had been lost, some 4,565 out of the 7,764 of the junior command personnel and 25,929 out of the 42,714 Red Armymen. There were also great losses in equipment and weapons. Of the 83 light tanks, 74 had been knocked out, and of the 26 armored vehicles 24 had been abandoned on the battlefield. Of the 369 mortars, 349 had been lost, 600 out of the 629 medium machine guns, 782 out of the 900 light machine guns and 36 out of the 40 motorcycles. There were also losses in cannons, tractors, horses and so forth. Certainly in such a state the army was not combat worthy. Immediate reinforcements were required.

[Rubtsov] Does this not mean that all the same we were not ready for the war? The combat equipment was obsolete and the human resources had not been mobilized....

[Krivosheyev] Yes, the Red Army lacked much in order to stop the aggressor from entering the interior of the nation and defeating it in the border engagements. But this does not mean that the nation and the army were not prepared, as some assert, for the defensive or for repelling the aggressor.

The Soviet people were doing a great deal, for instance, to improve the physical plant of the Army and Navy. Even before the war, they began receiving the heavy KV tanks and the medium T-34 and these successfully fought the Nazi tanks of all types. The pilots were breaking in on new combat aircraft. The first models of rocket artillery were undergoing testing. Small arms were being modernized. However, the technical reequipping of the army had just gotten underway.

As for the prewar period, it is essential to bear in mind the complicated foreign policy situation in which the nation's security had to be secured. The Soviet Union had significantly improved its strategic position as a result of the liberation campaign into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia as well as after settling the conflict with Finland, and had provided conditions for better security in Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad and Murmansk.

So judge for yourself whether the nation had prepared itself for war against the aggressor or not. If all of these and other major measures of a foreign policy, economic and military nature had not been provided for and implemented, the outcome of the war would have been completely different with even greater losses and with severe consequences for the fate of our state.

There is the different issue that not everything was carried out at the designated time. The war caught the army in the stage of rearming. Moreover, serious errors had been committed in the organizational development of the army and in the placement of the troops as well as in personnel and technical policy and these impeded the course of the development and improvement of the Armed Forces on the eve of the war.

[Rubtsov] All of this ultimately was felt in the human losses, was it not? What were they in 1941 as well as over the entire war?

[Krivosheyev] It is never easy in a war, and the first months of the war, its first period were the most severe and at times tragic. This can be seen from the following proof of the difficult situation which had arisen on the front. On 8 September 1941, a telegram with the following content was received addressed to the USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Ye.A. Shchadenko: "Over the period of the recent fighting at Yelnya and Roslavl, units of the 24th and 43d Armies have suffered heavy casualties and I request that you as a top priority remand to me 25,000 reinforcements including, if it must be 40 percent unarmed. Zhukov." As you can see, the situation was such that even the arriving reinforcements were brought up to strength on the spot.

Just from June through December 1941, the Red Army and Navy lost 3,138,000 men killed, dying from wounds, captured and missing in action, and 1,336,000 men were wounded, with concussions or sick. At the same time, there was a significant attrition in combat equipment. Deliveries to the front declined as many defense plants had been evacuated to the eastern regions of the nation

and had not yet begun to produce. But the courage and heroism of the Soviet troops could not make up for the shortage of tanks and aircraft, guns and automatic weapons.

However, the Nazi invasion had to be halted at whatever the cost. The divisions and drafts of reinforcements arriving on the front went straight into battle. Of the 10 million men called up during the first eight months of the war, three million were sent immediately to the front. And in the subsequent years, of the 10.5-11.5 million men under arms, one-half (5-6.5 million men) was fighting as part of the active Army and Navy.

The total killed and missing personnel over the war (killed, dying from wounds and sickness, killed in accidents, not returning from captivity and missing) were 8.6 million men. Some 3.8 million men were demobilized due to injury and illness and of this number 2.6 million became disabled. Each year, some 4-5 million sick and wounded were in hospitals for treatment and by the end of the war over one million persons remained there.

[Rubtsov] But certain publications have given other figures. On 30 April, for example, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published "its own" data on the human casualties....

[Krivosheyev] No one would deny that the author of the youth newspaper, Candidate of Historical Sciences B. Sokolov, in reflecting on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, has the right to look for the truth. However, one is struck by the fact that the search is not based upon the historical, archival documents. The author's "discoveries" are based on the chief argument that "I feel that." But, if you please, where is the science here?

Because of my official position, I have been directly involved with an analysis and generalization of the data concerning the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, armed conflicts and border clashes. For this reason, I consider it my duty to state that on the General Staff the human and equipment losses during the war of 1941-1945 have been established on the basis of archival documents. A special commission has been working on this. At present, the figures have been published in the press. We have given some of them here.

On what have we relied in our figures? Primarily on the reports from the fronts. Moreover, we know the size of the armies during one or another period, the number of divisions arriving at the front from the interior districts and the volume of the drafts of recruits. This also provides an opportunity to determine the losses on the front. Here guessing is superfluous. The losses cannot exceed the number of troops. Even Shota Rustaveli, not without irony, noted that you cannot pour out of a jug any more than is in it.

I would also wish to refute the forced conclusion by the author in the designated article of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the unnecessariness of the sacrifices suffered by our people. Is it possible to see in the patriotic,

truly all-people's struggle against the enemy merely the "military efforts" of the Stalinist system? Or what was D. Zarubin after and whose letter has been published here? By his rhetorical questions of "did not both peoples suffer from their 'leaders' equally? Yes, the Nazis were beasts but weren't there also beasts among us?" does he not in the popular mind equate the aggressor and its victim and place on them essentially the same responsibility for starting the war and for the suffering and grief brought about by it?

This is wrong. It is blasphemous in terms of the memory of those who fell on the battlefields. I would like to say to everyone who becomes involved in such a delicate matter as the price of our victory: In manipulating the figures of the losses, let us not forget that behind each of them is someone's grandfather, father or brother.... They are our own Soviet people.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the start of the war, we bow our heads and colors to their memory.



### Aid to Kabul Viewed Hindrance to USSR Southern Border Security

91UM0789A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian  
No 25, Jun 91 pp 24-25

[Article by Irina Lagunina: "Friendly"]

[Text] An Afghan aircraft of Soviet manufacture released its bombs in the USSR. Can border security be achieved if there is a war going on next door?

The bombing in Tajikistan was not the first. A similar incident occurred, for example, shortly after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. An Afghan aircraft of Soviet manufacture overflew our border at that time—just as freely, just as totally unnoticed—and dropped its bombs on the Tajik city of Khorog. A tragic accident, from which people died. Two years ago this incident was kept secret. But the press wrote about the Tajik village of Namadguti Poyen....

The Su-25 aircraft was in good shape and was being flown by an experienced pilot—deputy commander of the air force. What messed him up was the fact that the infrequent villages, scattered in the mountains on both sides of the border, are very hard to make out from the air. Such tragic accidents may happen more or less often in spite of the desires of the Afghan Government. And, consequently, our constant feeding of this war with weapons is not achieving its purpose—not safeguarding Soviet people's tranquillity. Why, then, is the Soviet Union supplying them? Proposition No. 1. It is necessary for the security of the borders.

Kabul is speaking increasingly less often about the Soviet people's fraternal assistance to the Afghan people. The ideological motives of "international duty" are becoming a thing of the past also. They are coming to be replaced by the strict demands of the two countries' state interests. President Najibullah tells Soviet journalists: "Fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers died in Afghanistan, and I sympathize with the grief of their mothers. But how much Soviet blood will be spilled if Hekmatyar raises up Soviet Muslims?"

The present Kabul government is undertaking to safeguard the stability and security of the Soviet Union's southern borders. Geopolitical, military, ideological. The bombing of Soviet territory by an Afghan pilot proves that no government of Afghanistan can guarantee the tranquillity of the Soviet southern borders while there is a war going on in Afghanistan itself.

In 1990 Soviet military supplies to Afghanistan ran to \$3.4 billion (according to figures of the U.S. State Department). This is approximately \$300 million a month. But we should not rush to conclusions as to how much Afghanistan is costing the Soviet Government and its people. There are two explanations as to why such active arms supplies are beneficial to our country. Moscow assures us that it is not giving the weapons but selling them. On credit. And some day, when the situation in the neighboring country is stable and Afghanistan itself becomes an economically prosperous and thriving

country, as was the case prior to the Soviet invasion, the Soviet Union will receive what it is owed.

The second explanation. According to Western assumptions, Afghanistan does not owe the Soviet Union anything for its weapons because it is paying for them in full. The West is saying that not all the uranium mines are under the control of the mujahidin....

Which explanation is the correct one is an official secret. But they both ultimately come to the same thing—it is beneficial to Moscow to support precisely the current government in Afghanistan. But what about the moral and ethical aspect of this support?

It would be blasphemous to write about Soviet weapons in Afghanistan only because they have accidentally been dropped on our territory. People in the neighboring country are dying from them daily.... I do not rule out the fact that, had it not dropped its bombs on us, the Afghan Su-25 would have bombed those same Tajiks, only several kilometers from the Soviet border. And it is perfectly probable that there also they would have hit not the "enemy" but the same peaceful population as with us, only even poorer and tormented by perennial starvation.

Bombing accuracy depends both on the skill of the pilot and on how far he has been able to descend. Descending is risky. A desire to drop one's bombs without descending sometimes leads to unexpected results. During an attempted military coup last year in Afghanistan on the part of former Defense Minister Tanai none of the bombs dropped on Kabul fell either on Amin's palace or on the building of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee [PDPA], at which the putschists were aiming. But two fell quite close to the Soviet Embassy....

This applies not only to Afghanistan, come to that. A French doctor once told me that, together with Soviet medical personnel, he was bombed by Soviet MiG's in Chad. Because the bombing was inaccurate, they were all spared.

But I shall leave aside the military skill of those to whom the Soviet Union sells arms and whom it trains in their use. We shuddered at the fact that an Su-25 strayed off course and dropped its bombs other than where it had been ordered. I am not speaking about this specific instance, but in principle such things involving our weapons happen not that infrequently—on account of their technical specifications. If not the aircraft, then certainly with the missiles. The Soviet Union does not supply Afghanistan with the latest arms—such trade is becoming even more profitable to Moscow for this reason. The operational-tactical Scud missiles, for example, which Afghan inhabitants call the "retribution of Allah," are in Afghanistan first-generation; Iraq, incidentally, was supplied with a more up-to-date modification. It is altogether impossible to accurately target the Scuds which the USSR sells to Kabul: the emphasis has to be put on the yield of the warhead. The monstrous fiery arrow, slicing the air with a savage roar, dislodges,

when it hits, several meters of rock. Some 1,554 such missiles have been fired in Afghanistan since the withdrawal of Soviet forces. How many peaceful inhabitants have suffered?

Some people in Kabul told me about the following "amusing" occurrence. The person telling me this was in fact smiling. "Ereski" [as transliterated] would periodically be fired at Kabul from a village in the mountains overlooking the capital. The authorities became sick of this and decided to fire off a Scud. The missile did not hit the village, but elders came from the village to Najibullah and requested that he send no more such missiles, from which people could become deaf. They, in turn, promised never again to fire at Kabul or allow others to do so....

But I will return to the security of our southern borders, which Najibullah promises the Soviet people. Why was it possible for an aircraft for the umpteenth time to cross the border from Afghanistan totally undetected? The more so in that this border is a special-control zone. Was the aircraft intruder criminal negligence on the part of national air defense?

Two years ago an unmanned Soviet MiG accidentally flew to Belgium and there came down. Responding to the question of how the military authorities of what was still at that time the GDR could have failed to have spotted our aircraft, the Soviet military gave a very odd answer and revealed a monstrous military secret: The aircraft had been spotted in the GDR, but inasmuch as it was flying with the same Identification Friend or Foe identification signals as the Soviet MiG's in Germany also, the alarm was not sounded—no German Soviet MiG was missing, and Berlin thought that the radars had made a mistake. Why had the Su-25 flying past not been noticed on the Soviet-Afghan border? Was it also flying with Soviet identification signals? This is only an assumption. But it seems to me that our military should explain the odd circumstance. After all, whereas earlier we might have feared only accidental bombs from Kabul pilots, the situation has now changed. Following their victory in Khost, the mujahidin now have both their own airfield, which they did not have before, and aircraft, which they captured during the offensive. Military aircraft of Soviet manufacture. Of course, it is unlikely that they would decide to bomb Soviet territory, but it is also true that as long as the USSR is supplying Kabul with weapons, the mujahidin will hardly have particularly warm feelings toward the Soviet Union.

Demanding that we not terminate military assistance, we are being intimidated with the Islamic factor—the threat of the unification of all Muslims in the struggle for world domination—a disease which could infect our Soviet Muslims also. An argument being used one after the other by both the government in Kabul and the government in Moscow. And Moscow, it seems, is reserving it exclusively for "internal use," what is more—as a means of persuading its own people.

But why is our government so worried that Soviet Muslims might align themselves with a mujahidin jihad? Where does such total distrust of tens of millions of fellow citizens come from? Our country is practically ignorant of what is meant by Islam in Afghanistan, which is largely dissimilar to Islam in the Near East states. When people speak of the Islamic factor, there instantly surfaces in the memory a picture of millions-strong demonstrations—crowds excitedly chanting in front of the portrait of this Great Leader or the other. I have difficulty imagining such a picture in Afghanistan with its tribal fragmentation, its small subsistence farms, and its traditional respect for elders and authorities, and where Islam is a way of life shaped down the ages of the tribe, the family, the home.... So how to explain, for example, from the viewpoint of notions current in our country the fact that several hundred mujahidin at the start of this year set off for Saudi Arabia to defend Kuwait against Iraqi aggression? In other words, we were in the same camp with them. Yet certain Soviet deputies who spoke in the Kremlin at that time are in another. After all, their calls for the Kuwait question to be solved in tandem with the Palestinian question and their references to the fact that "our Muslims will not understand or accept anything else" in fact worked against the anti-Husayn coalition. Simultaneously with the debate on Iraq in the Soviet parliament the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial office received a letter from an inhabitant of a small village in Tajikistan. He wrote: There are values common to all mankind, and the aggressor should be punished, and we should not be giving him such strange support in the form of the Palestinian question....

The war in Afghanistan and the involvement in it of the Soviet Army led to our country's estrangement from the Muslim world. This impoverished not only the country as a whole but primarily the Soviet Central Asian republics. Only now have they begun with difficulty to restore their relations with their neighbors. This development should not be hampered by strange arguments about the Islamic factor.

This very theory has emerged and gained currency precisely when all other ideological justifications of Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan have disappeared.

Both the Bible and the Koran call primarily for philanthropy, but our generals do not study the Koran. But had they done so, they would, perhaps, have understood that the differences which have been imposed on the peoples' mentality, culture, traditions, and customs by different religions are not a pretext for arms supplies to another country.

It is possible to trace stage by stage how the Soviet Government has been justifying its military supplies to Afghanistan at the international level also. Proposals that they be terminated were initially answered with a refusal on the grounds that the United States was supplying the mujahidin with weapons. Then there came from the West a proposal contained in the "negative

symmetry" formula—a gradual and proportional reduction in the military supplies of the United States and the USSR to Afghanistan. To which the Soviet side responded with the devastating argument that the United States was aiding the rebels and that this aid was illegal. We, on the other hand, are helping the legitimate government on legitimate grounds. Arms trade at the official state level is not prohibited in any international documents, and we will, therefore, continue to trade. The arguments that a civil war was being fought in Afghanistan had no effect.

This May the U.S. Congress decided that monies would no longer be allocated from the budget for support of the mujahidin. The period of official U.S. financial assistance to the Afghan resistance is over. Washington has recognized that the best method of settling the Afghan crisis is to allow the Afghans to solve their problems themselves. I can imagine what the response of the Soviet side will be: The United States is a long way away from Afghanistan, but for us it is a neighbor, and the mujahidin are receiving arms from Saudi Arabia and Iran so we cannot abandon our friends, who to a considerable extent suffered from our military presence in the past decade.

But so much has changed in recent years, particularly after Iraq. It is possible, apparently, to establish relations even with Saudi Arabia and to conduct a normal, civilized dialogue with Iran. A month ago the UN secretary general proposed a version of a political settlement in Afghanistan—a mechanism of a possible dialogue. Three weeks ago Angola showed that in any situation political methods of a solution of conflicts are more effective than military methods. Requests for the Afghans to be left alone, if the world community wants peace in this country, are ultimately being conveyed from Afghanistan. The proposal came not from Kabul, it is true, but from field commander Ahmed Shah Masood, a leader of the resistance.

The Soviet Union could increase humanitarian assistance and could develop trade with Afghanistan without completely ignoring the mujahidin here. But instead it is continuing to supply arms to Kabul, closing off to itself very many opportunities for securing its southern borders against unpleasant surprises. Perhaps the aircraft which accidentally dropped its bombs in the USSR will help us understand this.

### Polish Military Reform Viewed

91UM0702A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
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[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel M. Kireyev and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Petrukhin, Northern Group of Forces: "The Polish Army: Reform Continues"]

[Text] The radical socio-political changes that have been taking place in Poland are also rendering considerable influence on the Polish Army. Within the next few months, the Republic of Poland Ministry of Defense, which has been cut in half, will be headed by a civilian.

The minister will implement governmental decisions and represent the military in the National Security Council. In direct charge of military problem resolution in the ministry will be the inspector general, who is the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. In the event of war, he will assume the functions of commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces. In addition, it is planned to introduce into the General Staff structure a staff for strategic planning and organization of the Armed Forces, combat training and rear services inspectorates and a number of directorates (for personnel, finance, etc.).

Abolishment of the Warsaw Pact military structures has been associated with extensive review of the Republic of Poland's military doctrine. Poland has shifted from a coalition defense concept to a policy of "armed neutrality," one that assumes "equal proximity" relative to its relations with various countries of Europe and the world, while maintaining a strong military capability of its own. In the area of international security guarantees, Poland is inclined to travel this route via bilateral agreement based on military cooperation. Present day Poland's principal task under these conditions is "assurance of territorial integrity, independence and total sovereignty."

An important condition for the resolution of this problem, in the opinion of First Deputy Chief of the Polish Army General Staff, Division General F. Pukhala, is uniform distribution of the Armed Forces throughout the country. He has stated that the existing disproportion—40 percent of troops in western Poland, 35 percent in the central part and 25 percent in the east—has come about as a result of the former bloc doctrine, which causes Western neighbors to suffer "fears relative to the intent of such grouping."

The above served as the basis for initiating troop displacement from west to east. The extremely high cost of the operation (in excess of one trillion zlotys to move a single division) has prompted a decision to make changes in the degree of deployment of units and large units in the eastern part of the country along with the troop transfer. In this light, two logistical and technical support facilities located at Lublin and Rzeszow, which were converted from mechanized divisions, will assume their previous status of combined-arms large units.

Plans call for dividing the country into four military districts. In addition to the existing Pomoze and Slask districts, replacing the Warsaw District will be two new eastern ones: the Mazury and Malopolska districts. The district commanders will also be in charge of areas which in wartime will be the sites of deployment of four combined-arms armies. The military districts will differ largely in troop makeup and number of units and large units. In addition, Poland's geographic location is serving as a prompt to station a mountain infantry brigade in the south and a coastal defense brigade in the north.

The creation of the two eastern districts in the immediate proximity of the Soviet borders, with at least a

doubling of troop strength, has more behind it than the mere "equalization of disproportions." As emphasized in the Polish press, this particular decision is dictated by "the unstable political situation in the USSR and worsening of a plausible threat ... emanating from the western Soviet republics." The newspaper RSECZ POSPOLITA has reported that the Republic of Poland General Staff has already been tasked with devising an operational plan—to be completed by the middle of this year—calling for reinforcement of the eastern border "to counter uncontrolled migration out of the Soviet Union." With this in mind, the concept involves providing the border area with protection in the form of engineer reinforcement. Also in the offing is the creation of "quick reaction forces" under control of central authority capable of rapid deployment to any location in the country in the event of a critical situation.

All the Army's organizational structures are being restructured. The Air Force and Air Defense Troops are being combined into a single service. Operational-tactical formations are undergoing conversion to large units; a number of divisions into regiments or logistical and technical support facilities; and about 50 units disbanded. Large amounts of obsolescent weapons and other materiel have been taken out of service.

The advent of a noncommunist government in Poland is associated with relentless elimination of the party setup in the Polish Army. Political organ structures have been thrown out; many political workers discharged; and former members of the PZPR subjected to persecution. This kind of activity is continuing. It is being helped along by the political struggle raging in society over the infamous law on "decommunization." As reported in the newspaper RZECZ POSPOLITA, V. Bogachik, a functionary of the civilian committee Solidarity, demanded that about 40 percent of Polish Army officers be "removed" as having been befouled by "their membership in the PZPR and acting as KGB collaborators." In his letter to the newspaper POLSKA ZBROJNA, former political worker Colonel R. Kholosynyuk used the title "Return to the Middle Ages" to describe a plan to submit training officers to testing designed to elicit the extent of their involvement in the Communist Party.

Unfortunately, the above leads to rapidly implanting in the minds of Polish servicemen dominant concepts of antisocialist ideology. It amounts to a confirmation of Republic of Poland President L. Walesa's saying that the Polish Army of the past years was "like a radish: red only on the outside." Contacts with the Soviet Army, especially the Northern Group of Forces, are being terminated. Soviet-Polish brotherhood is being permitted to lapse, the history of our relations given a one-sided treatment. Traditions of the Polish bourgeois Army are being instituted; the former glories of Polish weapons, particularly those of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-1921, extolled.

Thus, the decision the country's Defense Committee made in November of 1988 relative to Polish Army reform is enjoying vigorous implementation. As if that

were not enough, the plan being implemented is a far cry from the one that was devised three years ago.

### **Maj-Gen Kirilenko on Causes of Iraqi Defeat**

91UM0723C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by Major-General G. Kirilenko: "Who Succumbed in Desert Storm, Saddam Husayn or Soviet Military Equipment?"]

[Text] Following the cease-fire on Iraq's southern border, people in the West—and even in our press—began saying that Saddam Husayn's defeat was in great part a defeat for Soviet equipment.

Iraq had a powerful army, with a superiority of almost 1.5-fold in tanks over the multinational forces. His defeat in the war came as no surprise to anyone, including Husayn. Today, it is not just the military experts who understand that modern armies rely primarily on the latest scientific and technological achievements. The number of barrels and ammunition, aircraft and bombs is no longer the most important factor. It is the computers which control them, the communications which make it possible to direct the troops on the battlefield, the reconnaissance and concealment assets which reveal the enemy's positions and conceal one's own.

With their overwhelming superiority in radioelectronic warfare personnel and equipment, the USA and its allies could achieve operational surprise. The role of the press should also be noted. It performed a role in the conflict, if not that of a branch of the armed forces, at least as large as that of a troop arm.

In its reports on the large number of Iraqi prisoners, the American press "forgot" to state that the first line was manned by militia divisions and the second by reserve divisions, that only the third line of defense on Iraqi territory was manned by formations of regular forces and the Republican Guard. The American professionals therefore routed mainly militia and reserve divisions, not regular forces.

Nor did the Western press report on a counterattack by two Iraqi tank divisions which resulted in the loss of more than 70 M1 Abrams tanks for the Americans.

It should probably be pointed out to the Western press that Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel involved individual missiles and were not massive missile attacks, that they were mainly for political, and not military, purposes, and that only because of this was their destruction by American Patriot missiles relatively effective. Incidentally, the U.S. Congress did not share the ecstasy expressed in the American press at the success of the Patriot missiles, but only expressed concern about the fact that three or four American Patriot missiles were launched for every Scud shot down.

The reader would probably like to know that a Syrian division with Soviet equipment (T-62 tanks from the



'60s) executed a 250-kilometer move to the buildup area for the multinational forces and lost only one tank and one infantry combat vehicle of technical causes. The equipment on the American Abrams tank in the same Arabian Desert conditions proved to be considerably inferior and immediately became a subject of attention and concern on the part of the U.S. tank industry.

It is at the very least naive to compare Soviet and American equipment on the professional level from the results of the combat operations in Iraq. This is why. In the first place, the coalition grouping, while inferior to Iraq in numbers of tanks, had almost a 2-fold superiority in aircraft and an absolute superiority in naval forces. It is also important to note that the size of the multinational force's air forces exceeded the air defense capabilities of Iraq's armed forces many times over.

Saddam Husayn had an abundance of equipment: French, German and, of course, ours. The SAM-2 surface-to-air missile system, for example, was used to cover important facilities, as were the Osa and Kvadrat. The air defenses of the ground forces included the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, the Strela-10 and the mobile Strela-3 surface-to-air missile systems. These weapons, particularly the Osa and Kvadrat, have great combat capabilities. According to information obtained by Soviet military specialists, however (this was stated by Col V. Suzdaltsev, deputy chief of staff of Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces, in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview, among others), these systems were practically not used. With respect to the SAM-2, as it is called in the West, it is simply the "granddaddy" of the air defense forces and has already been removed from our arsenal.

Despite the overwhelming superiority of the multinational forces, however, the Iraqis still shot down 68 of the enemy's planes and 29 helicopters.

As a result of the massive raids, Iraq's air defense ceased to exist as a system, which accounts for the bombings of Baghdad and Basra. Incidentally, even the most modern French systems possessed by Iraq, the Crotale and Roland, were also silent. I mention this to show that it was not a matter of deficiencies of our weapons; the foreign weapons were also ineffective.

The only valid criticism is the fact that we lag behind the West in the development of electronics. The solution lies in the development of new weapons exclusively on a competitive basis. The national defense is a victim of our industry's monopolistic nature.

There were other causes of Iraq's defeat in addition to these.

Lack of an automated troop command and control system, as well as the poor professional training of Iraq's air force, prevented it from taking full advantage of the capabilities of the equipment it did possess. I would mention also the fact that the modern models of Soviet weapons were not used in the combat operations.

In the third place, while Iraq did not have even automated command and control equipment, the coalition's forces had the unique opportunity to make extensive use of American space assets to enhance their reconnaissance, communications, troop command and control.

Even though almost all the military experts and political commentators predicted Iraq's defeat, most of them were totally unprepared for the weak resistance offered by its armed forces. Many of them were also surprised not so much by the numbers killed as by the numbers who surrendered. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the USA was able to put Iraq's air defenses out of action almost entirely and to gain complete dominance of the air, thereby discombobulating and demoralizing the groupings of Iraqi armed forces. And then, the absence of a stable logistics system undermined the already poor morale of the soldiers. After six weeks of half-starving in defensive trenches under direct fire from an enemy with absolute air superiority, the soldiers were approaching physical exhaustion. The withdrawal of Iraqi troops to Kuwait was not done for tactical or operational considerations, as stated in the Western press, but because Iraq's troops had gone three days without water, five days without food.

The strategic errors entailed also operational and tactical mistakes. In modern warfare one cannot expect even temporary success by relying solely on large numbers of weapons and military equipment. One must have personnel capable of creating air and antiaircraft defense, reconnaissance, troop command and control systems with this equipment. Basing his actions on experience in the static war against Iran, S. Husayn clearly underestimated the capabilities of the grouping facing him, which differed fundamentally in composition and technical equipment. On the open desert terrain he actually set up his troops as targets for the enemy. As a result, what had to happen did happen.

### Post-War Near East Balance of Power

91UM0723B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Jun 91 First edition p 5

[Answer to reader's question under the rubric "From Qualified Sources": "Who Is the Most Powerful in the Near East"]

**[Text] The balance of power changed following Iraq's total defeat. Please report the basic data on the numerical strength of the armed forces of nations in this region.—Sh. Zhalolov, Namangan Oblast**

The experts estimate that between 30 and 40 Iraqi divisions were destroyed in the war in the Persian Gulf. The multinational forces destroyed more than 2,800 of Iraq's 5,500 tanks, more than 2,000 of 3,000 artillery pieces and around 100 of 550 combat aircraft. Another 130 of the latter flew to Iran.

The table below contains the basic figures for the armed forces of other nations in the region.

	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Iran
Size of armed forces (thousands of men)	450	140*	400	600
Including ground forces	320	105*	300	305
Armaments				
—Tanks	2,425	3,800	4,050	500
—Combat planes	520	580	500	120
—Combat helicopters	70	80	110	

\*When a mobilization is announced, the numerical strength is increased to 600,000 men, including as many as 590,000 ground troops.

This reply is based on data from the foreign press and the reference book "Military Balance."

### Gulf War: Role of Special Operations

91UM0723A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Jun 91 First edition p 5

[Report by TASS correspondent D. Klimentov under the rubric "The Gulf War: Lessons and Conclusions": "Special Forces Mount the Attack"]

[Text] New York, 10 June—According to the weekly magazine NEWSWEEK, operations by American special forces determined in great part the outcome of the recent war in the Persian Gulf region.

According to the magazine, the contribution made by U.S. special forces participating in the war is practically unknown to the general public. In fact, even the first large-scale air attack would have been impossible without their participation. Reconnaissance satellites had gathered information on Iraq's air defenses over a period of several months but were still unable to find flaws in it. Literally a few days before combat operations began, Gen N. Shwarzkopf, commander of American forces in the area of the conflict, authorized a clandestine operation to destroy Iraq's two main radar centers. At

02:20 on the night of 17 January two helicopter groups crossed Iraq's border. They were specially equipped to prevent their detection by enemy radar. The two thoroughly guarded Iraqi air defense centers were destroyed with missiles. An armada of bombers surged into the air corridor formed.

The Voice of the Gulf, the radio station of the U.S. Army's psychological warfare forces, regularly reported which enemy subunit would be the target of the next bombing attack.

The magazine also cites examples of other successful operations conducted by special forces in the recent war. Six servicemen from a subunit of the U.S. Navy's Seals were landed on the coast of Kuwait prior to the beginning of the ground offensive, for example, and succeeded in creating the impression of a large naval landing. The Iraqis hastily transferred sizeable forces to this area, while the allies effected the main strike at an entirely different location. Several groups of Green Berets were dropped into Iraq itself prior to the beginning of combat operations. Some of them were practically within a hundred kilometers of Baghdad and transmitted information on movements of Iraqi forces by satellite. A Delta group dropped into Iraq carried out a series of attacks on command posts, missile fuel storage facilities and other facilities, reported movements of missile launchers and summoned aircraft.

The special forces in the U.S. armed forces presently number 45,000 men, NEWSWEEK states.

They are all subordinate to the command element for special operations based in Tampa, Florida. At a time when allocations are being cut for certain military programs in the USA, according to NEWSWEEK, the budget for this command element is growing and currently amounts to around 2.2 billion dollars. The weekly magazine states that, with the end of the cold war, most military conflicts will most likely be small-scale and occur in Third World countries.

### Conversion Plans No Solution for Naval Ship Repair Yards

91UM0738A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Captain 3d Rank V. Maryukha: "Who Will Rebuild the Tanks? Cooperative Members Have Proposed That Certain Types of Vehicles for the National Economy be Produced at the Ship Repair Yards. Is This Advisable?"]

[Text] On 22 January 1991, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the heading "The Navy Today and Tomorrow" published materials entitled "Conversion, the Market and Ship Repairs" and which brought up the question of the calamitous situation in the navy ship repair enterprises which have been virtually idled due to the cutback in funds allocated for defense and a decline in the number of orders. It was precisely the difficulties of the ship repair yards (SRZ) which attracted the attention of cooperative members from Kiev. The Design Cooperative [PKK] Orbita at the Kiev Stroydormash [Construction and Road Machinery] Plant not only agreed to familiarize the editors with their plans for "rescuing" the Navy's ship repair facilities but also invited the author of the article to personally visit the enterprise and be convinced of the optimality of the proposed solutions. The most intriguing in this invitation was the fact that among the other development plans of the cooperative there was also room for emergency rescue facilities. The navy, like, incidentally, other structures, is experiencing an acute shortage of rescue equipment.

In actuality, the caterpillar emergency rescue equipment developed at the design bureau of the Stroydormash Plant and improved by the cooperative designers in their off-time has interested numerous organizations and departments, including within the Ministry of Defense. The articles based on the BAT-M tracklayer and also developed here were used in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Now would they be superfluous in the organizational structure of the troop units, particularly in area with difficult terrain and where the servicemen are engaged in building roads and participate in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and accidents. However, the Ministry of Defense is not so rich to permit itself to purchase a large number of such vehicles, particularly with the inevitable "cooperative" surcharge. And already, because of the increased prices, the military was forced to reduce their orders by 5-7 percent for the basic types of products produced by Stroydormash and for the army this was road construction and engineer equipment.

The tax policy which has forced the cooperatives to increase the rates for their products significantly and greatly obstructs collaboration between the "civilized cooperative members" and the military department. For this reason, at the PKK Orbita attention was drawn to the article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The plan was a simple one: would the minister of defense prohibit his

central body in its request to receive several hundred tanks which were to be decommissioned in line with the reduction in conventional weapons in Europe for their subsequent refitting and sale in the national economy? In this instance the cost of the equipment would be sharply reduced (it would not be necessary to manufacture the chassis with engines for the equipment as on the tanks these are well made and reliable), the cooperative would earn a decent amount sufficient for a fair existence while work with guaranteed payment would be provided for the idled production capacity at the ship repair yards and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would receive a certain percentage of the profits for middleman services.

Enticing? And how if one considers that there are already purchasers for such vehicles? For example, a telex has arrived from Norilsk with a request to provide information on the composition of the tracked emergency rescue equipment and the possibility of deliveries. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy has shown an interest in yet another modification, a tracked snow removal vehicle, the SVT. The PKK Orbita has other requests for development. The additional funds would not hurt not only the ship repair workers but also KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as the prices grow significantly faster than the income. But, unfortunately, these plans, to put it mildly, are unrealistic.

The converting of a ship repair yard to produce even tracked snow removal equipment and rescue facilities needed by the national economy is tantamount to the already existing examples of restructuring military plants to produce metal mesh for beds. With a reasonable approach to conversion, it will be possible to find work for the ship repair workers including from repairing ships of the merchant and fishing fleets to the building of small barges for transporting various freight. In other words, the conversion process should not disrupt the already established potential for shipbuilding and ship repairs. It would be equally unreasonable to squander the experience gained by the tank builders. They have plans in hand for reequipping the former fighting vehicles into a peacetime product. Incidentally, this is how Stroydormash proceeded as well, having purchased a portion of the obsolete cable layers in the troops and having modernized and resold them to interested civilian departments and firms. They intend to proceed in a similar manner with the tracked tractor units being decommissioned, in equipping them as inspection vehicles for the oil field workers in Tyumen.

As it turns out, the tank builders have no reason to merely set out to implement the plans of the cooperative members. Their own scientific research institutes are loaded much below their capabilities due to the lack of funds in the military budget and the tank plants have simply nothing to reequip. According to the conditions of the Vienna Agreements, an absolute majority of the tanks to be reduced is to be melted down. The remaining portion of the equipment to be decommissioned can be completely reequipped by the tank builders themselves and plants similar to Stroydormash, without resorting to

the services of the ship repair workers. In addition, intermediaries are not required, even those such as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Of course, the national economy needs the BAT, the SVT and the tracked emergency rescue equipment just as it does the other developments of the Orbita Cooperative

now protected by certificates of invention. However, these should appear on the consumer market without an eye on the off chance of difficulties in the transitional period. This should be done not to disrupt the already acquired experience in many industrial sectors but rather for developing and adding to this for the common good and for benefit for oneself.



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